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ABSTRACT 
ECONOMIC REFORMS IN EAST AFRICAN COUNTRIES:  
THE IMPACT ON GOVERNMENT REVENUE AND PUBLIC INVESTMENT  
 
MAY 2009 
ADAM BENI SWEBE MWAKALOBO 
 
BSc., SOKOINE UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE, TANZANIA 
MSc. SOKOINE UNIVERSITY OF AGRICULTURE, TANZANIA 
MA., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Professors James Boyce and Léonce Ndikumana  
 
In the empirical literature on the revenue consequences of trade liberalization, most 
studies have focused on cross-country analysis. Because these studies are static in nature, they 
have not addressed the short-run and long-run dynamic public revenue and public investment 
consequences of economic reforms in developing countries. This dissertation contributes to the 
literature employing a dynamic time series analysis of the three East African countries-Tanzania, 
Kenya and Uganda. The dissertation uses a co-integration and error-correction framework to 
distinguish between short-run and long-run relationships.  
The results indicate that trade reforms in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda had varying 
impacts on government revenue, tax performance and public investment spending in these three 
countries. It is demonstrated that trade reforms had adverse impact on government revenue in 
Uganda, but not in Tanzania and Kenya. The results also show that Tanzania has had the weakest 
overall tax revenue and public investment. Poor tax performance and erratic revenue generation 
have been problems in all three countries, contributing to adverse impacts on public investment 
spending.   
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation is an empirical investigation on the fiscal impact of trade liberalization. 
Notwithstanding the proliferation of theoretical and empirical literature analyzing the 
consequences of trade liberalization on government revenue, existing evidence has yielded mixed 
conclusions. Some studies indicate that trade liberalization has not contributed to a fiscal squeeze 
in developing countries (Ebrill et al. 1999; DeRosa et al. 2002; Castrol et al. 2004; 
Hatzipanayotou et al. 1994; Falvey, 1994; Lyakurwa, 1993; Basu and Morrissey, 1997; Ayoki et 
al., 2005; Agbeyegbe et al., 2006; Muriithi and Moyi, 2003), whereas other studies point to 
negative fiscal effects of trade liberalization (Rao, 1999; Khattry and Rao, 2002; Grunberg, 1998; 
Baunsgaard and Keen, 2005; Emran and Stiglitz, 2003; Emran, 2005; UNECA, 2004b).  
The discrepancies in the findings on fiscal impact of trade liberalization could partly be 
attributable to the fact that countries differ in many respects, including their economic structure, 
trade regime, macroeconomic environment, political economy, and the mix of protective policies 
and revenue mobilization (Teera and Hudson, 2004; Randolph et al., 1996; Sturm, 2001; Clement 
et al., 2003; Dreher et al., 2006; Kumar et al., 2007; Gupta et al., 2003; Gupta et al., 2002; 2005; 
Mackenzie and Orsmond, 1996; Roy et al., 2006).  
Therefore, in order to understand the fiscal impact of trade liberalization and its 
implications for public investment in different countries and regions, each country or trade bloc 
must be studied separately. This study is an attempt to contribute to this debate, by analyzing the 
fiscal impact of trade liberalization and its implications for public investment (in physical and 
social infrastructure) in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda.  
Despite on-going unresolved debates about the fiscal impact of trade liberalization, many 
African countries and other parts of the developing world are liberalizing their trade and 
streamlining tariff regimes. The wave of economic integration is premised on the belief that trade 
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liberalization promotes economic growth. It is argued that removing trade barriers and 
harmonizing trade policies will enlarge export markets, increase competition, allow countries to 
exploit economies of scale and permit them to specialize in production of goods and services best 
suited to their resources and factor endowments (UNECA, 2004a; Choudhri et al. 2006).  
 While the potential benefits of trade liberalization have proven elusive in Africa, 
relatively little research has been carried out on its potential costs arising from the fiscal impacts 
of reduced revenues from trade taxes. In the theoretical literature, trade taxes are generally 
considered highly distortionary, with a high economic or efficiency cost per unit of tax revenue. 
Higher tariffs also create incentives for importers to evade tariffs legally by seeking exemptions, 
or illegally by smuggling, both of which impair revenue mobilization. In theory, lower tariffs may 
even lead to an increase in the tax base by lowering the marginal benefit to avoiding taxation, 
hence bringing a rise in revenue after liberalizing trade (Schade, 2005; Zafar, 2005; Elborgh-
Woytek et al. 2006).  Furthermore, there has long been a widespread view that less developed 
countries can offset tariff revenue losses by expanding their domestic tax base (Mitra, 1990; 
Falvey, 1994; Hatzpanayotou et al. 1994; Lyakurwa, 1993; Grunberg, 1998; Keen and Ligthart, 
2002; Jenkins and Khadka, 2000; Pelzman and Shoham, 2006; Basu and Morrissey, 1997; 
Muriithi and Moyi, 2003; Ayoki et al. 2005; Elborgh-Woytek et al. 2006).  
In practice, however, alternative sources of tax revenue are not easily forthcoming in 
these countries. Structural characteristics in less developed countries (LDCs), combined with 
weak tax administration, arguably limit the ability of these countries to raise taxes from 
alternative domestic sources (Khattry, 2003; Khattry and Rao, 2002; Rao, 1999; Emran and 
Stiglitz, 2004; 2005). The most popular alternative “domestic” tax source is the value-added-tax 
(VAT). Yet it has been reported that more than half of the tax revenue in developing countries 
from VAT is collected at the border on tradables (Baunsgaard and Keen, 2005).  
If alternative revenue sources are not readily available, cuts in trade taxes may be less 
efficient than is widely supposed. Reduced government revenues can translate into lower public 
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investment, and can jeopardize macroeconomic stability. Baunsgaard and Keen (2005) point out 
that tax shifts that are easy in principle may not always be easy in practice. Thus, the availability 
of alternative domestic tax sources and their potential effectiveness in compensating for trade tax 
revenue loss from trade liberalization merits careful assessment.  
The dependence of developing countries on trade taxes and the difficulty of raising 
alternative domestic tax revenues necessitate an assessment of fiscal impact of trade liberalization 
on the level and composition of tax-financed expenditures. Empirical studies show that the most 
frequent response by government to revenue loss is budget cuts on capital expenditure or social 
expenditures (Schade, 2005; Khattry, 2003; Khattry and Rao, 2002; Ndikumana, 2004; Rao, 
1999; Kumar et al. 2007; Gupta et al. 2002; 2005; Dabla-Norris and Matovu, 2002; Zaghini, 
2001; Annett, 2002; Baldacci et al. 2004, Gupta et al. 2003; Basu and Morrissey, 1997; Tanzi, 
1993). Government revenue loss thus creates a big challenge for developing countries in 
addressing economic and social development problems. Indeed, rather than cutting expenditures, 
many least developed countries, in particular sub-Saharan African countries, need to finance 
increased public spending on poverty reduction, physical infrastructure, health and education in 
line with their Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and achieving Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs).  
Using case studies of the three East African countries-Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda-this 
dissertation investigates the impact of trade reforms not only on total revenues, but also on public 
investment. Although several studies have analyzed the fiscal impact of trade liberalization in 
East Africa, none of these have attempted to assess the dynamic short-run and long-run fiscal 
impacts of trade liberalization (DeRosa et al. 2002; Castro, et al. 2004; Lyakurwa, 1993; Ayoki et 
al. 2005; Muriithi and Moyi, 2003; Basu and Morrissey, 1997). In addition, there are no any 
empirical analyses in East Africa that have investigated the implications for public investment of 
dynamic short-run and long-run domestic fiscal response and adjustment. Most of the studies are 
static in nature, ignoring plausible short-run and long-run dynamic adjustment resulting from 
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policy changes and other macroeconomic variables. An exception is the study by Baunsgaard and 
Keen (2005).  However, this study is based on cross-county regression analysis from which it is 
problematic to disentangle specific policy suggestions to reflect any specific country’s economic 
structure and macroeconomic conditions (Gupta et al. 2002; Banerjee and Duflo, 2003). The 
proposed study is an attempt to contribute to this literature.   
Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda offer an excellent case study since they have all launched 
economic reforms. These countries share some common features as well as differences in terms 
of their economic structure, macroeconomic environments and tax structures which need to be 
taken on board during policy making in order to improve revenue mobilization and public 
investment.  
Using cross-section time-series data of each country over the period 1970-2005, the 
dissertation examines plausible dynamic effects of trade liberalization on government revenue, 
responsiveness of the tax system and public investment in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. The 
dissertation employs the error-correction estimation approach to explain short-run and long-run 
dynamic effects of trade liberalization on government revenue, and the responsiveness of the tax 
system and public investment in the three countries. The advantage of using the error-correction 
models is that it combines short-run adjustment mechanisms with long-run information to explain 
dynamic effects in the equation (Wooldridge, 2002; 2005; Green 2003, Mukherjee et al., 1998).  
The data used in this dissertation are drawn from various official government reports 
from the bureaus of statistics, central banks, and ministries of finance and revenue authorities of 
the respective countries. These data were complemented with data from other various sources 
such as the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) and International Finance Statistics produced by 
the IMF; and World Development Indicators reports and African Development Indicators 
produced by the World Bank.  
In the fiscal impact of trade liberalization literature several different measures of 
openness have been used to capture the degree of trade liberalization. The most popular method 
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in the literature is the traditional measure of openness, the trade volume, defined as the ratio of 
import plus export to GDP, in which case, the higher ratio indicate greater openness to 
international trade (Ebrill et al., 1999; Adam et al., 2001; Tosun, 2003; Teera and Hudson, 2004; 
Baunsgaard and Keen, 2005; Agbeyegbe et al., 2006; Davoodi and Grigorian, 2007). Despite 
being popular, this approach is said to an imperfect measure of trade liberalization because there 
are other factors that affect trade inflows such as size of the country, foreign capital inflows. For 
example large countries generally tend to have small trade shares (Harrison, 1996). Despite this 
caveat, the approach remains the popular method used in the literature especially in developing 
countries where comprehensive data on other measures are limited. Other measures are collected 
tariff rate, measured as a ratio of import duties to the value of imports (a declining index indicate 
greater openness); the ratio of international trade taxes to international trade; average applied 
tariff rate, episodes of trade liberalization and use of dummy variables (Khattry and Rao, 2002; 
Ebrill et al. 1999; Agbeyegbe et al., 2006). In this study only the first measure (trade volume) is 
used because of easy availability of the data and order of integration that was compatible with the 
methodological approach employed in this dissertation. Other measures were excluded because of 
unavailability of data and non-statitionary of the first differencing of the data.  
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter Two provides a brief description of 
macroeconomic conditions and economic structure of the three countries. It describes the main 
economic reforms and their subsequent policy components undertaken in Tanzania, Kenya and 
Uganda over the period between 1970 and 2005. Chapter Three examines the fiscal consequences 
of trade liberalization for the East African countries. It presents the theoretical prediction of the 
effects of various trade policy reform measures on government revenue. It reviews various 
theoretical and empirical studies that have examined the impact of trade liberalization on 
government revenues. It also discusses the determinants of revenue collection. The trends and 
performance of revenue in the different policy episodes is also described.  
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Chapter Four presents an analysis of tax performance in the three countries. It reviews the 
theoretical and conceptual measurements of tax performance and empirical studies and 
determinants of tax performance. This is followed by an examination of the trends and patterns of 
tax buoyancy coefficients of all tax categories. 
An empirical exposition on the consequences of changes in revenue generation on public 
investment spending in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda is presented in Chapter Five. It reviews the 
theoretical issues and empirical evidence on the impact of trade reforms as well as other 
determinants on public investment spending. This is followed by an assessment of the trends in 
the composition of public spending. Chapter Six concludes by summarizing the major findings of 
the three empirical studies presented in this dissertation. It also offers some policy suggestions 
emanating from the major findings.  
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CHAPTER 2 
ECONOMIC REFORM: CONTEXT AND PRACTICES 
2.1 Introduction 
Since the 1960s, after independence many LDCs pursued interventionist policies in 
support of the import-substitution industrialization (ISI) development strategy. This was achieved 
by the erection of barriers to the importation of foreign manufactured goods and efforts instead to 
produce them domestically. The aim was to create a political, social and economic environment 
conducive to growth, while at the same time ensuring that the benefits would trickle down to the 
poor (Corbo and Fischer, 1995; Ray, 1998; Balassa, 1989; Bruton, 1989). As a result, by the late 
1970s many African economies were highly distorted due to interventionist policies (Mensah, 
2006; Mensah et al., 2006; Aman, et al., 2006; Kiiza, et al., Were, et al., 2006; Ray, 1998; 
Bagachwa, 1992; FAO, 1994). 
In the wake of the 1970s and early 1980s, many LDCs were afflicted by severe economic 
crises. Many of them faced crises of macroeconomic imbalances, manifested in high rates of 
inflation; accelerating foreign exchange constraints; unmanageable balance of payments and 
fiscal deficits, and high external debt ratios. Additionally, GDP growth rates were negative or 
failing to match the rate of population increase. Weak national policies, weak institutional 
frameworks and drastic and unfavorable changes in external conditions also aggravated the crisis. 
External conditions that contributed to the crisis include terms of trade shocks, interest rate 
shocks, a worldwide recession, oil price shocks and severe reduction in commercial bank lending 
(Tanzi, 1992; Ray, 1998; Corbo and Fischer, 1995; Lipumba, 1992; Bagachwa, 1992; Amani et 
al., 2006; Were et al., 2006; Kiiza et al., 2006; Toye, 2000; Weiss, 1994; Balassa, 1989; Faini and 
De Mello, 1993; Patel, et al., 1997; Coady, 1997).  
In the early 1980s, following these economic crises, practical problems, new policy ideas 
and institutional pressures saw a reappraisal of the direction of economic policy in many LDCs. 
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As part of stabilization and structural adjustment programs under the auspices of the International 
Financial Institutions (IFIs)-the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF)-economic 
reforms became de rigeur in LDCs.  
2.2 Context and Practices  
Economic reforms have been the cornerstone of the IFIs policy-based lending in LDCs 
since the 1980s. Following the crises of the 1970s and early 1980s, IFIs developed specific 
lending initiatives under which the balance of payments and budgetary support was provided 
conditional on and in support of economic reforms. In principle, the justification for these 
economic reforms rests on the widely perceived microeconomic grounds vis-à-vis the functioning 
of markets and superiority of market-based against non-market-based forms of resource 
allocation (Weiss, 1994; Bagachwa, 1992; Greenaway and Morrissey, 1993; Toye, 2000; Gilpin, 
2001; Choundhri et al. 2006). These reforms are generally known as stabilization and structural 
adjustment programs (Faini and de Melo, 1993; Weiss, 1995; Patel et al., 1997; Corbo and 
Fischer, 1995).  
Characteristically, these involved the use of a set of policy packages based on principles 
derived from the theoretical propositions first formulated by classical economists (Adam Smith 
and David Ricardo) and later strengthened by neo-classical economists (such as Heckscher and 
Ohlin, James Meade). They applied conventional economic theory to problems of developing 
countries based on the premises that markets are the most effective mechanism for transmitting 
information and allocating resources (Bliss, 1988; Weiss, 1995; Gilpin, 2001; Stiglitz, 2006).  
Notwithstanding the differences on particular details between countries, economic reform 
programs have had a common framework. More specifically, structural adjustment program 
(SAP) comprised of trade and exchange rate liberalization (trade reforms), designed to address 
external imbalances, whereas stabilization programs entailed tax and expenditure policy reforms 
(fiscal reforms) meant to address internal imbalances (i.e. cuts in the public sector deficit), in 
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order to enhance resource mobilization and allocation (Patel et al., 1997; Weiss, 1995; Faini and 
de Melo, 1993; Corbo and Fischer, 1995; Toye, 2000; Agenor and Montiel, 1999; Ray, 1998; 
Coady, 1997; FAO, 1994; Linn and Wetzel, 1990).  
In practice, stabilization and structural adjustment programs are complementary. 
Typically, stabilization programs precede structural adjustment programs. This is based on the 
fact that a rapid response to macroeconomic imbalance is to create conducive environment to 
structural reforms that will promote economic growth and trade in the long run. That is, the first 
response to an economic crisis is a well-formulated stabilization program to ensure that 
macroeconomic imbalances are sufficiently reduced prior to trade liberalization (Toye, 2000; 
Patel et al., 1997; Weiss, 1995; Linn and Wetzel, 1990). SAP measures are intended to increase 
the effectiveness of stabilization policies by removing microeconomic obstacles in order to 
enhance efficient allocation of resources.  
The fundamental argument in support of trade reform is that removing impediments to 
the free movement of goods and services would permit national specialization and facilitate 
optimal utilization of scarce resources. That is, trade liberalization would lead to efficient trade 
patterns determined by the principle of comparative advantage and relative abundance of factors 
of production. These would ensure that a country achieves greater economic growth through 
participation in foreign trade than through trade protection. It is argued that excessive government 
intervention into the functioning of the economy is distortinary; does not promote competition; 
discourages specialization based on comparative advantage; and results in inefficient allocation of 
scarce resources (Weiss, 1994; Bagachwa, 1992; Greenway and Morrissey, 1993; Toye, 2000; 
Gilpin, 2001; Choundhri et al. 2006).  Based on these premises, proponents of trade liberalization 
advocate the removal of trade barriers and streamlining tariff regimes, on the ground that by 
doing so, countries participating in trade will benefit and that free trade is an engine of growth 
and development.  
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However, given market imperfections and asymmetries in most LDCs, it has been argued 
that not all countries would benefit, let alone benefit equally, from international trade. 
Opportunities in the international markets accrue mostly to the developed countries that are able 
to take advantages of the opening up of markets. Above all, it has been contested that 
assumptions underlying the principles of comparative advantage and relative abundance of 
factors of production used to formulate trade theory are inappropriate in LDCs (Stiglizt, 2006; 
Palley, 2006; Sen, 2005; Ray, 1998; Bruton, 1989; Bliss, 1988), and that the theory is static in 
nature, failing to take into account dynamic short- and long-run changes in the international 
markets (Sen, 2005; Bliss, 1988). Notwithstanding these criticisms, however, the theory continues 
to be used to justify the push for trade liberalization in LDCs.  
 In the public finance doctrine, it is contended that import duties/tariffs (trade taxes) 
should not be used as sources of government revenue because of their negative effects on 
economic production. They are considered to have undesirable distortinary effects on the 
allocation of resources (Ahmad and Stern, 1989; Newbery, 1987; Patel et al., 1997; Coady, 1997; 
Linn and Wetzel, 1990; Lyakurwa, 1993). It is argued that taxes and barriers on international 
trade of any sort tend to encourage domestic production of final consumer goods while permitting 
relatively free imports of capital or intermediate goods. This tends to be associated with high rates 
of effective protection, high cost of domestic production, and creating a bias against exports. 
Consequently, while reducing the dependence of the country on imports of final consumption 
goods, the economy becomes highly dependent on imports of intermediate goods and more 
vulnerable to fluctuations in export earnings (Newbery, 1987; Coady, 1997). This ultimately 
affects government revenue collection and allocation.   
Thus defenders of trade and fiscal reforms advocate for trade liberalization requiring 
tariff reform through replacement of quantitative restriction with tariffs and reduction of tariffs. In 
order to ensure that liberalization efforts are not curtailed and reversed, it is argued that tariff 
reforms should be integrated with tax reform of domestic commodity taxes. That is, domestic 
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consumption tax should be increased at the same time as tariffs on final products are lowered. 
The goal is to eliminate the bias in favor of import substitution (Keen and Syed, 2006; Pelzman, 
2004; Patel et al., 1997; Linn and Wetzel, 1990).  
However, for LDCs that are heavily dependent on trade taxes as their sources of 
government revenue, tariff reform has a negative effect on government revenue and internal 
balances. Reduction in tariff rates reduces customs revenue from imports, thus causing a loss in 
government revenue. Moreover, the substitution of domestic consumption and income taxes for 
trade taxes does not necessarily provide a viable option. This is because consumption and income 
taxes in LDCs are notoriously difficult to collect. Most households in these countries consume 
from their own production. Furthermore, in LDCs revenue collection is limited because the tax 
bases are narrow, and there are large number of tax exemptions, large opportunities for tax 
evasion, and high age-dependency ratios (Newbery, 1987; Linn and Wetzel, 1990; Tanzi, 1987; 
Musgrave, 1987; Addison and Levin, 2006).  
In most LDCs rural households which comprise the bulk of the population in LDCs 
derive their incomes from a wide variety of sources. Self-employed in the informal sector for a 
substantial fraction of time, much of their incomes are in kind. They do not keep written records 
of incomes and expenditures, and literacy and income levels are so low that the administrative 
costs of assessing income are exorbitant (Newbery, 1987; Linn and Wetzel, 1990; Coady, 1997; 
Tanzi, 1987; Teera and Hudson, 2004; Musgrave, 1987; Addison and Levin, 2006). In this 
situation, a country may find it difficult to recover the loss of revenue due to cuts in trade taxes. 
Failure to raise sufficient revenue results in an increase in the size of the fiscal deficit, 
undermining the goal of economic reforms of achieving macroeconomic stability and economic 
growth. 
It is commonly argued that the initial priority of governments facing a serious economic 
crisis is the restoration of macroeconomic stability, through the reduction of fiscal deficits to 
more sustainable levels. In order to achieve this, the short-term to medium-term objectives of 
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fiscal reform should focus on cuts on public expenditures and raising revenues. The long-term 
objectives may involve the changes in the tax structure so as to remedy some of the deficiencies 
in the tax systems (Weiss, 1995; Coady, 1997; Patel et al., 1997; Faini and de Melo, 1993; Tanzi, 
1993).  
But empirical evidence suggests that cuts in public expenditures affect spending on 
physical infrastructure and social sectors such as education and health (Faini and de Melo, 1993; 
Toye, 2000; Basu and Morrissey, 1997; Tanzi, 1993; Rao, 1999; Khattry, 2003; Palley, 2006; 
Winters, et al. 2004; Clement, et al. 2003; Roy, et al. 2006; Schade, 2005; Kumar et al. 2007; 
Gupta et al. 2002, 2005; Baldacci et al. 2004). The option of cutting public expenditure as a 
means of reducing fiscal deficits does not necessarily provide a viable option, as this has potential 
adverse effects on growth and poverty. Public expenditure cuts introduce new distortions that 
reduce the productivity of the public sector’s service provision. Therefore, before any policy 
reform is implemented, a critical analysis is necessary to help shed light on the extent and 
direction of the effects of any proposed reforms so that possible mitigation measures to counter 
their effects can be implemented.  
2.3 Episodes of Economic Reform in East Africa 
This section takes stock of the overview of the economies and policy reform episodes in 
the three East African countries, Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, over the period 1970-2005. The 
aim is to characterize trends and to draw out specific policy instruments instituted in each reform 
regime that had direct or indirect impact on government revenue mobilization and public 
investment. The distinctive periods of reforms and causes of the changes between periods of 
reform and periods of retraction are also examined. A number of policy reform phases ranging 
from four to six, have been identified for the East African countries, and these are discussed in 
sequence in the following sections.  
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2.3.1 Tanzania 
Overview of the Tanzanian Economy 
Following the attainment of its independence in 1961, the Tanzanian economy has been 
characterized by two distinct economic structures, comprising a traditional rural sector and a 
modern urban sector. The rural sector is much concerned with the production of food and cash 
crops, whereas the modern urban sector, which is relatively small, is concerned with 
manufacturing and service activities. The linkage between the two sectors is weak (Bukuku, 
1993). The agricultural sector share in GDP has been more than one-third over the period 
between 1970 and 2005. Dependency on agriculture as the mainstay of the economy makes the 
Tanzanian economy vulnerable to both external and internal shocks. The industrial sector also 
contributes to the national output, but at a lower level than agriculture. The contribution of the 
industrial sector to GDP has varied since 1970. In early 1970s the sector contributed more than 20 
percent to GDP until 1980; thereafter the contribution of the industrial sector to GDP declined to 
15 percent in the early 1980s before it started to increase in the 1990s where it has remained 
constant at 18 percent of GDP (see Table 2.1).  
Consistently with its higher contribution to GDP, the agricultural sector employs more 
than 80 percent of the labor force, predominantly smallholders on average operating less than 1.5 
hectares, mainly producing for subsistence with very limited marketable surpluses.  Based on the 
population census of 2002, the country’s population was 34.4 million in 2002; this grew from 
23.2 million in 1988. The population grows at more than 3 percent per annum. Tanzania is among 
the poorest countries in the world. The larger proportion of the populace in Tanzania has 
remained poor since independence in 1961. In Tanzania, the per capita income has remained very 
low, ranging between US$ 120 and 340 (see Table 2.1). Tanzania’s weak economy also translates 
into the poor provision of social services such as health and education, contributing to poor social 
indicators (see Table 2.2). 
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Origins of the Economic Crisis in Tanzania 
After its independence in 1961 from the British government, Tanzania adopted an 
independent, socialist-oriented development strategy under the leadership of Julius Nyerere. With 
the Arusha Declaration in 1967, the government adopted an interventionist approach through 
stringent price controls and established a large number of state-owned enterprises with a view to 
promoting a public sector-led development strategy. With a good recorded economic performance 
in the early 1970s, internal and external economic shocks (i.e. the war with Uganda in 1978/79; 
the oil price shocks of 1973/74 and 1979/80; severe droughts in 1973/73, 1981/82 and 1983/84; 
the break up of the East African Community in 1977; the relocation of rural producers in new 
villages starting with “villagization” in 1972) led the country into an economic crisis of 
unprecedented proportions throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s (Maliyamkono and Mason, 
2006; Amani et al., 2006; Wobst, 2001; Bigsten and Danielsson; 1999; Morrissey, 1995; Basu 
and Morrissey, 1997, Bagachwa, 1992).  
Despite growing concerns of the emerging economic crisis in the period between the late 
1970s and early 1980s, the control regime was tightened further as the government sought to 
finance increased spending and to maintain the import-intensive Basic Industries Strategy (BIS) 
in the face of declining export revenue. External debt arrears developed rapidly, and after the end 
of the war with Uganda in 1979 foreign inflows fell drastically because donors were unsatisfied 
with macroeconomic policies.  The sheer size and intensity of the economic crisis between 1979 
and 1985 necessitated the government to react to the economic breakdown with home-grown 
adjustment efforts and later IFI-supported reforms. The home-grown reforms constituted the 
National Economic Survival Program (NESP, 1981/82) and own structural economic reform 
(1982/83-1984/85). The IFI-supported reforms consisted of the Economic Recovery Program 
(ERP, 1986/87-1988/89) and the Economic and Social Action Program (ESAP, 1989/90-
1991/92). Others include the period of off-track reforms covering the second phase of President 
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Ali Hassan Mwinyi’s regime between 1992 and 1995, and the second generation recovery 
reforms under President Benjamin William Mkapa (1996 to 2005).     
 
Home-Grown Policy Reforms in Tanzania (1981-85) 
The first response to the economic crisis was the National Economic Survival Program 
(NESP) covering the period 1981 and 1982. NESP had short-term objectives. The approach 
involved internal mobilization and utilization of resources. The goal was to increase export 
revenue, eliminate food shortages and reduce public expenditure (Amani et al., 2006; Bagachwa, 
1992; Wangwe, 1997; Basu and Morrissey, 1997). The main policy instruments implemented 
under NESP are as described in Table 2.3. The program was unsustainable. The country entered 
into even a deeper crisis. NESP did not successfully address problems underlying foreign 
exchange constraints and as a result the crisis persisted, and macroeconomic imbalances became 
acute (Basu and Morrissey, 1997; Morrissey, 1995). The economy was characterized by an 
overvalued exchange rate, unsustainable balance of payments, high shortages of goods in the 
market, and an inflation rate that continued to rise (Amani et al. 2006; Morrissey, 1995; Basu and 
Morrissey, 1997).  
NESP was soon replaced by another independent economic reform by the government 
spanning from 1983 to 1985. This was reached following the break-up of the negotiation with 
IFIs on the proposal that was prepared by the Tanzania Advisory Group (TAG) in 1981/82 
(Wangwe, 1997). The program was designed to restore external and fiscal balances. The aim was 
to contain inflation, stimulate output growth through agricultural output expansion, and increase 
capacity utilization and efficiency in industry. At first, SAP did not result in any significant 
changes in Tanzania’s economic performance because the government was reluctant to 
implement reforms. In the fiscal year 1984/85, the government launched some partial reforms 
aimed at liberalizing the economy (Morrissey, 1995; Basu and Morrissey, 1997; Wangwe, 1997; 
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Amani et al., 2006; Bigsten et al., 2001; Wobst, 2001). Policy measures implemented during the 
1981-85 reform period are presented in Table 2.3.  
Overall however, the experience during the period shows that the government’s own 
structural economic reforms failed to address macroeconomic imbalances. Although during the 
first years both recurrent and overall deficits declined, they both increased during the subsequent 
years reaching high levels. The fiscal deficit increased from 3.5 percent of GDP in 1973 to 6.6 
percent of GDP in 1977 and reached 18 percent of GDP in 1980. The current account deficit 
deteriorated from 2 percent of GDP in 1977 to 16 percent in 1980. In 1985, the current account 
deficit was 8 percent of GDP. This resulted in the failure of the government to adequately finance 
its public spending and importation of goods and services. The situation resulted in excessive 
government borrowing from the banking system. This in turn contributed greatly to the increase 
in inflation rates (Amani et al., 2006; Basu and Morrissey, 1997; Morrissey, 1995; Lyakurwa, 
1993). 
 
IFI-Supported Policy Reforms in Tanzania (1986-92)  
After long heated debates with IFIs, and other multilateral and bilateral donors, delays, 
reversal, and reluctance of implementing IFI-supported policy reforms and the failure to redress 
macroeconomic imbalances, in June 1986 the Tanzanian government reached an agreement with 
IFIs on the policy packages that were to be adopted. The government launched the Economic 
Recovery Program (ERP, 1986-89). The key features of this program were to liberalize internal 
and external trade, unify the exchange rate, revive exports, stimulate domestic savings, and 
restore fiscal sustainability (put limits on the budget and balance of payments deficits) as well as 
put limits on domestic credit. ERP was founded on donors’ ideas regarding market-oriented 
economic reforms, trade liberalization, privatization and minimal state intervention. With a good 
appeal to donors, the government received external support for the ERP. During this period the 
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Tanzanian government introduced multiparty democracy. The main policy reforms implemented 
during the ERP are summarized in Table 2.4. 
Following the implementation of prudent fiscal reforms during the ERP reform period, a 
number of impressive results were recorded. The GDP growth rate increased sharply from 0.5 
percent in the 1981-85 to 4.2 percent during the ERP reform period. The revenue/GDP ratio also 
increased from an average of 18.3 percent in 1981-85 to 22.1 percent in 1991. The budget deficit 
was reduced from an average of 10.1 percent in 1981-85 to 3.5 percent in 1991. The government 
also reduced its reliance on domestic bank borrowing to finance the deficit. Domestic borrowing 
decreased from 40 percent of GDP in 1986 to 13 percent of GDP in1989, further declined to 6 
percent in 1992. In 1990 and 1991 the government made net repayments to the banking system 
(Wobst, 2001; Amani et al. 2006; Bagachwa, 1992; Basu and Morrissey, 1997). 
 Despite the encouraging developments made under ERP, there were still problems that 
continued to limit economic growth. These problems include: low domestic savings; high rates of 
inflation; weaknesses in the agricultural marketing system; the pressure on a financial system 
faced by structural weaknesses; and the poor state of social services. In order to address these 
problems, the government launched a three-year Economic and Social Action Program (ESAP) in 
1989/90 as a successor to ERP. ESAP basically maintained the same objectives as those under 
ERP, but sough to address peoples’ concerns over the social consequences of ERP. To achieve 
these objectives, sectoral priorities and programs covering the agricultural sector, transport and 
communication, manufacturing, mining and energy were set for implementation (Amani et al., 
2006; Wangwe, 1997; Lyakurwa, 1993).  
ESAP concentrated on trade liberalization by reviving production incentives, exchange 
rate liberalization and management, macroeconomic stabilization, credit and money supply 
policies and balance of payments management. External support was available during the ESAP 
reform period, including a loan from the IMF Economic and Structural Adjustment Facility 
(ESAF) plus three World Bank projects, namely the Tanzania Agricultural Adjustment Credit, the 
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Financial Sector Adjustment Program and the Structural Adjustment Credit (Amani et al. 2006; 
Bigsten and Danielson, 2001; Wangwe, 1997; Basu and Morrissey, 1997). Policy reform 
packages contained in ESAP are summarized in Table 2.5.  
Overall, the period from 1986 to 1992 saw an aid boom, as most donors expressed more 
confidence in the kind of policy reforms that the government was implementing. Despite 
commitment to reforms, implementation faced resistance as the government was still dominated 
by hard-liners who opposed IFI-supported reforms. As a result, limited progress was recorded in 
the 1986-92 period. Nonetheless, the rate of investment increased from 20 percent of GDP during 
the crisis years of 1980-85 to an average of 34.6 percent during the 1986-92 reform. During this 
period the share of private investment in total investment rose from about 50 percent in the mid 
1970s to 60 percent in 1986 and further to 70 percent in the early 1990s (Bigsten and Danielson, 
1999; Wangwe, 1997).  
Consistent with the high rate of investment growth, the rate of economic growth 
recovered in the post-reform period (after 1986). The growth rate of GDP increased from an 
average of 2 percent per year in the period 1980-85 to an average of 4 percent during 1986 to 
1992. Growth performance was shared in the key sectors of the economy. Annual growth in 
agriculture increased from 0.6 percent during 1980-85 to about 5 percent in the period 1986-92. 
The industrial sector growth increased from a -4.5 percent (decline) per year during the period 
1980-85 to about 4-5 percent per year in 1986-92 (Wangwe, 1997; Bigsten and Danielsson, 
1999). Notwithstanding these achievements, there were still a number of challenges that were 
manifested in the economy threatening further improvement in these areas and/or even the 
sustainability of what had been achieved. These included continuing high budget deficits, 
persistent balance of payment deficits, the low level of domestic savings and continuing 
inflationary pressure (Wangwe, 1997).  
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Reforms Program Off-Track (1993-1995) 
Despite progress that was made in the improvement of macroeconomic stability and 
growth performance under ERP and ESAP during the 1986-92 period, the country experienced a 
setback in 1993-95 marking another era of economic crisis. This is attributed to lack of 
commitment by President Mwinyi’s government to continue with economic reforms. As a result, 
in 1994 donors suspended the balance of payments support, citing problems related to tax 
evasion. Tanzania’s reform program went off-track. During this period, fiscal policy went out of 
control as government spending grew and the budget deficit increased to 7.5 percent of GDP; tax 
revenue collection dropped drastically from 13.74 percent of GDP to 10.07 percent of GDP. 
There were large-scale of tax exemptions. Furthermore, corruption and tax evasion were rampant. 
The gains that were achieved in reducing inflation were reversed, and inflation rose from about 
22 percent in 1992 to 37 percent in 1994. Faced with the need to finance its deficit, the 
government resorted to borrowing from the central bank. The fiscal control and discipline that 
was put in place during the ERP and ESAP program was lost (Amani et al. 2006; Bigsten et al., 
2001).  
This was a period of economic stagnation. The government was hesitating and 
uncommitted to a new generation of reforms, as the demands of donors shifted to new areas. 
Donors pressed the Tanzanian government to implement second generation reforms which were 
believed to be more intrusive than the first generation of policy reforms. According to Bigsten et 
al., (2001) new generation reforms had demands which required closing various leakages in the 
system. The second generation reforms put much emphasis on bank reforms in particular. 
However, the government was not fully committed to implementing radical reforms. Its laxity in 
public finance management and granting tax exemptions to politically influential entities, led to 
the erosion of donor confidence, and ultimately to suspension of financial support (Amani et al., 
2006; Bigsten et al., 2001). Although, policy reform went off-track during this period, there were 
some institutional reforms that were starting to be implemented. These include investment 
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promotion, financial sector reforms, civil service reforms and privatization. But the pace of 
implementation was very slow (Amani et al., 2006; Bigsten et al., 2001). 
 
Second Generation Recovery Reforms (1996-2005) 
Tanzania’s economic reform process from the 1980s to 2005 can be described as a 
sequence from partial to off-track to successful reform. The early reforms, covering the period 
between 1980 and 1995, were sporadic and their implementation process was slow. In contrast, 
the reforms process since 1996 has been robust and relatively successful; macroeconomic 
stability has been achieved, donor relations restored, and structural and institutional reforms 
accelerated. During the years 1996-2005, reforms were back on track and the IMF provided 
support with a new ESAF loan covering a three-year period between 1996 and 1999 which was 
successfully implemented. This also brought in other donors. The ESAF loan was followed by 
another three-year loan under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility from 2000 to 2002 
(Amani, 2006). 
When President Benjamin Mkapa’s government came to power in 1995, it faced the 
challenges of restoring donor relations, pursuing radical reform, fighting corruption, reducing 
inflation and mobilizing domestic resources. Before embarking on radical reforms, the 
government initiated a shadow program with the IMF, for a period between January and June 
1996. The focus of this program was to eliminate impediments to sound budgetary management 
and reform the financial sector (Amani et al., 2006; Bigsten et al., 2001).  
Notwithstanding the commitment to policy reforms by President Mkapa’s government, 
poverty levels were still high and employment rates were also high. Towards the end of the 
1990s, the Tanzanian government responded by formulating domestic policies such as the 
National Poverty Eradication Strategy (NPES), the Tanzania Assistance Strategy (TAS) and, later 
on the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) in conjunction with initiating the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper (PRSP) which was tied to debt relief. Then the PRSP was revised in 2003 to form 
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the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP). Policy changes initiated 
during this period are summarized in Table 2.5.  
2.3.2 Kenya 
Overview of the Kenyan Economy 
Kenya’s economy is relatively diverse, with both agricultural and industrial potential. Agriculture 
is crucial to Kenya’s economy in terms of its contribution to output, employment and export 
earnings. The sector accounts for approximately a quarter of the GDP (see Table 2.6), employs 
almost 75 percent of the labor force, accounts for about 70 percent of export earnings, generates 
almost all of the country’s food requirement and provides a significant proportion of raw 
materials for the resource-based industrial sector. Smallholders and subsistence farmers play a 
key role; they contribute 70 percent of marketed agricultural production. The contribution of the 
industrial sector in GDP has varied over time. The slump in the share of the industrial sector in 
total GDP started in 1994; it fell to about 17 percent, down from 20 percent in the 1970s (Kiringai 
et al., 2006; Lundstrom and Ronnas; 2005). 
The structure of the Kenyan economy has undergone significant changes for the period 
under investigation. The sectoral contribution to GDP has varied over time, depending on the 
performance of the economy. The share of the service sector has increased from 39 percent in 
1980 to 46 percent in 2001; the contribution of agriculture has declined from 32 percent in 1980 
to 27 percent in 2001 and 24 percent in 2003, while manufacturing sector’s contribution has 
remained almost static at 13 percent since 1980. The service sector accounts for more than half of 
Kenya’s GDP and two-thirds of formal employment. The key service sub-sectors are tourism, 
travel, financial, communication and transport services (UNECA, 2002; Lundstrom and Ronnas; 
2005). 
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Despite having a relatively larger economy than its neighboring counterparts Tanzania 
and Uganda, Kenya is also among the poorest countries in sub-Saharan African region with its 
per capita income of about 400 USD a little more than a dollar per day (Lundstrom and Ronnas, 
2005). Poverty levels have risen in Kenya, from a headcount measure of 40 percent in 1994 to 52 
percent in 2000. Between 1996 and 1999, the number of people living under the poverty line rose 
from 11.5 million to about 15 million (HDR, 2001; UNECA, 2002). Rising poverty levels, along 
with inaccessibility of both rural and urban Kenyans to proper medical care and high quality 
education, have contributed to high unemployment rates and mortality rates (UNECA, 2002; 
Lundstrom and Ronnas, 2005). This is reflected in the relatively weak social development 
indicators; in terms of high mortality rates and low life expectancy (see Table 2.7). The county’s 
total population in 2004 was estimated at 32.4 million, with the annual percentage growth rate of 
1.7 percent. About 80 percent of the population lives in rural areas, deriving their livelihoods 
largely from agriculture. 
 
Origins of the Economic Crisis in Kenya 
Like many other African countries, after its independence from Britain in 1963 Kenya 
adopted an interventionist-inward-looking development approach. The goal was to promote 
economic growth in order to raise overall standard of living. Specific objectives included: to 
achieve high and rapid economic growth, guarantee political equality; social justice; human 
dignity; and equal opportunities (Wagacha, 2000). 
Kenya experienced a relatively stable economic environment in the period between 1960 
and early 1970s. Economic growth was strong in the first two decades after independence and 
weak or negative thereafter. Between 1963 and 1970, the economy grew at an average real 
growth rate of 6.6 percent. During the 1970s the situation changed drastically, as the nation 
experienced macroeconomic instability characterized by a stagnating economy with average 
growth rates slipping to 4 percent in the 1970-80 period coupled with trade shocks, fiscal 
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indiscipline, declining per capita consumption, increasing poverty and structural distortions 
(Were et al., 2006; Legovini, 2002; Kabubo-Mariara and Kiriti, 2002; Wagacha, 2000).  
The poor economic performance during the 1970s and early 1980s has been attributed to 
inadequate domestic policies and severe internal as well as external shocks (i.e. droughts in 
1979/80 and 1983/84, oil crises of 1973/74 and 1979/80) and deterioration in the terms of trade in 
1970s (Legovini, 2002). On the macroeconomic front, a large fiscal deficit was behind an 
acceleration of inflation and deteriorating current account deficit. On the microeconomic front, 
heavy government interventionist policies through price controls, import controls, multiple 
exchange rate systems, distribution controls and massive expansion of the public sector in the 
production of private goods aggravated the problems. All these combined resulted in heavily 
distorted relative prices and an overextended public sector, making the country more vulnerable 
to external shocks (Were et al., 2006; Legovini, 2002; Kabubo-Mariara and Kiriti, 2002).  
The government responded to the crises by tightening the trade regime and seeking 
financial assistance from donors whose general policy conditionalities were spelt out in the 1974-
78 development plans (Were et al., 2006; Kabubo-Mariara and Kiriti, 2002). Despite deepened 
economic crisis, the government opted for the home-grown policy reforms mainly focusing on 
control regimes, which exacerbated the crisis even further. Persistent economic crisis together 
with lack of external finances necessitated the Kenyan government to embark on economic 
reforms in order to restore donors’ confidence (Were et al., 2006; Legovini, 2002; Kabubo-
Mariara and Kiriti, 2002). Five episodes of Kenya’s economic policy reforms have been 
identified: the pre-crisis (1970-79), crisis period (1980-86) and post-crisis divided into the reform 
periods of 1987-90, 1991-96 and 1997-2005.  
 
Crisis and Home-Grown Economic Reforms over the period 1980-86 
In order to contain the economic crisis of the early 1980s, it was inevitable for the 
Kenyan government to adopt reform policies to reorient the economy and put it on a renewed 
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growth path. Reluctantly, the government embarked on a partial reform which was not successful. 
This was partly due to limited commitment by the government, which failed to carry out trade 
reforms and liberalize grain marketing (Lengovini, 2002; Were et al., 2006). The main features of 
the policy packages of the program were the removal of import controls and a shift from import-
substitution to an export-promotion strategy (Were et al., 2006; Legovini, 2002). The policy 
components of the program are summarized in Table 2.8. 
Notwithstanding the stability of the macro economy between 1982 and 1984, virtually no 
progress was made towards structural adjustment and the real GDP growth rate declined to 3.4 
percent. The poor performance of the 1980-84 reforms was partly due to weak and uneven 
commitment by the government to implement reforms, as the reforms took place within an 
environment of fiscal laxity and lacked coordination within macroeconomic policies (Were et al., 
2006; Legovini, 2002; Kububo-Mariara and Kiriti, 2002; Wagacha, 2000). 
The lack of adequate commitment to the reform process during the first phase of 
economic reforms (1980-84) resulted in a withdrawal of donor funding. To demonstrate it had a 
commitment to policy reform and a clear long-term development strategy, the government 
prepared a Sessional Paper of 1986 on Economic Management for Renewed Growth. In this 
policy document, the government accepted its minimal participation in the development process 
by paving the way for more private sector participation (Were et al., 2006).  
 
Economic Recovery Reforms of 1985-91 
The late 1980s saw a major policy shift towards liberalizing the economy through 
structural adjustment. The main focus of the economic recovery program was on sectoral reforms. 
This was accompanied by various sectoral loans. The adjustment programs were mainly 
developed in the agricultural sector (in 1986 and 1990); industrial sector (1988); financial sector 
(1989); and export development (1990 and 1991) (Were, et al., 2006; Kububo-Mariara and Kiriti, 
2002). Policy measures implemented under SAPs are summarized in Table 2.8. 
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During this second phase of economic reform (1985-91), attempts were made to 
liberalize the economy. However, the level of progress was still limited, and commitment to 
reform was patchy and intermittent. During this period, the liberalization process was far from 
complete. The reform efforts were characterized by policy reversals and delays, as well as failures 
in the implementation of planned activities. There were a number of distortion-creating 
instruments since tariff rates were still on the high side, the import licensing system was still in 
place with considerable executive discretion, and foreign exchange restrictions were still in 
operation (Were et al., 2006).  
The limited extent of the reform and the slow pace of its implementation were attributed 
to the fact that despite repeated announcements of intentions in policy documents, the 
government was still reluctant to implement the reform, and kept deferring actual 
implementation. For example, the government hesitated to levy user-charges in the provision of 
public health and education services. Although these were later implemented in December 1989, 
the policy was reversed in September 1990 by suspending the outpatient fee, nine months after its 
inception (Were et al., 2006).  
Additionally, other factors reported to affect the reform process in Kenya included 
political interference of the civil service, and secrecy and limited consultation during the 
implementation of its policies. Some major reforms were deferred or avoided because of looming 
political uncertainty of the effects of reforms and fear of losing patronage. Reforms were 
undertaken on the periphery, whereas the most sensitive reforms that had direct impact on the 
electorate such as retrenchment in the civil service, and user-fees in the social sector were 
deferred or reversed (Were et al., 2006; Kabubo-Mariara and Kiriti, 2002; Wagacha, 2000). 
As a result, most donors were dissatisfied with the pace of the implementation process. 
This ruined the relationship between the Kenyan government and development partners, thus 
halting adjustment lending. Although there were records of good economic performance during 
the second phase of reform, structural adjustment failed to create conditions for sustainable 
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recovery of economic growth to the rates experienced in the 1960s. Economic growth was 
unstable throughout the entire period of the first and second phase reforms. Growth rate 
fluctuated at an average growth rate of real GDP of 3.3 percent in 1973-75, rising to 6.7 percent 
in 1976-78, then falling to 5.2 percent in 1985-9  and declining further to 2.3 percent in 1990-91 
(Were et al., 2006; Kabubo-Mariara and Kiriti, 2002; Wagacha, 2000). 
 
Economic Reforms of 1991-96 
The third phase of economic reforms (1991-96) demonstrated bold reforms in trade, civil 
service, agriculture and social sectors. In the public sector, a number of reforms were undertaken, 
including restructuring and privatization of public enterprises. The aim was to enhance the role of 
the private sector by reducing the claims on the budget, rationalizing the public enterprise 
operations, improving the regulatory environment and broadening the base of ownership. This 
involved the retrenchment of civil servants. In order to implement effectively the public sector 
reform, the government established the Department of Government Investment and Public 
Enterprises in 1990, charged with the responsibility of overseeing the parastatal reform program. 
In addition, a Parastatal Reform Program Committee was set up as policy-making body (Were et 
al., 2006; Legovini, 2002). 
Under the social sector reform, the government announced a phased reintroduction of 
user-fees in April 1992. Outpatient fee was reintroduced as a fee to be paid only after receiving 
treatment. Other reforms implemented in the social sector include the expansion of the segment 
of the population that was exempted from the fees, including civil servants, the military and the 
unemployed. In addition, this was accompanied by the decentralization of management (Were et 
al; 2006). The major policy components of the third phase economic reforms are summarized in 
Table 2.9. 
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Economic Reform of 1997-2005 
The economic policy reforms between 1997 and 2005 saw progress in the 
implementation of reforms, particularly in the public sector that lagged behind during the 1991-96 
period. The 1997-2005 public sector reform had important features including the “right-sizing” of 
the government by reducing the civil service by 30 percent; reducing the number of ministries; 
balancing revenue and expenditure more closely; and renewing the privatization strategy (Were et 
al., 2006; Legovini, 2002).  Important policy components of the program are summarized in 
Table 2.9. However, attempts to down-size the civil service were halted because the parliament 
did not agree with the decision. It was argued that the decision was a directive from donors, 
rushed, and that there wasn’t adequate consultation in the design of the reform. The government 
was also sued for breaching the Employment Act by terminating employment contracts without 
adequate notice (Were et al., 2006; Legovini, 2002).  
Despite concerted efforts by the government in undertaking public sector reforms a 
number of factors have been cited to explain the halt of the implementation process. For instance, 
Legovini (2002) observes that despite a good start and progress made on preparing for the 
privatization process, the program was stalled because transactions lacked transparency, political 
support was weak, the strategy was unclear, and institutional and administrative arrangements 
was inadequate. Were et al. (2006) outline a number of other factors that contributed to the 
disruption of the reform process, including: elusive fiscal discipline; the implementation process 
lacked specific targets, sanctions and incentives; weak institutional structures; mechanisms to 
control discretionary spending were weak within the executive; and high turnovers of ministers 
and their permanent secretaries.  
Furthermore, the government kept on delaying and reversing the implementation process; 
privatization proceeded without a privatization law, which left some loopholes for manipulation; 
and the government avoided privatizing some of the parastatals that caused a major drain on the 
budget. For instance, in 1999/2000 fiscal year a number of state-owned enterprises which were 
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planned for restructuring and privatization were not privatized (Were et al. 2006). The failure of 
the Kenyan government to implement donor reform agendas led to the suspension of the 
disbursement of funds by the donors. As a result, Kenya’s long-term economic performance 
deteriorated in the 1990s. Poverty rate increased from 48 percent in 1990 to 56 percent in 2001 
(Sasaoka, 2005; Alia and Njeru, 2005; Ondieki, 2005; Otieno, 2005). With the take over of the 
power by the National Alliance Rainbow Coalition (NARC) in 2002, the government initiated the 
dialogue with donors on the kind of reforms that were needed among others to address issues 
related to governance, corruption and poverty. Despite showing some indication of commitment 
to economic reforms by the NARC government, corruption remained rampant and the 
government did not commit itself to policy reforms.  
Following the failure to implement donor reform agenda, in 2003 the Kenyan 
government decided to formulate its Economic Recovery Strategy (ERS) with the positive 
consideration for both economic growth and poverty reduction. The overall objective of the ERS 
was to harmonize strategies for accelerated economic growth with the country’s poverty 
reduction strategies (Sasaoka, 2005; Alia and Njeru, 2005; Ondieki 2005). The ERS was 
criticized because it was too broad and lacked direct poverty reduction objectives, which was left 
in the background by the focus on the overall economic growth strategy. In order to qualify for 
donor support, the Kenyan government was advised to formulate a more focused policy document 
to reduce poverty. In 2004 the Investment Program for Economic Recovery Strategy (IP-ERS 
2003-2007) was formulated as a poverty reduction strategy and PRSP for Kenya (Ondieki, 2005).  
2.3.3 Uganda 
Overview of the Ugandan Economy 
The Ugandan economy is predominantly agricultural, employing more than 80 percent of 
the workforce, growing food for subsistence and export crops. Over the years, agriculture 
accounted for more than 50 percent of GDP. In recent years, however, the share of the sector in 
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GDP has declined from more than 50 percent in 1994 to 33.5 percent in 2005. The service sector 
plays an important role in the Ugandan economy. The percentage share of service in total GDP of 
the country as in 2004 is calculated at 46.6 percent. Historically, the contribution of the industrial 
sector to the national output has been minimal, but it has grown recently (see Table 2.10). The 
contribution of the industrial sector to GDP has increased from less than 10 percent of GDP in the 
late 1970s to more than 20 percent in 2002-2005.  
With a per capita GDP that has remained very low over the years, between US$ 170 and 
330, or less than a dollar per day, Uganda is one of the poorest countries in the world. The 
prevalence of low income and poverty in a large part of the populace is a major feature of the 
Ugandan economy, reflected in the low development in social indicators in terms of high infant 
mortality rate, high crude death rates, low life expectancy, and low secondary school enrollments 
(see Table 2.11). Uganda has been successful, however, in raising growth rates and reducing 
poverty. Real GDP growth has averaged 6.5 percent per annum since the country began to 
implement economic reforms in 1987. The incidence of poverty has declined from 56 percent to 
44 percent of the population during the 1990s (Ssendaula, 2000). The total population of the 
country in 2004 was at 27.8 millions, growing at the annual percentage rate of 3.5, with more 
than 80 percent living in the rural areas.  
 
Origins of the Economic Crisis in Uganda 
Following its political independence in 1962 from the British government, Uganda was 
among the most vibrant economies in East Africa, with real GDP growing at an average rate of 
4.8 percent; favorable terms of trade, and healthy state of public finances. When Idi Amini came 
to power after overthrowing President Obote’s government in January 1971, the situation 
changed dramatically. This was the beginning of the deterioration of the Uganda’s economy, 
experiencing domestic and external shocks, exacerbated by the absence of sound macroeconomic 
policies; collapse of the East African Community in 1977; oil price shocks of the 1973/74 and 
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1979/80; civil strife in the 1970s; economic war of 1972, which led to the expulsion of Asians 
and expropriation of their assets and the brief war with Tanzania in 1978/79. Most of the 1970s 
and 1980s saw the country suffering from severe macroeconomic imbalances, including high 
rates of inflation and balance of payments deficits (Kiiza et al., 2006; Ndikumana and Nannyonjo, 
2007; Tumusiime-Mutebile, 2000).   
During the period from 1971 to 1986, country’s GDP shrank by 40 percent (Collier and 
Reinikka, 2001). In responding to the crisis, Uganda since 1987 has implemented economic 
reforms of macro-stabilization, structural adjustment and institutional reforms. Uganda has been 
labeled among the most successful reformers in sub-Saharan Africa (Holmgren et al., 2001; 
Tumusiime-Mutebile, 2000; Kiiza et al., 2006; Mackinnon and Reinikka, 2002; Ndikumana and 
Nannyonjo, 2007). 
Economic reforms of one form or another have been underway in Uganda since early 
1981 (the first-generation reforms), with the most radical reforms implemented since 1986 (the 
second-generation reforms). The first generation reforms focused on economic stabilization, 
economic openness and exchange rate liberalization. The second generation reforms involved 
adoption of structural adjustment programs, requiring the abolishment of state controls, 
liberalizing the economy, privatizing state-owned enterprises and abolishing subsidies on 
education and health (Kiiza et al., 2006; Tumusiine-Mutebile, 2000; Holmgren et al., 2001). 
Overall, both the first and second generation reforms resulted in the changes in trade policies, 
fiscal policies, as well as monetary and exchange rate policies. Four economic policy regimes can 
be distinguished in Uganda, namely the pre-crisis (1977-79), the crisis period (1980-85), and 
post-crisis period divided into two policy regimes-the first generation reform policy period (1987-
91) and second generation economic reforms (1992-2005).  
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Economic Reforms over the period 1980-1985 
The 1980-85 period marks the advent of home-grown structural adjustment programs 
implemented in Uganda. Like many other countries in the region, Uganda suffered severe 
macroeconomic imbalances for the most of the 1970s and 1980s. During this period the country 
experienced high rates of inflation; severe decline in real per capita GDP; and balance of 
payments deficits (Holmgren et al., 2001; Tumusiime-Mutebile, 2000; Kiiza et al., 2006). 
By 1980, the need to rehabilitate the economy was inevitable. To restart growth, the 
government under Milton Obote put a high priority on re-establishing macroeconomic stability. 
However, given the level of development at the time, the country needed long-term finances from 
external sources. This led to the first stand-by agreement with the IMF in 1981. The critical goal 
of the program was to restore macroeconomic stability through the promotion of production in the 
export crop sector; reduction of government deficits; overcome the balance of payments 
disequilibria; and restore growth (Holmgren, 2001; Kiiza et al., 2006). This focused on policies to 
encourage mobilization of domestic resource and demand management to encourage economic 
growth through realignment of the value of the Ugandan shilling; providing price incentives; 
removing price controls; increasing interest rates; and improving economic management through 
fiscal and monetary measures (Holmgren et al., 2001; Kiiza et al., 2006). The major structural 
changes that featured in the first-generation economic reform are outlined in Table 2.12.  
Despite a commitment by the Obote government to undertake pro-market reforms, there 
was little progress in achieving the goal. During this period economic performance deteriorated, 
with real GDP declining by 10 percent between 1984 and 1985; inflation went back to triple 
digits by 1985 as opposed to double digits attained in 1984; the export base was reduced to a 
single export crop, coffee, due to an overvaluation of the exchange rate. This was accompanied 
by the decline in the import volumes, reflecting the reduced capacity of the economy to finance 
imports (Holmgren et al., 2001; Kiiza et al., 2006).  
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The Ugandan government failed to improve the tax structure and tax collection. This was 
coupled with weak expenditure controls, due to growing and sustained military opposition; 
deterioration of the fiscal discipline in the period 1984-85 and accumulation of huge expenditure 
arrears, equivalent to 21 percent of total expenditure commitments during this period. Moreover, 
the monetary policies that were in place resulted in high inflation and rapid depreciation of the 
Ugandan shilling (Holmgren, 2001; Kiiza et al., 2006). In responding to fast depreciation of the 
shilling, the Ugandan government imposed restrictions on the floating exchange rates (Holmgren 
et al., 2001; Kasekende and Ssemwogere, 1994 cited by Kiiza et al., 2006). This development led 
to the violation of the monetary benchmarks that were agreed upon with the IMF. This led to the 
collapse of IMF-supported reform in 1984.  
The national output recovered from a -2.7 percent growth rate between 1971 and 1980 to 
1.7 percent over the period 1980 to 1983. Nonetheless, industrial production plummeted due to 
foreign exchange constraints and the poor state of infrastructure. Industrial production fell by 3.9 
percent per annum between 1983/83 and 1985/86. Agricultural production also failed to respond 
positively because government incentives did not trickle down to producers, resulting in the 
abandonment of the production of major export crops such as cotton, tea and tobacco. Overall, 
GDP growth averaged -0.4 percent between 1983/84 and 1985/86 (Holmgren et al. 2001). 
 
Economic Recovery Programs 1986-91 
When Yoweri Kabuta Museveni took power from Militon Obote’s government through a 
coup d'état in January 1986, the Ugandan economy and all state institutions had virtually 
collapsed. The main challenge to this government was to rebuild the economy and restore a social 
structure torn apart by decades of violent conflict under dictatorial regimes; which was 
characterized by a thin tax base; economic mismanagement; weak institutional structures; corrupt 
society and decayed bureaucracy (Ndikumana and Nannyonjo, 2007; Kiiza et al., 2006; Kayizzi-
Mugerwa, 2002). In order to address these macroeconomic problems, restore economic growth, 
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and revive its relationship with the IFIs and other multilateral and bilateral donors, the Ugandan 
government embarked on the second-generation economic recovery programs (ERP, 1987-1991). 
In 1985-86, the Ugandan economy suffered from serious policy reversal, culminating into 
tightened foreign exchange constraints; worsened budgetary discipline; and dislocation of the 
institutional framework. During this period the economy was in deep crisis: inflation rose to 296 
percent in 1986; GDP growth rate dropped from 11.7 percent in 1982 to -1.5 percent in 1986, 
external debt was extremely very high, and the balance of payments had worsened (Kiiza et al., 
2006; Holmgren et al., 2001).  
Despite deepened economic crisis in the mid-1980s, the new movement government 
under Mseveni opted for state-interventionist policies, with the belief that pro-market reforms 
were instruments of western imperialism. The government embraced the state-guided 
development strategy by implementing foreign exchange controls, state ownership of enterprises 
and price controls (Kiiza et al., 2006).  The donor communities refused to extend credit to the 
new Ugandan government. SAP conditionalities required the government to abolish state 
controls; liberalize the economy; privatize parastatals (state-owned enterprises); and abolish 
subsidies on education and health (Kiiza et al., 2006; Holmgren et al., 2001). 
The economy suffered from serious policy reversal, foreign exchange constraints 
tightened, the budgetary discipline deteriorated, the institutional framework was further disrupted, 
inflation rate soared, and GDP growth rate declined (Holmgren et al., 2001; Kiiza et al., 2006). In 
trying to address the situation, the new government sought assistance in designing and 
implementing an Economic Recovery Program (ERP) from a team of economists both local and 
foreign, which advocated for radical reforms.  
In May 1987, the government embarked on IFI-supported reforms. The main objectives 
of the reform package were to promote economic growth; reduce inflation by tightening 
budgetary and monetary policies; reduce balance of payments deficits; strengthen institutional 
framework; generate surplus foreign reserves; and rehabilitate major sectors of the economy 
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(Holmgren et al., 2001; Kiiza et al., 2006; Tumusiine-Mutebile, 2000). The ERP policy packages 
are as summarized in Table 2.12.  
Over the period 1987-91, the economy experienced excessive growth in domestic credit, 
emanating from weaknesses in monitoring the program and failure to take appropriate mitigation 
measures when problems emerged. During this period the government monetized the budget 
deficit averaging at 10.2 percent of GDP in 1991-92 as opposed to 3.5 percent in the previous 
years. Public expenditure increased from 16 percent in 1990-91 to 23 percent in 1991-92, 
resulting in the rise of inflation rates to 58 percent by March 1992, hence the violation of the IFIs’ 
benchmarks in the monetary program. Donors delayed the disbursement of funds in 1991 in lieu 
of requiring the Ugandan government to implement economic reforms such as foreign exchange 
auction, which led to a fiscal crisis (Holmgren et al. 2001). 
 
Economic Reforms 1992-2005 
Between 1992 and 2005 the government implemented wide-ranging policies intended to 
eliminate structural bottlenecks that constrained progress in economic stabilization. This was 
meant to address the problems that emerged during the period 1987-91. The program included 
institutional and public management reforms. During this period, Uganda entered into a period of 
sustained reforms. Following the restoration of fiscal imbalances, a three-year ESAF program 
was agreed with the IMF in 1994. The program focused on structural reforms, fiscal objectives 
and reserves accumulation (Holmgren et al., 2001; Kiiza et al., 2006).  
Although President Museveni’s government was strongly committed to policy reforms, 
the first and second generation reforms had not effectively addressed the economic and social 
problems of the majority of Ugandans. As a result, the Ugandan government embarked on a pro-
poor growth package reforms. The Ugandan government formulated the Poverty Eradication 
Action Plan (PEAP) in 1997 under the World Bank PRSPs and the IMF Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility (IPRGF) as a response to poverty problems (Antingi-Ego, 2006; Williamson, 
  35 
2006; Kiiza et al., 2006; Miovic, 2004). The policy packages during this period are presented in 
Table 2.13.  
2.4 Conclusions 
It is apparent from this chapter that policy reforms implemented in East African countries 
had broadly similar frameworks and objectives. The chapter reveals that foreign aid has played a 
significant role in the implementation of economic reforms in the three countries. Aid was used 
by the donor community as leverage for implementing economic reforms.  
For the three countries, donors have relatively increased the amount of aid to Uganda and 
Tanzania in the form of General Budget Support (Levin, 1999; Danielson and Eriksson, 2001; 
Holmgren, et al., 2001; Bigsten et al., 2001; McGillivray and Morrissey, 2004; Williamson, 
2006). Much of the aid to Kenya is no longer paid as budget support; instead it is granted directed 
to NGOs such as churches, citizen’s associations, women’s group, the private business sectors 
and individuals (O’Brien and Ryan, 2001; Were et al., 2006). This corroborates with the figures 
in Tables 2.1, 2.6 and 2.10, where the ratio of ODA to GDP is higher in Uganda and Tanzania 
than in Kenya. This is probably because Uganda and Tanzania were relatively committed to 
donor policy agendas as compared to Kenya.  
The implementation process in the three countries, however, has faced the resistance 
from within the government and civil society, thus contributing to delays and reversals of policy 
reforms. In part, this was due to the fact that policy reform was considered to be the agenda of 
donors and lacked local ownership. Governments implemented reforms in order to please donors 
when they were desperate in need of funds. This had implications for the effectiveness and 
sustainability of economic reforms in these countries.  
Uganda has been labeled more liberal, and its commitment to policy reform has been 
strong as compared to its neighbor-counterparts Tanzania and Kenya. This is reflected by the 
measure of trade restriction-the average applied tariff rate in Tables 2.1, 2.6 and 2.10. It is evident 
  36 
from the tables that Uganda reduced its tariff rates significantly as opposed to Tanzania and 
Kenya. Among the three countries, Uganda showed the most sustained commitment to economic 
reforms during President Museveni’s regime, although at the beginning there were delays in the 
implementation process. In Tanzania, in contrast, commitment to reforms came late, when 
President Mkapa took control of the government between 1996 and 2005, at the time when 
reforms had already gone off-track.  
Economic reform has been conducive to economic growth in the three countries. This is 
evident when looking at the trends in economic growth depicted in Tables 2.1, 2.6 and 2.10 for 
Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, respectively. It can be observed that Uganda’s economic growth 
picked when Museveni took power. Similarly, the Tanzanian economy started to show signs of 
sustained growth in 1996, when Mkapa took over from president Mwinyi. Kenya’s economic 
growth, on the other hand, has been stagnant over the period under evaluation. The three East 
African countries have also successfully reduced the levels of inflation down to single-digit rates. 
Despite commitment to reforms, the budget deficits and trade imbalances have remained high 
(see Table 2.1, 2.6 and 2.10). Furthermore, institutional reforms have not yet been fully 
implemented in the three countries, although these are considered to be crucial for an effective 
implementation of policy reforms. Political economy issues such as corruption, governance, legal 
framework enforcement and political stability need to be addressed in order to enhance the 
effectiveness of policy reforms. 
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Table 2.1: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators for Tanzania, 1970-2005 
 
Year PCY YG INF TBL PDF TRD AGR SEV IND ODA LON GRT ATF 
1970 119 3 3.49 -2.50 -6.12 35.02 31 29.50 20 3.35 50.00 50.00 NA 
1971 124 4.2 4.78 -5.67 -3.76 37.08 30 29.20 22 3.73 53.08 46.92 NA 
1972 136 6.7 7.64 -2.63 -4.09 36.72 30 28.70 22 3.26 31.00 69.00 NA 
1973 157 3.1 10.40 -4.40 -3.88 33.89 30 29.40 22 4.42 37.94 62.06 NA 
1974 182 2.5 19.60 -11.45 -8.70 35.69 29 31.40 20 5.87 40.45 59.55 NA 
1975 203 5.9 26.06 -11.30 -4.21 32.33 31 31.40 20 9.21 38.03 61.97 NA 
1976 213 6.4 6.86 -2.80 -5.50 28.19 33 31.40 26 7.74 28.94 71.06 NA 
1977 247 0.4 7.7 -4.85 -3.59 25.87 34 31.80 25 8.24 38.45 61.55 NA 
1978 286 1.2 14.3 -13.08 -11.72 26.80 35 33.90 26 11.58 22.36 77.64 NA 
1979 293 3.3 12.5 -10.44 -11.25 24.86 36 34.70 23 12.10 25.12 74.88 NA 
1980 330 3 27.8 -12.03 -12.12 24.92 35 34.10 22 13.17 20.05 79.95 NA 
1981 368 -0.5 26.1 -8.34 -13.41 20.72 36 35.40 20 9.87 28.87 71.13 NA 
1982 377 0.6 27.6 -8.91 -9.10 14.65 40 35.30 17 9.07 29.55 70.45 23.9 
1983 368 -2.4 29.7 -4.90 -8.08 13.11 42 36.10 15 7.78 28.75 71.25 NA 
1984 327 3.4 35.4 -4.27 -9.16 16.10 43 35.60 15 7.95 24.52 75.48 NA 
1985 349 4.6 32.3 -8.12 -7.21 14.06 42 35.10 15 6.28 17.83 82.17 NA 
1986 238 1.9 32.6 -10.79 -13.33 19.83 44 34.40 16 13.97 16.35 83.65 32.1 
1987 162 4.9 29.8 -17.19 -11.26 25.31 42 34.10 17 24.00 28.14 71.86 NA 
1988 183 4.1 31.8 -12.09 -8.02 36.61 50 33.80 13 23.13 22.64 77.36 29.8 
1989 189 4 30.3 -13.69 -6.74 41.27 48 33.70 18 19.42 21.77 78.23 28.2 
1990 179 4.5 35.8 -22.58 -7.87 47.57 44 36.39 18 26.49 29.43 70.57 29.7 
1991 195 5.7 38.7 -23.33 -7.74 46.56 47 34.97 17 22.72 24.70 75.30 NA 
1992 168 8.1 21.8 -23.76 -4.92 48.29 46 35.80 18 29.95 34.70 65.30 33.0 
1993 150 1.2 24 -25.20 -3.70 59.65 45 36.32 17 28.51 18.62 81.38 27.5 
1994 154 1.6 35.5 -21.78 -2.17 64.83 43 39.88 17 21.94 24.47 75.53 27.5 
1995 174 3.6 27.4 -19.15 1.88 65.05 45 38.36 17 17.12 23.50 76.50 24.5 
1996 210 4.6 21 -6.56 1.20 58.07 46 37.75 17 14.00 27.67 72.33 24.4 
1997 241 3.5 16.1 -5.85 -2.50 43.99 45 38.92 17 11.78 30.41 69.59 22.3 
1998 258 3.7 12.9 -7.03 -1.23 42.80 44 39.81 17 12.78 23.71 76.29 21.3 
1999 261 3.5 7.8 -9.52 -1.72 39.69 44 39.41 17 12.11 32.70 67.30 18.0 
2000 269 5.1 6 -7.40 -1.22 37.93 44 39.22 17 12.25 21.71 78.29 17.9 
2001 274 6.2 5.2 -7.56 -0.52 40.98 44 39.39 17 14.15 16.35 83.65 17.9 
2002 277 7.2 4.5 -6.21 -1.59 41.65 44 39.17 18 13.65 18.11 81.89 15.2 
2003 287 7.1 3.5 -7.82 -3.38 45.64 44 38.44 18 17.53 35.96 64.04 14.3 
2004 310 6.7 4.2 -4.31 -5.27 45.57 45 37.12 18 17.14 23.80 76.20 13.5 
2005 337 7 4.3 NA NA NA NA 37.65 NA 12.64 26.47 73.53 12.2 
 
Note: PCY: Per capita GDP; YG: Annual GDP growth rate; INF: Inflation rate; TBL: Trade balance (% of GDP); PDF: Public Budget 
deficit (% of GDP); TRD: Trade volume (export + import as % of GDP); AGR: share of agriculture sector in the economy (% GDP); 
SEV: share of service sector in the economy (% GDP), IND: share of industry sector in the economy (% GDP); ODA: Share of 
official development assistance in GDP; LON: share of loans in total ODA; GRT: share of grants in total ODA; ATF: the average 
applied tariff rate. 
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Table 2.2: Selected Social Indicators for Tanzania 
 
YEAR ALT INFM CRD CRB LFE DYC SEP SES 
1980 51.00 115.80 13.80 46.50 53.70 2197.00 92.50 3.30 
1985 44.00 110.70 12.90 45.30 54.90 2220.00 75.10 3.30 
1987 41.20 109.30 12.80 45.00 54.90 2198.00 71.10 3.80 
1988 39.80 108.80 13.00 44.40 64.40 1806.00 69.40 4.20 
1989 38.40 108.40 13.20 43.90 53.90 2189.00 69.40 4.50 
1990 37.10 108.00 13.30 43.40 53.40 2066.00 69.70 4.90 
1991 35.80 107.50 13.50 42.90 52.90 2100.00 69.90 5.30 
1992 34.60 107.10 13.70 42.40 52.40 1983.00 69.00 5.30 
1993 33.30 106.60 14.00 41.90 51.60 1950.00 68.90 5.30 
1994 32.10 106.00 14.40 41.50 50.70 1912.00 67.50 5.30 
1995 30.80 105.50 14.80 41.10 49.90 1884.00 66.80 5.40 
1996 29.70 105.00 15.20 40.60 49.00 1898.00 66.10 5.30 
1997 28.50 104.50 15.60 40.20 48.20 1846.00 66.50 5.60 
1998 27.30 104.50 15.80 39.80 47.70 1934.00 62.20 6.00 
1999 26.20 104.50 16.00 39.30 47.30 1946.00 64.00 5.80 
2000 25.00 104.50 16.20 38.90 46.90 1938.00 66.00 36.00 
2001 24.00 104.50 16.50 38.50 46.40 1949.00 72.00 NA 
2002 23.00 104.40 16.70 38.10 46.00 1955.00 87.00 NA 
2003 21.90 104.30 16.60 37.50 46.10 1955.00 95.00 NA 
2004 20.90 104.20 16.50 37.00 46.20 1963.00 101.00 NA 
2005 19.90 104.20 16.40 36.40 46.40 NA 106.00 NA 
 
Notes: ALT: Total adult illiteracy rate (as % of 15-64 age group); INFM: Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births); CRD: Crude 
death rate (per 1,000 people); CRB: Crude birth rate (per 1,000 mothers); LFE: Life expectancy at birth (years); DYC: Daily calorie 
supply (per capita); SEP: Primary school enrolment ratio (% gross); SES: Secondary school enrolment ratio (% gross). 
 
 
 
 
 
  39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.3: Home-Grown Policy Reforms in Tanzania, 1980-1985 
 
Policy Reform 
Areas 
Timing Policy Measures Policy Reform Objectives 
Policy Reforms Under NESP, 1981-82 
Trade Reform 1981 Export Taxes abolished Bolster agricultural exports 
Exchange rate 
reform 
1981-82 Domestic Currency 
overvalued 
Improve country’s competitiveness in exports 
Fiscal Reform: 
-Expenditure 
Policies 
-Tax Policies 
1981-82 
 
 
1979-81 
Tight control on public 
expenditure 
 
Excise tax abolished 
To reduce fiscal deficits 
 
 
To increase tax revenue 
Own Structural Policy Reform Packages, 1982-1985 
1984-85 Partial import 
liberalization 
to address the foreign exchange constraint 
through lifting a variety of import controls and 
introduction of “own-funds” imports 
1984-85 Export-retention scheme 
introduced 
exporters were allowed to retain a share of their 
proceeds, meant to promote exports 
Trade Reforms 
1984-85 Own-Fund Imports 
Scheme introduced 
To allow imports purchased with foreign 
currency deposited abroad, meant to address 
foreign exchange constraints 
Exchange rate 
liberalization 
1984 partial devaluation of the 
domestic currency 
To improve the balance of payments;  
 
To improve the country’s competitiveness 
Fiscal Reforms 
-Expenditure 
policies 
1985 cost sharing scheme 
introduced 
to finance basic social services; whereby parents 
were required to contribute to secondary 
education, and development levy was re-
introduced for all those who were eligible (i.e. 18 
years old and above) 
Tax Policies 1983 Income tax amended 
 1985 import duties and sales tax 
were reduced 
 
To increase tax revenue 
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Table 2.4: ERP Policy Reforms in Tanzania, 1986-89 
 
Policy Reform 
Package 
Timing Policy Measures Policy Objectives 
1988-90 -deregulation of imports 
and local trade  
 
-removal of restrictions on 
trade 
-promote the country’s competitiveness in 
exports 
 
-to improve the balance of payments 
-to reduce protection 
1988-90 Rationalize tariff systems 
(tariff rates reduced) 
To promote export growth so as to address trade 
imbalances  
1988-90 open general license 
(OGL) system was 
introduced 
to ease access to import licenses and improve 
country’s competitiveness in order to give 
impetus to export growth 
Trade Reform 
1987 producer prices for export 
crops raised 
To increase agricultural output and boost export 
growth 
1986-87 devaluation of the 
exchange rate 
to eliminate exchange rate overvaluation and to 
maintain equilibrium rate 
1989 Nominal exchange rate 
adjustment 
To increase tax revenue generation from export 
duties 
Exchange rate 
reform 
1988-90 own-fund and export 
retention schemes 
simplified and widened in 
scope 
to allow easier access to foreign exchange for 
importers 
1985 Retrenchment of civil 
servant  
Cut spending on wage and salaries 
1988-89 Redirected expenditure to 
priority areas- repair 
transport infrastructure 
To allocate recurrent spending to activities 
promoting both output of food and exportable 
agricultural crops 
1989 Restrained external debt 
burden 
To reduce debt monetization, bank borrowing 
and fiscal deficit 
 Reduced defense spending To limit public spending growth to 15 percent 
per annum 
1987 Tax institute established to train tax administrators so as to improve tax 
administration and tax collection 
Fiscal Policy: 
a. Public Sector 
Reform 
 
b. Expenditure 
management 
 
 
 
 
 
c. Tax Reform 1988-89 -Reduction and 
rationalization of domestic 
sales taxes  
-sales taxes converted to 
ad-valorem taxes  
-income tax reduced 
To eliminate tax distortions between sectors 
To promote economic growth and maintain high 
levels of revenue generation 
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Table 2.5: Second Generation Policy Reform in Tanzania 
 
Policy Reform 
Areas 
Timing Policy Measures Policy Reform Objectives 
Policy Reforms under ESAP, 1988-92 
1988-90 Tariff levels reduced 
Own-Funds import continued 
To promote export,  increase tax 
revenue and to address foreign exchange 
constraints 
1990 Liberalization of Agricultural 
marketing 
To boost agricultural exports 
 
Trade Reform 
1990 Rationalized and reduced import 
duties 
to address the foreign exchange 
constraint 
Exchange rate 1989-90 Export Retention scheme 
abolished and OGL expanded 
Improve access to foreign exchange 
 
Fiscal Reform:  
Expenditure 
1990-91 restructuring and privatization of 
public enterprises  
Reduce the fiscal deficits, improve the 
efficiency of public enterprises and limit 
borrowing 
Tax reform 1989 -Reduction and rationalization of 
domestic sales taxes 
-Excise duty introduced 
-Tax commission established 
to broaden the tax base 
 
To strengthen the tax system and 
mobilize domestic revenue 
Successful or Second Recovery Policy Reforms in Tanzania, 1996-2005 
1997-98 
 
Tariff Band reduced to 5 
 
Promote exports and enhance revenue 
collection 
1997/98 COMESA tariff suspended  
1998 COMESA tariff reintroduced To increase tax revenue 
1998-99 Export duty on traditional export 
eliminated and all export 
restriction removed 
To promote exports and increase tax 
revenue from exports 
 
Trade Reforms 
2000 Pull out of COMESA  
1996 Cash Budget introduced To create a prudent fiscal management 
so as to ensure that the cash budget 
spent up to the equivalent of estimated 
revenue and grants 
Fiscal reforms: 
Expenditure 
 Integrated financial management 
system introduced 
To foster coordination and collaboration 
among various ministries and the 
treasury, monitor expenditure and 
enhance transparency in budget 
management 
1996 Tanzania Revenue Authority 
established 
To enhance revenue and address the 
problem of massive tax exemption and 
evasion 
1996 Value-added Tax introduced Broaden the tax base and minimize 
revenue leakage 
Tax reform 
1996-97 Sources of revenue differential on 
imports tax rate between 
Mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar 
eliminated 
To limit discretionary exemptions 
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Table 2.6: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators for Kenya, 1970-2005 
  
Year PCY YG  INF  
 
TBL  PDF  TRD  AGR 
SEV 
IND 
ODA LON GRT ATF 
1970 291.02 -7.91 2.19 -2.93 -6.24 60.49 33.29 46.87 19.83 2.79 50.40 49.60 NA 
1971 343.18 17.93 3.78 -3.71 -10.05 63.83 31.38 48.25 20.38 2.98 48.54 51.46 NA 
1972 387.63 12.95 5.83 -3.93 -6.42 55.31 35.19 44.39 20.41 4.04 22.45 77.55 NA 
1973 395.83 2.12 9.28 -4.56 -4.23 56.06 35.46 43.80 20.74 3.29 49.65 50.35 NA 
1974 397.10 0.32 17.81 -2.87 -10.76 74.57 35.36 43.93 20.70 3.33 43.74 56.26 NA 
1975 386.11 -2.77 19.12 -4.82 -8.02 64.34 34.15 45.60 20.25 3.22 36.75 63.25 NA 
1976 380.12 -1.55 11.45 -5.14 -3.28 64.21 37.90 43.49 18.60 3.74 38.78 61.22 NA 
1977 400.94 5.48 14.82 -3.26 -1.23 66.55 41.95 40.06 17.99 3.06 36.96 63.04 NA 
1978 413.00 3.01 16.93 -4.09 -9.93 67.62 36.92 43.00 20.07 4.19 39.90 60.10 NA 
1979 428.09 3.65 7.98 -5.87 -7.01 57.36 34.60 45.55 19.85 4.68 41.27 58.73 NA 
1980 435.24 1.67 13.86 -4.42 -12.99 65.42 32.59 46.56 20.85 4.48 40.13 59.87 NA 
1981 434.78 -0.11 11.60 0.00 -10.05 64.28 32.50 47.22 20.28 5.35 36.09 63.91 NA 
1982 424.79 -2.30 20.67 -0.26 -7.25 58.22 33.36 46.70 19.94 6.00 48.55 51.45 40.3 
1983 414.28 -2.47 11.40 1.29 -4.89 54.16 34.22 46.41 19.37 5.39 34.28 65.72 NA 
1984 405.96 -2.01 10.28 -1.08 -5.51 58.80 33.97 47.12 18.91 5.33 34.73 65.27 41.7 
1985 407.98 0.50 13.01 -1.80 -5.86 55.45 32.59 48.33 19.07 5.80 33.00 67.00 NA 
1986 421.59 3.33 2.53 -5.72 -4.59 55.74 33.04 48.38 18.58 5.19 28.60 71.40 39.2 
1987 430.90 2.21 8.64 -3.11 -7.51 47.70 31.55 49.96 18.49 5.86 34.29 65.71 39.2 
1988 441.88 2.55 12.26 -3.48 -8.27 49.98 29.89 50.50 19.61 8.17 37.43 62.57 41.7 
1989 447.06 1.17 13.79 -3.54 -10.92 53.16 30.19 50.78 19.03 10.24 50.26 49.74 37.5 
1990 450.58 0.79 17.78 -3.49 -10.23 57.02 29.52 51.44 19.04 15.68 31.83 68.17 43.7 
1991 442.53 -1.79 20.08 -4.95 -7.60 55.41 28.14 52.18 19.67 10.52 41.87 58.13 34.0 
1992 425.43 -3.86 27.33 -1.24 -7.28 52.93 28.74 52.88 18.38 8.95 28.68 71.32 33.6 
1993 414.22 -2.63 45.98 -2.25 -6.62 72.86 31.52 51.58 16.89 13.53 43.33 56.67 31.9 
1994 413.04 -0.29 28.81 -3.89 -5.75 71.27 33.32 49.43 17.25 8.52 35.32 64.68 32.1 
1995 419.60 1.59 1.55 -2.35 -9.55 67.79 32.35 52.85 17.46 7.18 45.26 54.74 22.0 
1996 425.79 1.48 8.86 -0.58 -7.31 53.86 30.74 50.93 18.33 6.22 48.12 51.88 13.5 
1997 417.35 -1.98 11.36 -0.57 -9.12 51.43 30.91 51.32 17.77 4.55 35.50 64.50 19.0 
1998 420.97 0.87 6.72 -1.06 -9.00 46.68 31.23 51.27 17.50 4.06 38.38 61.62 19.9 
1999 420.82 -0.03 5.74 0.53 -9.24 46.52 32.38 50.81 16.80 3.78 30.51 69.49 18.0 
2000 414.00 -1.62 9.98 0.80 -11.70 51.16 32.36 50.72 16.92 5.25 48.90 51.10 18.1 
2001 422.84 2.14 5.74 -2.94 -13.89 53.37 30.65 51.45 16.54 4.67 33.26 66.74 19.2 
2002 415.56 -1.72 1.96 -4.49 -8.51 53.23 28.27 52.67 16.85 4.23 28.06 71.94 16.8 
2003 418.00 0.59 9.82 -2.45 8.64 52.19 27.79 53.04 16.78 4.76 29.52 70.48 15.2 
2004 426.56 2.05 11.62 -5.73 -11.76 57.94 26.75 54.17 17.19 4.93 23.09 76.91 16.3 
2005 428.41 0.43 10.31 -3.55 NA 55.56 27.36 54.44 17.78 4.90 22.58 77.42 12.1 
 
Note: PCY: Per capita GDP; YG: Annual GDP growth rate; INF: Inflation rate; TBL: Trade balance (% of GDP); PDF: Public Budget 
deficit (% of GDP); TRD: Trade volume (export + import as % of GDP); AGR: share of agriculture sector in the economy (% GDP); 
SEV: share of service sector in the economy (% GDP), IND: share of industry sector in the economy (% GDP); ODA: Share of 
official development assistance in GDP; LON: share of loans in total ODA; GRT: share of grants in total ODA; ATF: the average 
applied tariff rate 
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Table 2.7: Selected Social Indicators for Kenya 
 
YEAR ALT INFM CRD CRB LFE DYC SEP SES 
1980 43.80 73.70 11.40 48.90 57.70 2255.00 115.20 19.60 
1985 36.50 67.90 10.40 46.40 58.90 2266.00 99.00 21.30 
1987 33.60 67.10 10.20 45.00 59.00 2147.00 98.20 23.30 
1988 32.20 66.20 10.20 43.70 58.60 2089.00 96.80 23.00 
1989 30.70 65.40 10.20 42.40 58.20 2090.00 98.20 26.00 
1990 29.20 64.60 10.20 41.10 57.80 1984.00 95.00 24.10 
1991 28.00 63.80 10.30 39.80 57.50 1987.00 93.00 27.90 
1992 26.70 63.00 10.30 38.50 57.10 1973.00 91.70 27.30 
1993 25.50 63.40 10.90 38.30 55.80 1906.00 90.50 25.70 
1994 24.20 63.80 11.50 38.10 54.40 2064.00 86.90 24.80 
1995 23.00 64.30 12.10 37.90 53.10 2089.00 84.90 24.40 
1996 21.90 64.70 12.80 37.70 51.80 2033.00 84.20 23.80 
1997 20.80 65.20 13.40 37.50 50.50 2054.00 86.00 32.70 
1998 19.70 65.70 13.80 37.70 49.80 2086.00 90.70 30.00 
1999 18.70 66.20 14.20 38.00 49.10 2132.00 93.00 38.00 
2000 17.60 66.70 14.70 38.20 48.40 2147.00 98.00 39.00 
2001 16.70 67.20 15.10 38.50 47.70 2158.00 96.00 32.00 
2002 15.80 67.80 15.50 38.80 47.00 2142.00 94.00 41.00 
2003 14.90 66.80 15.20 38.90 47.70 2166.00 111.00 44.00 
2004 14.00 65.80 14.80 39.10 48.30 2149.00 111.00 48.00 
2005 13.10 64.80 14.50 39.20 49.00 NA NA NA 
 
Notes: ALT: Total adult illiteracy rate (as % of 15-64 age group); INFM: Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births); CRD: Crude 
death rate (per 1,000 people); CRB: Crude birth rate (per 1,000 mothers); LFE: Life expectancy at birth (years); DYC: Daily calorie 
supply (per capita); SEP: Primary school enrolment ratio (% gross); SES: Secondary school enrolment ratio (% gross). 
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Table 2.8: Economic Policy Reforms in Kenya, 1980-1991 
 
Policy Reform 
Areas 
Timing Policy Measures Policy Reform Objectives 
Home-Grown Policy Reforms, 1980-86 
1983 elimination, rationalization and 
replacement of quantitative 
restrictions with equivalent tariffs 
To address foreign exchange constraints 
and promote exports 
1980/81 Import controls relaxed to address the foreign exchange constraint 
1982 Import licenses introduced to address the foreign exchange constraint 
Trade Policies 
1984 export compensation scheme re-
introduced 
to promote exports and increase tax revenue 
from exports  
SAP Policy Measures, 1985-91 
1990 Tariff rates reduced and rationalized Promote export growth and enhance 
revenue collection 
1991-93 Export promotion strategy 
established 
1993 Export processing zone established 
1993 Export compensation scheme 
reintroduced 
1993 export compensation abolished 
 
 
 
 
To give impetus to export growth 
 
 Manufacturing under bond 
established 
To allow customs authorities to waive 
import duties on imported inputs used in the 
production of export goods 
1993 Full import liberalization To promote export growth 
Trade policies 
Late 1993 Full foreign exchange liberalization To address foreign exchange constraints 
and give impetus to export growth 
Fiscal Reform 
-Expenditure 
Policies 
1989 Cost Sharing introduced To reduce fiscal deficits 
 1991 Parastatal Restructuring To promote efficiency and productivity of 
public enterprises 
-Tax policies 1990 A duty/VAT import exemption 
introduced 
To increase tax revenue 
 1991 Tax exemption abolished To broaden the tax base and increase tax 
revenue 
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Table 2.9: Second Generation Economic Reforms in Kenya, 1991-2005 
 
Policy Reform 
Area 
Timing Policy Measure Policy Reform Objectives 
Third Phase Economic Reforms, 1991-96 
Trade Policies 1992-95 Average tariff rate reduced 
 1992 Retention scheme introduced 
 March 1993 Import licensing reinstated 
 
To give impetus to export growth 
 
 February 1994 Capital Controls relaxed 
 1993-94 Current accounts and capital 
account restrictions lifted 
 March 1993 Retention accounts suspended 
 May 1993 Retention accounts 
reintroduced 
 
 
 
 
To reduce current account deficits (trade 
imbalance) 
Exchange rate 
Policies 
1991 Foreign Exchange Market 
liberalized 
 February1993 Foreign exchange allocation 
abandoned 
 March 1993 Foreign Exchange controls 
reinstated 
 May 1993 Import licensing abolished 
 October 1993 Official exchange rate 
abolished-floating exchange 
rate introduced 
 1995 -Foreign exchange restrictions 
eliminated 
-Foreign exchange bureau de 
change permitted 
-Exchange Control Act 
abolished 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To address foreign exchange constraints and 
promote export growth 
1993/94 Retrenchment of civil servants 
1990-95 Restructuring and 
privatization of public 
enterprises 
Fiscal Policies 
-Expenditure 
policies 
1992 Use-fees reintroduced 
 
 
To reduce fiscal deficits 
Tax policies 1993 Export taxes abolished Promote export growth 
Policy Reforms during  the period 1997-2005  
1997-98 -Tariff bands reduced to 3 
-Tariff rate reduced 
Trade Policies 
2000-01 Suspended duties abolished 
 
To promote export growth and increase tax 
revenue from export taxes 
Fiscal Policies 
-Expenditure 
Policies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1998-2000 
-Restructuring and 
privatization of public 
enterprises 
-retrenchment of civil servants 
-reduce the size of the 
government 
-Medium term expenditure 
framework introduced 
 
 
 
To move revenue and expenditure more 
closely into balance and achieve fiscal 
discipline (reduce fiscal deficits) 
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Table 2.10: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators for Uganda, 1977-2005 
 
Year PCY YG  TBL PDF INF  TRD  AGR SEV IND ODA LON GRT ATF 
1977 232 1.4 -2.63 1.44 NA 16.95 73.97 18.99 7.04 0.85 40.41 59.59 NA 
1978 231 -4 -0.25 -1.40 NA 32.52 74.27 20.57 5.16 1.36 54.96 45.04 NA 
1979 212 -12.5 -3.54 1.87 NA 36.93 65.57 30.27 4.16 2.25 10.75 89.25 NA 
1980 218 -2.5 -2.71 -6.59 NA 45.48 72.03 23.48 4.49 4.17 28.15 71.85 NA 
1981 241 3.9 -3.41 -12.62 108.74 38.14 58.43 34.83 6.74 5.01 14.25 85.75 NA 
1982 267 7.8 -3.45 -6.42 49.27 25.90 53.73 34.82 11.44 4.08 42.51 57.49 NA 
1983 286 6.3 -2.06 -2.85 24.05 22.30 57.57 32.98 9.44 4.30 35.20 64.80 NA 
1984 274 -4.6 -2.12 1.89 42.73 27.02 54.82 34.32 10.86 4.32 41.97 58.03 NA 
1985 272 -0.3 -2.37 -0.36 157.66 28.75 52.74 37.38 9.88 4.68 55.61 44.39 NA 
1986 298 1.5 -2.56 -4.43 160.98 28.05 56.61 33.16 10.23 4.54 36.99 63.01 30.0 
1987 322 6.4 -2.54 -9.32 200.03 26.29 56.75 33.17 10.08 6.10 51.16 48.84 19.9 
1988 354 7.8 -0.89 -7.51 196.12 25.35 56.71 33.10 10.19 7.13 38.33 61.67 NA 
1989 301 6.9 -1.25 -8.96 61.44 26.05 56.79 32.51 10.70 10.21 50.93 49.07 NA 
1990 206 6.2 -3.70 -10.80 33.12 26.61 56.58 32.36 11.06 18.84 50.09 49.91 NA 
1991 161 5.5 -2.58 -12.00 28.07 29.40 52.82 34.82 12.36 23.23 39.27 60.73 NA 
1992 167 4.6 -7.31 -11.24 52.44 33.05 51.12 35.67 13.21 23.17 38.44 61.56 NA 
1993 167 7.1 -2.89 -10.01 6.00 28.24 51.54 35.36 13.09 19.19 39.65 60.35 NA 
1994 255 10.8 -3.35 -8.65 10.00 27.84 49.92 36.21 13.87 15.41 44.87 55.13 17.1 
1995 289 9.4 -6.47 -8.59 9.00 32.62 49.39 36.32 14.29 14.53 37.90 62.10 16.8 
1996 285 6.2 -7.40 -13.16 7.00 35.39 45.14 38.68 16.18 12.09 37.24 62.76 12.8 
1997 297 5.5 -6.10 -8.05 7.00 34.16 41.98 40.46 17.55 12.71 41.37 58.63 13.2 
1998 277 9.7 -5.66 -11.55 6.40 30.04 42.07 39.85 18.08 14.47 27.29 72.71 10.0 
1999 255 6.5 -5.75 -11.42 6.00 36.51 38.40 41.70 19.90 11.81 29.05 70.95 10.4 
2000 236 4.4 -8.88 -12.88 2.80 34.23 37.34 42.36 20.30 16.16 26.18 73.82 8.2 
2001 230 6.4 -10.55 -13.65 3.50 36.40 36.38 43.38 20.24 15.91 38.56 61.44 8.0 
2002 232 4.7 -12.16 -14.84 4.20 38.49 30.96 47.48 21.56 13.85 18.10 81.90 7.8 
2003 240 6.3 -10.57 -14.39 8.70 39.00 32.35 46.45 21.20 16.91 31.43 68.57 7.3 
2004 281 5.7 -9.70 -14.12 3.70 41.21 32.17 46.64 21.19 17.88 12.56 87.44 6.9 
2005 316 5.6 -7.79 -13.08 8.15 42.33 33.51 42.53 20.93 14.32 18.08 81.92 12.3 
 
Note: PCY: Per capita GDP; YG: Annual GDP growth rate; INF: Inflation rate; TBL: Trade balance (% of GDP); PDF: Public Budget 
deficit (% of GDP); TRD: Trade volume (export + import as % of GDP); AGR: share of agriculture sector in the economy (% GDP); 
SEV: share of service sector in the economy (% GDP), IND: share of industry sector in the economy (% GDP); ODA: Share of 
official development assistance in GDP; LON: share of loans in total ODA; GRT: share of grants in total ODA; ATF: the average 
applied tariff rate 
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Table 2.11: Selected Social Indicators for Uganda 
 
YEAR ALT INF CRD CRB LFE DYC SEP SES 
1980 54.10 106.20 16.00 49.70 50.10 2061.00 49.50 5.00 
1985 49.00 102.20 16.30 49.90 49.20 2099.00 73.20 10.00 
1987 46.90 98.90 16.40 50.00 48.70 2157.00 79.70 13.20 
1988 45.90 97.20 16.80 50.00 47.70 2223.00 84.00 13.60 
1989 44.90 95.40 17.30 49.90 46.70 2346.00 79.40 13.20 
1990 43.90 93.70 17.80 49.90 45.70 2321.00 71.00 13.20 
1991 42.70 92.00 18.30 49.80 44.60 2276.00 75.00 12.10 
1992 41.60 90.00 18.70 49.80 43.60 2226.00 74.00 11.80 
1993 40.50 89.40 18.70 49.70 43.40 2260.00 74.00 11.40 
1994 39.30 88.40 18.70 49.70 43.20 2258.00 73.00 11.70 
1995 38.20 87.50 18.80 49.70 43.10 2271.00 74.00 12.00 
1996 37.20 86.60 18.80 49.60 42.90 2198.00 76.00 13.60 
1997 36.10 85.70 18.80 49.60 42.70 2191.00 128.00 14.00 
1998 35.10 84.80 18.20 49.70 43.50 2282.00 143.00 10.00 
1999 34.00 83.90 17.70 49.80 44.30 2300.00 126.00 10.00 
2000 33.00 83.00 17.20 49.90 45.10 2327.00 127.00 16.00 
2001 32.10 82.10 16.60 50.10 46.00 2346.00 130.00 16.00 
2002 31.20 81.20 16.10 50.20 46.80 2388.00 134.00 19.00 
2003 30.20 80.30 15.60 50.30 47.90 2337.00 134.00 19.00 
2004 29.30 79.40 15.10 50.50 48.90 2348.00 125.00 19.00 
2005 28.40 78.40 14.50 50.70 50.00 NA 118.00 16.00 
 
Notes: ALT: Total adult illiteracy rate (as % of 15-64 age group); INFM: Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births); 
CRD: Crude death rate (per 1,000 people); CRB: Crude birth rate (per 1,000 mothers); LFE: Life expectancy at birth 
(years); DYC: Daily calorie supply (per capita); SEP: Primary school enrolment ratio (% gross); SES: Secondary 
school enrolment ratio (% gross). 
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Table 2.12: Uganda’s Policy Reforms Over the Period 1980-1991 
 
Policy Reform 
Area 
Timing Policy Measures Policy Reform Objectives 
Home-Grown Policy Reforms over the period 1980-85 
1981-84 State controls on products 
and factor prices abolished 
Improve country’s competitiveness in export 
crops so as to restore economic growth 
Trade Policies 
1981-84 Export producer prices 
raised 
To stimulate export crop production (promote 
export growth) and restore economic growth 
Foreign 
Exchange 
Policies 
1981-82 Uganda currency realigned 
to reflect realistic levels 
(Flotation of exchange rates) 
introduced 
 1984 The dual Exchange regime 
unified 
 
 
 
To address foreign exchange constraints and 
stabilize the Ugandan shilling 
Tax policies 1981-84 Sales tax on imported and 
locally produced goods 
equalized 
Broaden tax base and enhance tax revenue 
collection in order to reduce government 
deficits and contain inflation 
Expenditure 
policies 
1981-84 Some Indian properties 
returned that had been 
confiscated by Idi Amin in 
1992 
To restore fiscal discipline and reduce 
government budget deficit 
Uganda’s IFI-Supported Policy Reforms over the period 1986-91 
1987 Export Monopolies 
liberalized 
1988 Open General License 
(OGL) established 
1989 OGL abolished 
Export retention scheme 
introduced 
1990-91 Export licensing scheme 
abolished 
Coffee marketing board 
abolished 
Import licensing scheme 
abolished 
 
 
 
 
To improve country’s competitiveness in order 
to give impetus to export growth 
Trade Policies 
1988 Some protective tariff raised 
(e.g. sugar, soap) 
To increase tax revenue 
1987 Devaluation of the exchange 
rate 
1989 Special Import program 
(SIP) introduced 
Exchange rate 
policies 
1990 Foreign exchange bureaus 
legalized 
 
 
To address foreign exchange constraints and 
contain balance of payments problems (reduce 
trade imbalances) 
Tax policies 1987 Indirect sales taxes on 
exports removed and applied 
only to imports 
 1991 Uganda Revenue Authority 
(URA) created 
 
 
 
To improve revenue collection 
Expenditure 
policies 
1986-92 Restructuring, 
denationalization, 
privatization of public 
enterprises and returning of 
Indian properties 
 
 
To reduce government deficits 
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Table 2.13: Uganda’s Second Generation Policy Reforms 1991-2005 
 
Policy Reform 
Area 
Timing Policy Measures Policy Reform Objectives 
1992-96 Tariff structure rationalized 
1993 Export Retention scheme 
reintroduced 
1997 All restrictions on 
international transactions 
removed 
 
 
 
To promote export growth and increase tax 
revenue from exports 
1997 Current account restriction 
removed 
Full capital account 
convertibility granted 
 
 
To reduce current account deficits (trade 
imbalance) 
Trade Policies 
2000 Liberalization of exporting 
except those on a negative 
list (e.g. timber, charcoal & 
whole fresh fish) 
 
To promote export growth and increase tax 
revenue from exports 
1992 Official and free market rates 
unified 
Exchange rate 
policies 
1993 Exchange rate markets fully 
liberalized 
 
To address foreign exchange rate constraints, 
boost export growth and restore economic  
growth 
1989-90 Sales tax all zero rated and 
exempt product introduced 
1993-94 All exemptions removed 
except those under bilateral 
agreements 
1995 Tax on coffee reduced 
Exemptions on raw materials 
and intermediate inputs 
reduced 
1995-96 Tax rates on international 
trade reduced 
Discretionary exemptions on 
imports abolished 
1996 Value added tax (VAT) 
introduced 
Tax Policies 
1997 Excise duties extended to 
finished goods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To broaden the tax base and increase tax 
revenue 
1992 Cash budget rule introduced 
1992-93 Civil service reduced in size 
Number of ministries 
reduced 
Fiscal Policies 
(Expenditure) 
1994 Restructuring, 
denationalization, 
privatization of public 
enterprises and returning of 
Indian properties continued 
 
 
 
Improve revenue allocation and reduce 
government deficits 
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CHAPTER 3 
REVENUE CONSEQUENCES OF TRADE REFORMS 
3.1 Introduction 
The major concern with trade liberalization in LDCs is its consequences on government 
revenue. As they liberalize their trade and streamline tariff regimes, LDCs also reduce a key 
source of government revenue. This concern evolves from the fact that in most LDCs, trade taxes 
continue to constitute a large proportion of government revenue. A loss of revenue is likely to 
disrupt development programs, and reverse the pace at which MDGs and poverty reduction goals 
can be achieved. LDCs contemplating further tariff liberalization therefore need to devise 
measures that will ensure the recovery of revenue losses that tariff liberalization entails.  
A substantial literature on fiscal impact of trade liberalization exists (Khattry and Rao, 
2002; Ebrill et al. 1999; Baunsgaard and Keen, 2005; Rao, 1999; Agbeyegbe et al. 2006; DeRosa 
et al. 2002; Castrol et al. 2004; Hatzipanayotou et al. 1994; Falvey, 1994; Emran and Stiglitz, 
2003; 2005; Emran, 2005; UNECA, 2004b; Michael et al., 1993; Keen and Lighart, 2002; 2005; 
Diewert et al., 1989; Naito, 2006; Lyakurwa, 1993; Basu and Morrissey, 1997; Ayoki et al., 2005; 
Muriithi and Moyi, 2003), but there are ambiguous conclusions on this literature. Some studies 
claim that trade liberalization increases government revenue, whereas other studies indicate that 
trade liberalization reduces government revenue.  
A serious neglect in this literature is that it pays little attention to dynamic short-run and 
long-run revenue consequences of trade liberalization. In other words, this literature ignores the 
time it takes to achieve the goals of trade liberalization. The benefits of trade liberalization may 
take longer to become evident than costs (Blejer and Cheasty, 1990). Therefore, most previous 
studies that have ignored dynamic short-run and long-run effects of trade liberalization might not 
be able to capture the full range of its potential revenue consequences.   
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This chapter is an attempt to investigate dynamic short- and long-run fiscal impacts of 
trade liberalization and to test whether Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda have been able to recover 
revenue losses due to cuts in trade taxes. This tests the hypothesis that emerges from the belief of 
the proponents of trade liberalization and public finance doctrine that developing countries are 
likely to experience revenue losses in the short-run, with the promises of fiscal gains in the long-
run. The latter effect is premised on the assumption that long-term growth prospects will enable 
government to raise more domestic revenues because of increased economic activities and trade 
volumes.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized in five sections. In section two, I review 
theoretical predictions of revenue consequences of trade reforms. I also review theoretical and 
empirical studies on revenue consequences of tariff liberalization and determinants of 
government revenue mobilization. Section three provides an analysis of fiscal stance in East 
Africa. In particular it describes the trends and patterns, structure and performance of government 
revenue in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. An econometric analysis on revenue consequences of 
trade liberalization is presented in section four. The section starts by describing the analytical 
framework used, followed by a presentation and discussion of estimation results. The last section 
gives concluding remarks.  
3.2 Literature Review  
3.2.1 Theoretical Predictions of Trade Reforms 
The standard trade theory suggests that trade liberalization leads to improved economic 
and allocative efficiency in production, enhances international competitiveness and stimulates 
higher economic growth. Liberalization involves the reduction or removal of quantitative 
restrictions and other non-tariff barriers to trade, and the conversion of these barriers to their 
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equivalent tariff. This is then followed by the reduction in the number of tariff rates and 
dispersion, and finally by the reduction in the tariff rates.  
In LDCs, heavily dependent on customs duties and other trade taxes as their major 
sources of revenue, there have been fears about revenue consequences of trade liberalization. 
However, the scale and trend of the impact of trade policy reforms on government revenue 
depends on initial trade value and tariff level; the size and mode of the tariff cut; import demand 
and supply elasticities; the nature of accompanying policies (such as exchange rate policies, tax 
policy reforms); economic structure; and the macroeconomic environment (Blejer and Cheasty, 
1990; Seade, 1990; Ebrill et all., 1999; UNECA, 2004b; Elborgh-Woytek et al., 2006; Tanzi, 
1989). In order to predict the extent and trend of the impact of trade policy reforms on 
government revenue, we need to consider the theoretical predictions associated with changes on 
trade policy instruments, namely, conversion of quantitative restrictions (QRs) to equivalent 
tariffs, tariff reform, the reduction of export taxes, and exchange rate reforms as well as 
accompanying fiscal policies.  
 
Tariffication 
The first step toward tariff reform is the conversion of quantitative restrictions (QRs) and 
other non-tariff barriers to equivalent tariffs (tariffication). Replacing quantitative restrictions on 
imports with equivalent tariffs leads to an increase in revenue, as economic rents are transferred 
to the government as trade tax revenue. In this way all those goods that were subject to quotas 
now become subject to tariff which translates into higher trade tax revenue (Agbeyegbe et al., 
2006; Coady, 1997; Ebrill et al., 1999; Linn and Wetzel, 1990). However, on the other hand, 
tariffs may increase the variability of domestic prices which may tend to have adverse effects on 
the volume of trade, thus resulting in diminishing trade tax revenue (Khattry and Rao, 2002; 
Blejer and Cheasty, 1990). 
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Tariff Reform 
A tariff reform involves rationalization and reduction of tariff rates. Rationalization 
entails reduction of tariff dispersion. The effect of the reduction of tariff dispersion depends on 
the relative price elasticities of demand of the commodity in question.  Overall, a reduction in 
tariff dispersion tends to increase revenue, by virtue of the fact that reducing tariff dispersion is 
associated with the reduction of the effective rates of protection. Thus the tariff revenue effect is 
mitigated as imports replace import-competing production. In addition, a reduction in the 
dispersion of tariffs typically increases the minimum tariff rate, which bolsters revenue collection. 
Reducing tariff dispersion also can enhance revenue mobilization because taxes levied at a more 
uniform rate tend to minimize tax evasion and administrative difficulties (Agbeyegbe et al., 2006; 
Ebrill et al., 1999; Linn and Wetzel, 1990; Blejer and Cheasty, 1990). 
The effect of tariff reduction on revenue again depends on the levels and existing 
coverage of tariffs before the reduction, and on the extent to which they are reduced. The precise 
impact is said to be difficult to predict because it depends on complex economic responses. If 
import values are unchanged, the immediate effect of a reduction in tariff rates is to lower 
revenues from trade taxes. This can also be accompanied with the reductions in revenues from 
excise taxes and VATs levied on imports (Ebrill et al., 1999; Agbeyegbe et al., 2006). However, 
if the value of imports rise in response to tariff reduction, and if the price elasticity of net demand 
for imports is sufficiently high, the revenue gain due to increased demand for the cheaper imports 
may compensate for, or even outweigh, the revenue loss due to tariff cuts (Ebrill et al., 1999; 
Linn and Wetzel, 1990; Blejer and Cheasty, 1990; Agbeyegbe et al., 2006).  
 
Reduction of Export Taxes 
Reduction of export taxes is another common feature of trade liberalization.  Export taxes 
are a typical means of taxing primary commodities, where there are relatively few exporters and 
many agricultural producers who are difficult to bring under the tax net, a common phenomenon 
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in LDCs. In these circumstances, export taxes are an expedient to raise government revenue. 
However, export revenues are often extremely unstable because they are subject to fluctuations of 
the international markets, sharp changes in the levels of exportable surplus of the country, and 
movements of the real exchange rate, making it an unattractive source of government revenue 
(Gomez-Sabaini, 1990). Additionally, export taxes discourage the production of exportable 
goods, dampening revenue collection (Linn and Wetzel, 1990; Khattry and Rao, 2002).  
 
Exchange Rate Adjustment 
Exchange rate adjustments translate directly into changes in domestic revenue collection 
from imports and exports. The net effect of the exchange rate depends on the type of the tax 
revenue category and exchange rate movements. The overall effects of exchange rate adjustment 
will depend on the share of the different tax categories in total government revenue.  
A devaluation of the domestic currency is among important components of trade reforms 
implemented in LDCs. Devaluation of the local currency increases the trade tax base in domestic 
currency terms, thus increasing trade tax collection. Although a real depreciation may lead to 
lower levels of imports, this is offset in whole or in part by higher domestic currency values. In 
some instances, devaluation may be associated with the increase in exports, hence an increase in 
export tax revenue. But in most developing countries export taxes are insignificant and therefore 
the tax effects on imports tend to dominate (Agbeyegbe et al., (2006). A devaluation of the local 
currency leads an increase the collection of revenue from sales and excise taxes (including VAT), 
because devaluation leads to an increase in the relative prices of imported goods or goods using 
imported inputs. Exchange rate adjustment also impacts income tax revenue collection through its 
indirect effects on inflation. This will depend on whether the income brackets are adjusted for 
inflation or not. If income brackets are adjusted for inflation, real exchange rate depreciation is 
likely to lead to a decline in real wages and thus a decline in income tax collection because 
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taxpayers are shifted into lower tax brackets. But if brackets are not adjusted fully in real terms, 
in this case income tax collections will rise (Agbeyegbe et al., (2006).  
A real depreciation of the exchange rate is also likely to cause a decrease in revenue 
because it leads to a shift in import composition towards more price inelastic and less heavily 
taxed goods. Devaluation also tends to reduce the differential between the official and black 
market exchange rates, which leads to a sharp drop in implicit export and import taxes and 
weakens the fiscal balance through its effects on debt service (Agbeyegbe, et al. 2006; Adam et 
al., 2001). Overvaluation of the domestic currency, on the other hand, reduces incentives to 
produce goods for export. By encouraging capital flight because of expectation of future 
devaluation and currency substitution, it also weakens the balance of payments, and encourages 
black markets and trade restrictions, thus indirectly suppressing import and export bases 
measured in domestic currency terms. This reduces collection of international trade taxes and 
sales and excise taxes which are levied on domestic and imported consumption goods (Adam, et 
al. 2001; Agbeyegbe, et al. 2006; Seade, 1990). In addition, overvaluation favors the production 
of non-tradable goods over tradable goods, whether exports or import substitutes. This is reflected 
in a loss of competitiveness in international markets. As a result, export performance deteriorates 
in the long-run, and investment declines in the tradable goods sector. This dampens the country’s 
ability to export, thus decreasing export tax collection (Linn and Wetzel, 1990; Khattry and Rao, 
2002; Adam et al., 2001; Lyakurwa, 1993; Seade, 1990).  
3.2.2 Empirical Evidence 
Trade liberalization has been the centerpiece of the development strategy in LDCs. It has 
been linked to government revenue through its impact on customs revenue. However, the precise 
relationship depends on several variables, including the nature of trade liberalization; the 
response of imports and exports to liberalization; macroeconomic environment and economic 
structure.  
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Substantial theoretical and empirical studies have been carried out to investigate revenue 
consequences of trade liberalization. But the general evidence is inconclusive. In the theoretical 
public finance literature it is established that a coordinated tariff and domestic tax reform that 
involves a reduction in tariffs (export taxes) accompanied by the increase in consumption taxes 
(production taxes) leaving consumer (producer) prices unaffected increases public revenue (Dixit, 
1985; Hatzipanayotou et al., 1994; Falvey, 1994; Diewert et al., 1989; Michael et al., 1993; Keen 
and Lighart, 2002). These studies assume that alternative domestic tax instruments exist and that 
the expenditure side of the budget will not be affected by substituting between types of taxes. 
Empirical studies refute this claim arguing that low income countries’ alternative tax sources 
have very low yield, which limits the substitution of domestic taxes for trade taxes (Khatrry, 
2003; Khatrry and Rao, 2002; Rao, 1999; Emran and Stiglitz, 2004; 2005; Emran, 2005). 
In addition, the conclusion emanating from these studies are derived from doubtful 
assumptions. It is assumed that there is no informal sector in the economy; all commodities are 
taxed and there is perfect competition. When more stringent restrictions on the tax instruments 
are imposed by the presence of a large informal and shadow sector, where not each and every 
commodity in the economy can be taxed with imperfect competition, such consumer or producer 
price-neutral reforms reduce government revenue under plausible conditions (Emran, 2005; 
Emran and Stiglitz, 2004; 2005; Keen and Lighart, 2006; Devarajan and Panagariya, 2000). That 
is, the existence of a larger informal and shadow economy implies that the increase in 
consumption (production) tax required to neutralize the changes in consumer (producer) prices is 
feasible only if a commodity is produced and transacted in the formal part of the economy. Once 
this feasibility restriction on the choice of commodities for adjustments in consumption or 
production tax is taken into account, there are plausible sufficient conditions under which such 
consumer or producer price-neutral reform reduces government revenue (Emran, 2005; Emran 
and Stiglitz, 2004; 2005; Devarajan and Panagariya, 2000).  
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Furthermore, invoking a dynamic analysis changes the results of  a static model, such as 
those employed by Dixit, (1985); Hatzipanayotou et al., (1994); Falvey, (1994); Diewert et al., 
(1989); Michael et al., (1993); Keen and Lighart, (2002). Naito (2006) demonstrates this by using 
a dynamic analysis of tariff and tax reform. His results show that lowering tariffs and raising 
corresponding consumption tax in a consumer or producer-price-neutral way decreases 
government revenue. Moreover, the claim that LDCs will be able to recover revenue lost by 
switching from trade taxes to consumption tax is not feasible. This is because in LDCs 
consumption taxes are notoriously difficult to collect. Most households in developing countries 
consume from their own produce before marketing their surplus (Newbery, 1987; Linn and 
Wetzel, 1990; Tanzi, 1987; Musgrave, 1987; Addison and Levin, 2006).  
Emran (2005), and Keen and Ligthart (2005) also observe that under imperfect 
competition and in the presence of a binding revenue constraint, reduction in tariff rates and 
substitution of domestic consumption taxes for trade taxes may not be revenue-enhancing. That 
is, switching to domestic taxes may not constitute a viable option for low-income countries 
because of weak tax administrations, widespread tax evasion and rampant corruption which make 
the assessment of tax liabilities and collection of taxes problematic (Khattry and Rao, 2002; 
Schade, 2005; Baunsgaard and Keen, 2005; Rao, 1999; Linn and Wetzel, 1990).  
Furthermore, in economies with large informal and agricultural sectors producing 
agricultural export commodities, production taxes may not provide a better option because 
agricultural commodities and products in the informal sector are highly subsidized and exempted 
from taxes. Moreover, production taxes in developing countries may not be feasible because they 
are associated with informational and administrative problems and in some cases production is 
not easily quantified (Emran and Stiglitz, 2004; Khattry and Rao, 2002; Grunberg, 1998).  
Despite providing powerful and persuasive analytical findings, most of these studies are 
theoretical in nature, based on hypothetical situations which do not necessarily depict the real 
economy. Therefore, findings emanating from this literature cannot directly be transposed to 
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developing countries without being subjected to comprehensive empirical analysis. For better 
policy design, it is important that the characterization of the policy change and its actual impact 
are ascertained so as to come up with appropriate policy recommendations. Most of these 
theoretical studies are too general, and in many cases they are derived from the experiences 
gained from developed countries with quite different macroeconomic conditions and economic 
structure.   
Substantial empirical studies have been carried out on the revenue consequences of trade 
liberalization, but the conclusions emanating from these studies are mixed. Most of these studies, 
however, are based on cross-country regression analyses, rather than country-specific case studies 
from which policy recommendations can be derived that are best suited to country’s economic 
structure and macroeconomic conditions. Ebrill et al. (1999), Agbeyegbe et al., (2006), Gupta 
(2007) based on cross-country analysis, and country case studies by Lyakurwa (1993) Basu and 
Morrissey (1997), DeRosa, et al. (2002) Castro, et al. (2004), Ayoki et al., (2005), Muriithi and 
Moyi, (2003), Pelzman and Shoham (2006) find a positive effects of trade liberalization on 
government revenue. On the contrary studies by Rao (1999), Khattry and Rao (2002), Khattry 
(2002), Schiff and Winters (2003), Baunsgaard and Keen (2005), and Pelzman (2004) indicate 
that trade liberalization has led to a fiscal squeeze in developing countries.  
Baunsgaard and Keen (2005) use a cross-country panel data regression analysis to 
evaluate whether countries that have embarked on trade liberalization have been able to recover 
the revenue lost due to tariff liberalization. The findings reveal that high-income countries have 
been able to recover revenue lost from cuts in trade taxes, and middle-income countries had a 
close to full recovery. The study found, however, that revenue recovery has been extremely weak 
in low-income countries, countries that happen to be highly dependent on trade tax revenues. 
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3.2.3 Determinants of Revenue Mobilization 
The amount of government revenue collected depends on the taxation potential of the 
individual countries, the taxation targets set by the authorities, and the ability of governments to 
collect revenue.  However, the success of exploiting the revenue potential and attaining the 
taxation targets depends on a number of other factors. These include the macroeconomic 
environment, economic structure and the level of development as well as the administrative 
capacity and the willingness to pay taxes (Teera and Hudson, 2004). These factors may interact in 
different ways at different times and in different countries, thus the disparities in government 
revenue collection among countries.  
A variety of macroeconomic variables such as inflation, public debt, and aid affect 
government revenue mobilization. Inflation is a proxy indicator for the quality and stability of 
country’s macroeconomic policies. This captures the direct impact it exerts on tax collection 
through its effects on consumption, investment and related tax categories (Davoodi and 
Grigorian, 2007). Higher inflation rates lead to public demoralization, lowering tax compliance, 
thus reducing the amount of revenue collected (McMahon and Schmidt-Hebbel, 2000). Overall, 
inflation generally has negative impact on government revenue mobilization. Foreign aid, 
whether in the form of grants or loans, affects the country’s tax effort. The response of the tax 
effort to increased aid flows can be either positive, negative or zero depending on the purpose of 
aid, and whether it is a grant or a loan. A grant will tend to have a negative relationship because 
governments have no need to repay. In this respect, grants reduce incentives for governments to 
adopt good policies and maintain efficient institutions, hence resulting in low tax revenues due to 
tax exemptions to powerful interest groups and weak tax compliance, as well as diverting 
attention from addressing weaknesses in governance. In principle a loan to which a government 
has a commitment to repay may motivate that government to collect revenue to service the loan 
(Gupta et al. 2003; Agbeyegbe et al. 2006). In addition, the volatility of aid has implications for 
macroeconomic stability, which can affect the country’s tax effort (Gupta, et al. 2003).  
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Public debt plays a role in determining the extent to which countries may take advantage 
of their taxable capacity (Tanzi, 1987). The effect of public debt depends on its size and how it is 
financed. A large public debt implies the need for the government to raise revenue in order to 
service the debt (Teera and Hudson, 2004). Therefore, a large public debt has a positive 
relationship with the present and future tax level. However, if most of the debt is external, debt 
service creates macroeconomic imbalances that might tend to reduce the tax level. This is from 
the fact that servicing foreign debt requires a trade account surplus, which in turn requires a 
reduction in imports.  
A country’s economic structure also helps explain its tax capacity. The shares of 
agriculture and industry in GDP, population size (such as population density and dependency 
ratio), and urbanization reflect the county’s economic structure. The share of agriculture in GDP 
is important due to the general difficulties of taxing agriculture and government deliberately 
providing tax exemptions and/or subsidies to the sector. The share of the agricultural sector 
therefore has an inverse relationship with government revenue mobilization. Partly, this is 
because in most LDCs the agricultural sector is dominated by small farmers who are notoriously 
difficult to tax, especially when a large share of agriculture is subsistence. Moreover, most 
agricultural activities organized in small-scale farming generate limited taxable surpluses 
(Davoodi and Grigorian, 2006; Suliman, 2005; Agbeyegbe et al. 2006; Khattry and Rao, 2002; 
Teera and Hudson, 2004)). Generally, as the share of agriculture in GDP increases, less revenue 
is collected.  However, the relationship may be positive in countries with a large share of 
agricultural products in total exports (Agbeyegbe et al. 2006).  
Industrial activities are easier to tax because business owners keep better records, and 
their activities are concentrated in towns. Manufacturing industry can generate larger surpluses 
positively affecting the tax base (Teera and Hudson, 2004; Tosun and Abizadeh, 2005). The share 
of the mining sector is also said to exhibit a positive relationship with tax revenue (Agbeyegbe et 
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al. 2006). But the relationship can also be negative in cases where resources are associated with a 
higher risk of conflict (Agbeyegbe et al. 2006; Ndikumana, 2004).  
Population density controls for the scale effect of the economy. The economic intuition is 
that if there are economies of scale in tax collection, due to fixed administration costs, then the 
higher the population density the higher will be the taxes collected for a given tax base and tax 
ratio (Khattry and Rao, 2002; Teera and Hudson, 2004).  
There share of urban population captures the process of urbanization in a country. Both 
on the demand and supply sides, urbanization is positively linked to tax revenue. On the demand 
side, greater urbanization leads to a greater need for public services, whereas on the supply side, 
urbanization leads to a large taxable base as economic activities tend to be concentrated in urban 
areas. The economic intuition is that as an economy grows; it generally becomes more urbanized, 
which increases both the need for tax revenues and the capacity to tax (Tanzi, 1987; 2000; 
Khattry, and Rao, 2002, Teera and Hudson, 2004; Tosun and Abizadeh, 2005). 
GDP per capita and GDP control for the level of economic development and scale 
effects. It is assumed that higher per capita GDP indicates a higher capacity to pay taxes, as well 
as a greater capacity to levy and collect those taxes (Teera and Hudson, 2004; Tosun and 
Abizadeh, 2005; Gupta, 2007). The economic intuition is based on the premise that the higher the 
per capita GDP, the more monetized is the economy, and the better the tax administration, hence 
the better the overall performance of revenue collection (Tosun, 2003; Agbeyegbe et al. 2006; 
Suliman, 2005).  
Growth rates of real GDP and per capita GDP account for the business cycles. This 
captures previous failures in the adjustment process and its implications on government revenue 
mobilization. It also directly affects the tax bases, particularly due to economy-wide fluctuations 
in outputs, income and consumption. The fiscal impact of real GDP growth and per capita GDP 
growth is typically positive (Tosun, 2003). 
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3.3 Revenue Trends in East Africa 
Based on the review of policy reforms presented in chapter two, a number of policy 
episodes are relevant for the East African countries. This is worth noting as it has direct bearing 
on government revenue trends and fiscal consequences. Tanzania’s and Kenya’s policy reform 
episodes can be divided into five policy reform regimes, and Uganda is into four periods (see 
Table 3.2). However, to capture the overall net effects of the changes of trade policies on 
government revenue, two broader periods can be distinguished: the pre-reform (1970-1986) and 
post-reform (1987-2005) periods (see Table 3.1). The year 1986 is taken as a benchmark to 
separate the two periods since this is the time when all three countries initiated significant 
economic policy reforms. There are several key variations in the trends that emerge when looking 
at the patterns, performance and composition of different taxes in total government revenue and 
tax revenue for the three countries.  
3.3.1 Tanzania 
Table 3.1, 3.2 and Figure 3.1 illustrate the trends, patterns and composition of tax 
revenue over the period between 1970 and 2005. A close examination of Tables 3.1 and 3.2 and 
Figure 3.1 show that in Tanzania tax revenue and its components have been decreasing 
throughout the entire period. The revenue/GDP ratio has declined significantly from 1970-80 
period to 1993-95, with a slightly improvement in the period between 1996 and 2005.  On 
average the share of government revenue to GDP declined from 23.4 percent in the pre-crisis 
period (1970-80) to 19.1 percent during the crisis period (1981-85), declining further to 15.3 
percent during the economic recovery program (1986-92).  
During the 1993-95 policy reforms, the revenue collection deteriorated further to 11.2 
percent, with some slight improvement to more than 12.0 percent during the second generation 
recovery reforms period, 1996-2005 (see Table 3.2). This declining trend can be linked to the 
declining trends in sales and excise tax revenue and income tax revenue. Strong supported is by 
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the declining trends of sales and excise and income in Figure 3.1. Table 3.3 and Figure 3.1 depict 
the time trend of the share of government revenue, and tax revenue and its components in GDP. 
Generally speaking it can be noticed that they all show the same pattern: a declining trend across 
all tax revenue categories. The declining trend of government revenue/GDP ratio could be 
attributed to changes of trade and tax policies implemented between 1970 and 2005. Throughout 
this period, the government of Tanzania pursued a number of economic policy reforms. During 
this period the government raised and/or lowered the tax rates and introduced new taxes.  
It has also been reported that the low levels of government revenue have been due to 
lower tariffs on international trade as a result of tariff reform; stagnant trade due to the economic 
recession of the 1980s and 1990s (this is also reflected in Figure 3.1); and low output growth due 
to inappropriate tax policies and tax structure. Tanzania’s tax system had been reported to 
comprise high tax rates which had adverse effect on output growth through its impact on the 
growth of investment, saving and competitiveness of the economy (Osoro, 1994; World Bank, 
1996). Low levels of government revenue/GDP ratio have been also due to low imports and 
inflows of foreign funds which caused shortages of intermediate inputs and low productivity in 
the manufacturing sector; overvalued exchange rate which hindered the countries 
competitiveness; reliance on only a few sources of taxes; and the enlargement of the informal 
economy (Fjetdstad and Rakner, 2003; World Bank, 1996), thus lowering tax revenue generation.  
Other factors that explain low government revenue in Tanzania include widespread 
corruption in the revenue authority and different sectors of the economy and politics; lack of 
administrative capacity in mobilizing domestic resources; widespread tax exemption and evasion; 
and embezzlement of collected taxes (URT, 1996; Fjeldstad, 2002; Fjeldstad and Semboja, 2000; 
Morrissey, 1995; Levin, 2005).  
Table 3.2 demonstrates that the composition of tax revenue has changed significantly in 
the period between 1970 and 2005. The share of trade taxes in total tax revenue decreased from 
20.0 percent in the pre-crisis period (1970-80) to 7.6 percent in the crisis period (1981-85) and 
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increased to 23.0 percent during the economic recovery reform period (1987-92). During the 
1993-95 policy reform, the share of trade tax in total tax revenue rose from 23.0 percent during 
the period of economic recovery program to 27.2 percent and then increased further to 37.4 
percent during the period of recovery reforms (1996-2005).  
The fluctuations in the components of total tax revenue during the period 1970-2005 
reflect the changes in tax and trade policies implemented during this period.  Throughout the 
period between 1970 and 2005, a number of policy changes were made. Trade reforms that were 
implemented during the period include: increasing export taxes of agricultural commodities and 
import duties between 1980 and 1985; reducing customs duties and abolishing export taxes on 
agricultural commodities in the period 1986-95; and abolishing exemptions on capital goods and 
import duties during the period 1996-2005.   
Tax policy reform involved increasing sales tax, abolishing cumbersome sales taxes in 
the period 1980-83; reducing the differential sales tax rates for goods and services, unifying tax 
rates for similar domestic and imported goods. In the period 1996-2005, the government 
introduced VAT, replacing sales tax. In addition, tax reforms involved changes in income tax. 
Specifically, the changes in income tax that were implemented during the period included: 
limiting the marginal tax rate to between 5.0 and 30.0 percent, introducing six income brackets 
for personal income; wages, salaries and all allowances were taxed; abolishing differentiation in 
levying corporate income from similar sources; and waiving tax incentives for public enterprises 
and new investors.  
Despite a number of attempts by the Tanzanian government to improve tax revenue 
collection in the 1980s and 1990s, through tax reforms, changes in the tax rates, adoption of the 
VAT and customs reforms, revenue mobilization has remained very low in the country. The low 
tax revenue collection in Tanzania has been linked to lack of fundamental tax reform in the tax 
system. It was until the mid 1990s when radical tax and trade reforms were implemented that 
provided a turning point for Tanzania’s government revenue performance (see Tables 3.2 and 
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3.3). In 1996 the government established the Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) and in 1998 
sales taxes were replaced by the introduction of VAT. The aim was to expand the consumption 
tax base, increase government revenue and remove inefficient protection structure. Despite all 
these efforts, VAT revenue has remained modest, suggesting the existence of tax leakages and 
exemptions. The delays in undertaking policy reforms also contributed to the lower government 
revenue and tax revenue collection. 
3.3.2 Kenya 
Tables 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, and Figure 3.2 illustrate the trends of revenue in Kenya. Unlike 
the Tanzanian case, the revenue/GDP ratio for Kenya shows an increasing trend over the entire 
period under investigation. On average, Kenya’s revenue/GDP ratio rose from 14.1 percent 
during the pre-crisis period (1970-79) to 20.5 percent during the period between 1997 and 2005. 
An important component of the increase in the Kenya’s revenue/GDP ratio over the entire period 
under study could be linked to stringent trade and fiscal policies implemented in the country 
between the reform periods 1987-91 and 1992-1996, when the Kenyan government made 
deliberate efforts to broaden the tax base and reduce reliance on trade taxes. This is reflected by 
the declining trend of trade taxes in Figure 3.2, quadrant 2. This is also reflected by the observed 
increase in the income tax revenue/GDP and sale and excise (VAT) revenue/GDP ratios, 
suggesting Kenya’s relatively successful shift from trade taxes to domestic taxes (See Tables 3.1 
and 3.3). This has also been reported by Moyi and Ronge (2006) and Karingi (2001). The 
increasing trend of Kenya’s revenue/GDP ratios may be explained by the country’s relatively 
competitive, well-developed manufacturing, and service sectors, as compared to those of 
Tanzania and Uganda.  
The impressive performance of revenue yield in Kenya, despite a significant reduction in 
the tariff rates, has been attributed to the increase in import volumes, decrease in duty exemptions 
on imports, increased effective duty rates, a shift from imports subject to ad valorem rates 
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towards imports in the high duty rate group, and changes in trade and administrative policy (i.e. 
introduction of pre-shipment and secondary destination inspection programs and customs control 
programs) (Glenday, 2000; Moyi and Ronge, 2006). Nonetheless, there have been notable 
fluctuations in the revenue/GDP ratios over time, suggesting a considerable vulnerability to 
changes in policy regimes, policy reversal and delays in policy reforms as described in chapter 
two. It is also reported that Kenya would have been able to collected more government revenue, 
but because of tax leakages, due to wide spread corruption, weaknesses and inefficiencies in tax 
administration and tax collection, tax exemptions, tax evasion, tax avoidance and taxpayers non-
compliance has not been able to do so (Kelly, 2000; Glenday, 2000; Castro et al., 2004; Moyi and 
Ronge, 2006; Karingi, 2002). 
With regard to the Kenya’s tax revenue composition, income taxes have consistently 
continued to represent more than one-third of total tax revenue. Another important source of 
Kenya’s revenue has been sale and excise taxes (VAT), on average contributing approximately 
about one-third of the total tax revenue. This has also been reported by Okello (2001), Karingi 
(2001) and Moyi and Ronge (2006). The contribution of trade taxes in total tax revenue has been 
declining over the entire period under study, reflecting that there has been a shift from trade taxes 
to domestic taxes.  However, the composition of taxes in tax revenue has been fluctuating 
throughout the period under study. As shown in Table 3.2, the share of trade taxes in tax revenue 
was decreasing from the pre-crisis period until a turning point during the 1997-2005 economic 
policy reforms. The ratio of trade tax/total tax revenue ratios increased in 1997-2005 reform 
period to 19.6 percent from 14.9 percent.  
On the other hand, the proportions of both sales and excise taxes and income taxes in 
total tax revenue have been increasing throughout, with the exception of a slight decrease during 
the period 1997-2005. During this period the contribution of sales and excise taxes in total tax 
revenue increased during the crisis period to 43.0 percent from 34.7 percent in the pre-crisis 
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period. Then the share increased further to 48.6 percent during ERP period and rose to 49.2 
percent during the period 1992-96. It then declined to 43.63 percent in 1997-2005.  
Correspondingly, the share of income taxes in total tax revenue, decreased from 39.6 
percent in the pre-crisis period to 32.4 percent in the crisis period, then slightly declined further to 
31.15 percent during the 1987-91 economic recovery program and increased to 38.3 percent 
during the 1992-96 reform period before it went down to 35.68 percent during the 1997-2005 
reform period. (see Table 3.2) 
The variations and fluctuations of the contributions of the various tax components in total 
tax revenue reflects the changes in the government policies  as described in chapter two and in the 
performance of the economy in general. In the period 1970-2005, the Kenyan government 
undertook a number of tariff and tax reforms that help to explain these fluctuations in the share of 
the various taxes in total tax revenue. These include the introduction of the export compensation 
scheme, relaxation of import controls, introduction of VAT, and abolishment of tax exemptions 
and export taxes.   
3.3.3 Uganda 
Over the past 25 years, the trend of the revenue/GDP ratio and the composition of tax 
revenue in Uganda have changed dramatically. Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3 and Figure 3.3 illustrate the 
changing patterns and composition of revenue, in which two trends stand out. The first is the 
increase in the overall total revenue/GDP and trade tax ratios, with the exception of a decline of 
trade tax revenue from 4.0 percent of GDP during the crisis period (1980-86) to 2.8 percent 
during the SAP (1987-91) period. The second fact is the high proportions of trade tax in the 
composition of total tax revenue, constituting more than half of total tax revenue on average.  
The overall trend depicts an increasing trend for Uganda’s government revenue/GDP 
ratio over the period under investigation. On average the revenue/GDP ratio rose from 6.4 percent 
during the pre-reform period (1977-86) to 15.3 percent during the post reform period (1987-
  68 
2005). The revenue/GDP ratio has increased significantly from the period 1977-79 to 1987-1992, 
with a very impressive performance between the period 1987-91 and 1992-2005. On average, the 
share of government revenue to GDP increased from 6.3 percent in the pre-crisis period (1970-
79) to 6.5 percent during the crisis period (1980-86), increasing further to 8.3 percent during the 
economic recovery program (1987-91) and then to 17.7 percent in the period 1992-2005 (Table 
3.2). The improvement in revenue collection during this period is attributed to the creation of the 
Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) in 1991 and the introduction of VAT in 1996 (Kangave, 2005; 
Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2002). 
Despite an impressive performance in revenue collection, the Uganda’s revenue/GDP 
ratio has remained fairly low as compared to Tanzania and Kenya. The factors that have been 
advanced to explain the Uganda’s paltry tax revenues include: weak tax administration, poor tax 
culture among citizens, rampant corruption that pervaded the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA) 
and the civil service, and the resultant prevalence of tax evasion (Kangave, 2005; Teera, 2003; 
Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2002). 
Table 3.2 shows mixed trends and patterns of the ratios of tax revenue and its 
components in relation to GDP. The tax revenue/GDP and trade tax revenue/GDP ratios increased 
during the crisis period to 6.3 percent and 4.0 percent from 5.9 percent and 3.9 percent during the 
pre-crisis period (1977-79) respectively. Thereafter, both declined to 5.8 percent and 2.8 percent 
respectively during the economic recovery program period, before they rose to 11.1 and 5.3 
percent during Uganda’s second generation reforms (1992-2005). Sales and excise tax 
revenue/GDP and income tax revenue/GDP ratios show the same pattern. They both declined 
from 1.9 percent and 0.6 percent in the pre-crisis period to 1.6 percent and 0.4, respectively 
percent during the crisis period. Thereafter, both were increasing from the pre-crisis period 
throughout the economic reform and complete reform periods (Table 3.2).  
Table 3.2 also shows that despite the Ugandan government’s commitment to tariff 
reform, the share of trade taxes in total tax revenue remains high, though showing a decreasing 
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trend. Taxes from international trade have slightly declined in relative importance as a proportion 
of total tax revenue in recent years. However, trade taxes remain the primary source of revenue in 
Uganda as compared to Tanzania and Kenya. The share of trade taxes in total tax revenue fell 
from 58.4 percent in the pre-crisis (1977-97) to 47.8 percent during the complete reform (1992-
2005) period respectively. 
The share of sales and excise taxes and income tax in total tax revenue show a mixed 
pattern. The proportion of sales and excise tax in total tax revenue declined from the pre-crisis 
period from 29.7 percent to 20.9 percent in the crisis period, then decreased further during the 
economic recovery program period to 19.1 percent. It then increased to 19.9 percent in the reform 
period 1992-2005. The share of sales and excise tax in total tax revenue has remained relatively 
constant, though showing a slight declining trend.    
3.4 Econometric Analysis 
3.4.1 Methodology 
The econometric analysis employed in this chapter builds on existing theoretical and 
empirical studies on the fiscal impact of trade liberalization (Suliman 2005; Baunsgaard and 
Keen, 2005; Khattry and Rao 2002; Adam et al. 2001; Rao, 1999; Teera and Hudson, 2004; 
Tosun and Abizadeh, 2005). The basic estimation equation to analyze the fiscal consequences of 
trade liberalization is formulated as follows: 
 
GRVt = β0 + β1OPt + δkZt + εt        (3.1) 
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Where GRV is government revenue as a share in GDP, OP is openness as a proxy for 
trade liberalization1 (openness-measured as the share of imports plus export in GDP), Zt is a 
vector of control variables, and εt is an unobservable random idiosyncratic error term-
representing a time-variant unsystematic effect and is independently and identically distributed 
(i.i.d). 
The control variables included in the equations are real per capita GDP (in natural 
logarithmic form), population size (in natural logarithmic form), domestic taxes (as a percentage 
of sales and excise taxes plus income to GDP) and the inflation rate. Trade volume (the sum of 
exports and imports as a percentage of GDP) is included as a measure of openness so as to 
capture the effects of trade liberalization on government revenue.  A dummy controlling for time-
specific effects is included so as to capture the effect of civil war on the performance of 
government revenue in Uganda. The inclusion of these variables in the equation was reached via 
a stepwise regression approach, adding and dropping variables one at a time while retaining those 
that are significant. After a tentative step-wise regression analysis, a final model was estimated; 
variables that were excluded at earlier stages were tested repeatedly for inclusion, to minimize the 
possibility of misspecification problems due to omitting important variables. The inclusion of 
variables in the model is also based on whether the variable are co-integrated of order 0 or 1 and 
availability of data2.  
The central aim of this study is to assess short- and long-run dynamic effects of trade 
liberalization on government revenue. In order to capture the dynamics of the changes in trade 
reforms, one starts by estimating the general autoregressive distributed lagged model:  
 
                                               
1 It was envisaged that several openness measured would be used to proxy for trade liberalization. However, due to 
unavailability of data for some measures of openness (such as average applied tariff rate-a measure of trade restriction), 
only one measure (trade volume-the share import plus export in GDP) was adopted for which data were readily 
available. 
 
2 Data on average applied tariff, interest rate payments and debt servicing were only available for few years, running 
between the 1990s and 2005 for all three countries. The series for Uganda were available for the years between 1977 
and 2005 and that for Tanzania and Kenya were available for the period running between 1970 and 2005.  
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GRVt = β + γGRVt-1 + θ1OPt + θ2OPt-1 + δ1Zt + δ2Zt-1 + εt       (3.2) 
 
Estimating equation (3.2) can generate spurious results when time-series are not 
stationary.  With non-stationary time-series data, the best alternative to explain the dynamics of 
changes in policy reforms is the error-correction model. This involves the re-parameterization and 
re-arrangement of equation (3.2), which gives the following error-correction model: 
 
ΔGRVt = α + θ1ΔOPt + δΔZt + ηεt-1 + Ωt      (3.3) 
 
Where η = (γ-1), is the adjustment coefficient (i.e. the estimated coefficient on the error-
correction term). The expected value of adjustment coefficient is negative, which implies that 
there are dynamic stability in the long-run within the error-correction estimation model; εt-1 = 
(GRVt-1 - kOPt-1- hZt-1) is the error correction term (which can also be obtained directly from the 
co-integration regression equation (3.2)), k = θ1+θ2/ (1- γ) and h = (δ1+ --- + δ4)/ (1- γ). The error-
correction term captures long-run equilibrium changes of government revenue following the 
implementation of trade reform policies in the short-run. 
3.4.2 Estimation Results 
With time-series data it is meaningless to estimate the error-correction model with 
variables which are not co-integrated. Therefore, the first step before embarking on estimating the 
error-correction model is to ascertain the stationarity, order of integration and whether the 
variables under scrutiny are co-integrated.  
 
Unit Root Test  
A unit root test was performed for each variable for the period spanning 1970 to 2005. 
First, a unit root test was performed for each variable in their levels. For the variables in which 
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the null hypothesis of non-stationary was rejected, their first differencing was tested for 
stationarity. To minimize the possibility of falsely rejecting the true null hypothesis or accepting 
the null hypothesis which is false, both the augmented Dickey Fuller Test (ADF) and Pillips-
Perron (P-P) non-parametric test were used to test for the presence of unit root. The ADF and P-P 
unit root tests are summarized in Table 3.4. The results show that after taking the first differences 
most of the variables became integrated of order 1. Other variables were integrated of order 0 (i.e. 
inflation rate, external debt and per capita GDP for Kenya) and 2 (i.e. per capita GDP for 
Uganda). Variables integrated of order 0 were also included in the estimation of the error-
correction estimation after taking their first differences so that all variables are of the same order 
of integration and interpretation purposes. 
 
Co-integration Analysis 
Since more than one variable was included in the co-integration regression equation, 
critical values generated by the Mackinnon (1991) and Ericsson and Mackinnon (2002) method 
were used for co-integration analysis. This is because ADF and P-P do not take into account finite 
samples and asymptotic distribution properties (Mackinnon, 1991). Results for co-integration 
analysis (unit root test for the residuals-the error-correction term) are summarized in Table 3.5. 
An examination of unit root tests for the residuals 5 fail to reject the null hypothesis of non-
stationary series, suggesting that the variables in the co-integration regression equation are co-
integrated. This warrants the use of the error-correction model to examine short-run and long-run 
dynamic changes in government revenue in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. 
 
Error-Correction Model Results 
Tables 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 report both the co-integration (column 1) and error-correction 
(columns 2ODA, 2GRANT and 2LOAN for ODA, grants and loans respectively) estimation results for 
trade tax revenue and total government revenue for the respective countries. In all cases, the 
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results suggest that there exists a long-run relationship between total government revenue and its 
determinants included in the co-integration equation. This is supported by the negative and 
statistically significant adjustment coefficient (error-correction term). The results also show that 
there are significant differences among the three countries, and these are worth noting.  
 
Tanzania 
In the case of Tanzania, the only significant variables are one-period lagged dependent 
variable (GRVt-1), openness (TRADE), inflation rate, industry as a share in GDP, per capita GDP 
and time trend in the co-integration regression, and openness measure, per capita GDP and the 
error-correction term in the error-correction regression model. As expected, the adjustment 
coefficient-error-correction term (ECMt-1) is negative and statistically significant, indicating the 
existence of dynamic stability. That is, any discrepancies in the changes in government revenue 
are corrected by the extent the Tanzanian economy is open to the rest of the world, and the 
changes in the inflation rate, per capita GDP and share of industry in GDP toward the 
equilibrium. This is an indication of the existence of a long-run relationship between government 
revenue and extent of openness to the rest of the world, changes in inflation rate, per capita GDP 
and growth of the industrial sector. This suggests that continued trade and tax reforms, promoting 
the manufacturing sector, promoting the growth of GDP per capita and creating macroeconomic 
stability should be at the fore to ensure sustainable government revenue mobilization in Tanzania. 
The results in Table 3.6 show that there are partial adjustments in government revenue and trade 
tax revenue over time in Tanzania. The evidence is supported by the significant coefficients on 
the lagged dependent variable in the co-integration regression (column 1).  
It is evident from Table 3.6 that there are positive significant long-run effects of trade 
reforms on government revenue in Tanzania. This is evidenced by a positive estimated long-run 
coefficient 0.67; that is, greater openness to trade by a percentage point, contributed to an 
increase of 0.67 percentage points in government revenue in Tanzania, implying that Tanzania 
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has been recovering revenue lost due to cuts in international trade taxes. Based on this finding, it 
can be concluded that trade reforms implemented in Tanzania have not contributed to the 
observed decline in the share of government revenue in GDP. The declining trend in the share of 
government revenue in GDP can be attributed to weaknesses and inefficiencies in the Tanzania’s 
tax system, particularly in tax administration and collection as well as tax leakages due to tax 
evasion, tax exemption, rent-seeking and embezzlements of collected taxes (Fischer, 2006; 
Fjeldstad, 2002; Fjeldstad and Semboja, 2000; Morrissey, 1995; Levin, 2005). This explanation 
will be supported by findings in Chapter 4, which demonstrates that tax revenue generation has 
been sluggish as evidenced by less-than-one tax buoyancy across all tax categories and the tax 
system as a whole.  
Contrary to prior expectation, the coefficient on the share of industry in GDP is negative 
and significant, suggesting that the share of industry in GDP is inversely correlated with revenue 
mobilization in Tanzania. In contrast, economic theory suggests that the rise of the share of 
industry in GDP is associated with increases in government revenue mobilization. Similarly, 
though insignificant, the coefficients on external debt across the regressions are negative. It is 
often argued that as the share of external debt in GDP rises, the government is pressurized to 
collects more revenue to service the debt. However, based on the results in Table 3.6 it is not the 
case for Tanzania.  
As expected, positive scale effects are evident in Tanzania, as increasing per capita GDP 
is significantly and positively correlated with the share of government revenue in GDP. This is 
expected because as per capita income rises, the government revenue/GDP ratio increases. That 
is, the higher the per capita income, the high the income of the populace and the more are willing 
and able to pay taxes. The results show that the inflation rate is inversely and significantly 
associated with government revenue collection in Tanzania.  
Although insignificant, the share of agriculture in GDP is negatively correlated to 
government revenue in Tanzania. The results reveal that the overall effect of aid (ODA) on 
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government revenue is positive, though not significant. This is not surprising because Tanzania is 
one of the most aid recipient countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The country has been receiving 
substantial amount of foreign aid as general budget support. However, when ODA is separated 
into its components, as expected although not significant, the share of grants as a percentage of 
GDP has a negative effect and the share of loans in GDP has a positive effect on government 
revenue. This suggests that grants reduce incentives for the government’s commitment to 
adopting good policies and to maintain efficient institutions to enhance revenue collection. In the 
case of loans, the government has an obligation to repay, and thus has incentives to collect more 
revenue in order to pay back the loan.    
 
Kenya 
Table 3.7 displays co-integration and error-correction regression results of the 
determinants of government revenue in Kenya. The results show that there exists a long-run 
relationship between government revenue as well as trade tax revenue and agriculture and 
industry.  Strong support for dynamic stability is provided by a significant negative adjustment 
coefficient (ECMt-1). That is, government revenue in Kenya moves towards the equilibrium due 
the changes in the structure of the economy as reflected by the changes in there share of 
agriculture and industry in GDP. This suggests that continued trade and tax reforms, promoting 
the manufacturing sector, commercialization of the agricultural sector, promoting the growth of 
GDP per capita and creating macroeconomic stability can provide the base for sustainable 
government revenue mobilization for the Kenyan government. The results also demonstrate that 
there are partial adjustments over time in government revenue and trade tax revenue in Kenya. 
This is supported by the significant positive coefficients on the lagged dependent variable.  
The results reveal that there seem to be significant positive long-run effects of trade 
reform on trade tax revenue. A long-run impact coefficient of trade liberalization on trade tax 
revenue collection is estimated at 1.75 and short-run coefficient is 0.57. That is, in the long-run 
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and short-run, increased openness of the Kenya economy to the rest of the world by a percentage 
point, contributed to 1.75 and 0.57 percentage points increase in trade tax revenue, respectively. 
This may suggest that in the long-run trade tax revenue has been improving as a result of 
increased trade volumes in Kenya. Although these positive effects are statistically insignificant, it 
is evident from the results in Table 3.7 that trade reforms did not adversely affect government 
revenue mobilization in Kenya. 
It is evident from the results that there are significant positive short-run effects of the 
changes in the share of external debt and industry in GDP on government revenue in Kenya. The 
positive and significant effect of the increase in the share of industry in GDP on government 
revenue in Kenya is not surprising because Kenya has a well developed manufacturing sector as 
compared to its neighbor counterparts-Tanzania and Uganda. Additionally, Kenya has been more 
successful in designing an efficient, less-distortinary and buoyant domestic tax system as 
compared to Tanzania and Uganda. Strong support is evidenced by higher levels of the share of 
VAT and income tax in total tax revenue in Kenya as compared to Tanzania and Uganda (see 
Tables 3.1 and 3.2).  
Contrary to expectation, the results show that there are negative effects of economies of 
scale on government revenue mobilization in Kenya, as indicated by negative correlation between 
rising per capita income and the share of government revenue in GDP, though statistically 
insignificant. This is an indication of the existence of structural and institutional weaknesses and 
inefficiencies in tax administration in Kenya. Though not significant, the results indicate that 
overall aid (ODA) has a positive effect on government revenue. However, when ODA is split into 
its components, as expected, the share of grants in GDP has a negative effect on government 
revenue mobilization, whilst the share of loans in GDP has positive effects on government 
revenue.   
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Uganda 
Table 3.8 summarizes co-integration and error-correction estimation results of the 
determinants of government revenue in Uganda. The results show that there is a long-run 
dynamic relationship between government revenue and greater openness to trade, inflation, 
agriculture, and total external debt. This suggests that continued trade and tax reforms, and 
creating stability are important for the sustainability of government revenue mobilization in 
Uganda. Dynamic stability is implied by significant negative coefficients of the error-correction 
term (ECMt-1) across all specifications. That is, short-run changes in inflation, total external debt 
and greater openness to trade equilibrates the movement of government revenue towards the 
equilibrium point. The co-integration regression results suggest that there are partial adjustments 
of government revenue and trade tax revenue in Uganda over time. The evidence is provided by a 
positive and statistically significant coefficient on the lagged dependent variables.  
The results show that there are significant negative short-run and long-run effects of trade 
reforms on government revenue in Uganda. Strong support is provided by a negative statistically 
significant long-run coefficient on the openness measure (TRADE), estimated at -1.05. That is, 
greater openness to trade by a percentage point has been associated with a decline in government 
revenue by 1.05 percentage points in Uganda. This indicates that Uganda has not been recovering 
revenue lost due to cuts in trade tax revenues. This is noteworthy because despite the observed 
increasing trend of the share of government revenue in GDP in Uganda, the regression results 
indicate that trade liberalization led to lower levels of government revenue. The conclusion that 
can be drawn from this finding is that trade reforms depressed share of government revenue in 
GDP in Uganda, unlike in its neighbors Tanzania and Kenya.  
It is evident from the regression analysis that short-run changes in inflation rate and 
official development assistance had significant effects on government revenue in Uganda. The 
results indicate that overall aid (ODA) has a negative effect on government revenue. This may be 
because grants make up a larger proportion of the foreign aid that has been provided to the 
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Ugandan government (Table 2.10). This is also supported by the by the regression results 
whereby after splitting ODA into its components, the share of grants in GDP has a significant 
inverse relationship with government revenue mobilization. The plausible interpretation is that 
grants reduce incentives for the government’s commitment to adopting good policies and to 
maintain efficient institutions to enhance efficiencies in revenue mobilization. Somewhat 
surprisingly, the share of loans in GDP too has a negative effect on government revenue, though 
statistically insignificant. The inverse relationship between loans and government revenue 
mobilization in Uganda could be related to the volatility of loan disbursement to Uganda 
contributing to unpredictability of revenues for a general budget support (Antingi-Ego, 2006; 
Williamson, 2006). There seem no significant short-run effects of changes in external debt, 
agriculture, industry and civil war on government revenue.  
Results in Table 3.8 show that short-run changes in the inflation rate contributed 
significantly to the decline of total tax revenue and trade tax revenues in Uganda. Strong support 
is provided by the negative and statistically significant coefficient on inflation. The results also 
reveal that short-run changes in the share of industry in GDP had positive and significant impacts 
on trade tax revenue mobilization in Uganda. Other variables seem to have no significant short-
run effects on trade tax revenue mobilization in Uganda.  
3.5 Conclusions  
The results provide a clear picture that revenue consequences of trade reform have not 
been the same for the three East African countries under study. The regression results indicate 
that trade reforms led to lower government revenue in Uganda. Despite the observed declining 
trends of government revenue in GDP in Tanzania, the econometric results indicate that trade 
reforms have not contributed to the decline in government revenue.   
Econometric results show that trade reforms had significant positive and negative impacts 
on government revenue in Tanzania and Uganda, respectively, implying that Tanzania has been 
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recovering revenue lost due to cuts in trade tax revenue whereas Uganda has not been able to do 
so. In the case of Kenya, though not statistically significant, the results show that trade reforms 
had not adverse effects on government revenue. These dissimilarities in the revenue 
consequences of trade reforms in the three countries support the argument made earlier that 
revenue consequences of trade reforms are country-specific, and cannot be derived from cross-
country analysis as this may obscure the different ways in which any given country has been 
affected.  
It is evident from the findings that changes in policy episodes have been part and parcel 
of observed variations and fluctuations of the trends of revenue/GDP ratios as well as in the 
changes in the ratio of the different tax components in GDP and tax revenue. Most prominent is 
the declining trend of the contribution of trade taxes. There has been a significant decline in the 
reliance on trade taxes as a source of revenue among the three countries, with the exception of 
Uganda where the proportion of trade taxes in GDP and tax revenue remains higher.  
The results also reveal that in one way or on other, trade reforms have contributed to the 
variations and fluctuations of revenue in all three countries. This has been contributed to volatility 
and unpredictability of revenue generation, which may adversely affect the smooth financing of 
government budgets. 
The findings demonstrate that the success of government revenue collection depends on 
the taxation potential of the individual countries as conditioned by the macroeconomic 
environment, economic structure and the level of development. For example, Kenya has been 
successful in designing relatively more efficient and buoyant tax system, as evidenced by 
collection of larger proportions of taxes from VAT and income taxes, which are considered to be 
less distortionary (Heady, 2004). Kenya has a higher government revenue/GDP ratio, consistent 
with its relatively higher literacy levels and well-developed manufacturing and service, sectors-
easy-to-tax sectors, as compared to Tanzania and Uganda (see Tables 2.1, 2.6 and 2.10).   
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There is strong evidence that there are perverse weaknesses and inefficiencies in tax 
administration and collection. Institutional weaknesses and high incidences of tax revenue 
leakages due to tax evasion, tax exemptions, tax holidays and embezzlements of collected taxes 
have been reported to obstruct government revenue mobilization in all three countries (Fischer, 
2006; Fjeldstad, 2002; Fjeldstad and Semboja, 2000; Morrissey, 1995; Levin, 2005; Kangave, 
2005; Teera, 2003; Kayizzi-Mugerwa, 2002; Chen et al., 2001, Ayoki et al., 2005; Ndikumana 
and Nannyonjo, 2007; Kelly, 2000; Glenday, 2000; Castro et al., 2004; Moyi and Ronge, 2006; 
Karingi, 2002).  
The following policy lessons can be drawn from these findings. First, all three countries 
have the potential for increasing government revenue mobilization. This is possible if these 
countries can rectify existing structural, institutional and administrative weaknesses in their tax 
systems. Improvement in revenue mobilization could be achieved through the computerization of 
tax administration and collection. This can help to monitor tax collection and control corruption 
because it makes harder to temper with records. This will also help to address issues related to tax 
revenue leakages and embezzlement. 
Second, expansion of the tax base should be at the forefront in the ongoing tax reform in 
the three countries. Enlarging the tax net by bringing in more taxpayers into the tax bracket; 
provision of better incentives to taxpayers so as to improve tax compliance; abolishment 
unnecessary tax exemptions; and instituting and enforcing stringent laws to punish tax evaders 
and embezzlers are important issues that need to be addressed.  
Third, the three countries should focus at providing incentives for the development of the 
manufacturing sector and commercialization of the agricultural sector, as means for the 
monetization and raising income and sales and excise taxes as well as trade taxes. 
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Table 3.1: Tax Structure Pre- and Post-Reform in East Africa 
 
Variable Pre-Reform Period 
(1970-86) 
Post-Reform Period 
(1987-2005) 
Whole Period 
(1970-2005) 
Tanzania                                                                 (As % of GDP) 
Total Revenue 21.61 15.54 18.41 
Tax Revenue 20.12 11.68 15.67 
Trade Tax Revenue 3.22 3.65 3.45 
Sales & Excise/VAT 7.12 3.72 5.33 
Income Tax Revenue 5.80 3.10 4.37 
(As % of Tax Revenue) 
Trade Tax Revenue 15.57 32.11 24.30 
Sales & Excise/VAT 36.46 30.56 33.36 
Income Tax Revenue 29.24 26.59 27.83 
Other Taxes 18.73 10.74 14.51 
Total Tax Revenue 100.00 100.00 100.51 
Kenya                                                                    (As % of GDP) 
Total Revenue 14.95 18.98 17.07 
Tax Revenue 12.83 16.60 14.82 
Trade Tax Revenue 3.38 2.99 3.17 
Sales & Excise/VAT 5.15 7.34 6.38 
Income Tax Revenue 4.64 5.36 5.02 
(As % of Tax Revenue) 
Trade Tax Revenue 24.29 18.16 24.28 
Sales & Excise/VAT 38.60 44.52 39.58 
Income Tax Revenue 36.61 36.34 35.36 
Other Taxes 0.50 0.98 0.78 
Total Tax Revenue 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Uganda                                                                     (As % of GDP) 
Total Revenue 6.44 15.26 12.22 
Tax Revenue 6.29 9.70 8.52 
Trade Tax Revenue 3.94 4.62 4.39 
Sales & Excise/VAT 1.70 3.10 2.62 
Income Tax Revenue 0.47 1.55 1.18 
As % of Tax Revenue) 
Trade Tax Revenue 57.23 47.71 51.00 
Sales & Excise/VAT 31.88 31.69 31.75 
Income Tax Revenue 9.09 14.92 12.91 
Other Taxes 1.80 5.68 4.34 
Total Tax Revenue 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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Table 3.2: Tax Structure in Policy Reform Episodes in East Africa, 1970-2005 
 
Tanzania Kenya Uganda Variable 
70-80 81-85 86-92 93-95 96-05 70-79 80-86 87-91 92-96 97-05 70-79 80-86 87-91 92-05 
Government Revenue (as % of GDP) 
Total 
Revenue 
23.36 19.01 15.19 14.74 16.00 14.14 16.10 17.00 18.64 20.45 6.25 6.53 8.33 17.73 
Tax Revenue 21.25 18.61 13.74 10.07 11.08 11.78 14.32 15.24 16.55 17.54 5.85 6.25 5.82 11.08 
Trade Tax 
Revenue 
4.24 1.42 2.93 2.75 4.17 3.36 3.40 2.65 2.69 3.36 3.92 3.95 2.76 5.29 
Sales & 
Excise/VAT 
5.91 9.74 6.01 2.71 2.80 4.27 6.16 7.58 7.84 6.96 1.89 1.61 1.86 3.55 
Income Tax 
Revenue 
6.08 5.49 3.63 2.89 2.91 4.64 4.63 4.82 6.54 5.20 0.56 0.44 0.57 1.90 
Taxes (as % of Total Tax Revenue) 
Trade Tax 
Revenue 
19.98 7.65 23.02 27.17 37.42 26.12 23.71 18.87 14.22 19.57 58.41 56.73 47.57 47.76 
Sales & 
Excise/VAT 
28.06 52.55 42.15 26.99 25.34 33.71 43.04 48.64 49.19 43.63 31.96 31.85 31.75 31.66 
Income Tax 
Revenue 
29.23 29.41 26.32 28.83 26.27 39.57 32.38 31.15 36.31 34.68 9.59 8.88 9.74 16.77 
Other Taxes 22.73 10.39 8.51 17.01 10.97 0.60 0.87 1.34 0.28 1.12 0.04 2.54 10.94 3.81 
Total Tax 
Revenue 
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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Table 3.3: Time Trend Coefficients of Government Revenue in East Africa 
 
Country Pre-Reform Period 
(1970-1986) 
Post Reform Period 
(1987-2005) 
Whole Period 
(1970-2005) 
Total Government Revenue 
Tanzania -0.559  
(3.44)*** 
0.165 
(1.75)* 
-0.287  
(5.20)*** 
Kenya 0.204  
(2.92)** 
0.283  
(5.08)*** 
0.231  
(10.64)*** 
Uganda 0.133  
(0.526) 
0.814  
(10.94)*** 
0.646 
(13.00)*** 
Total Tax Revenue 
Tanzania -0.371 
(2.98)*** 
-0.154 
(2.01)** 
-0.412 
(10.60)*** 
Kenya 0.292 
(4.91)*** 
0.207 
(4.32)*** 
0.218 
(11.63)*** 
Uganda 0.334 
(0.93) 
0.467 
(9.52)*** 
0.304 
(6.24)*** 
Trade Tax Revenue 
Tanzania -0.333 
(5.94)*** 
0.132 
(3.50)*** 
-0.002 
(0.09) 
Kenya -0.030 
(0.75) 
-0.041 
(0.98) 
-0.013 
(0.88) 
Uganda 0.308 
(1.20) 
0.228 
(5.48)*** 
0.108 
(2.89)*** 
Sales and Excise Tax (VAT) Revenue 
Tanzania 0.414 
(4.17)*** 
-0.246 
(3.46)*** 
-0.134 
(3.09)*** 
Kenya 0.229 
(5.36)*** 
-0.068 
(1.49) 
0.103 
(4.76)*** 
Uganda -0.027 
(0.35) 
0.177 
(13.43)*** 
0.114 
(8.56)*** 
Income Tax Revenue 
Tanzania -0.008 
(0.15) 
-0.043 
(2.25)** 
-0.120 
(7.75)*** 
Kenya 0.019 
(0.94) 
0.001 
(0.01) 
0.032 
(2.26)** 
Uganda -0.005 
(0.24) 
0.156 
(13.82)*** 
0.094 
(9.74)*** 
 
Notes: Absolute t-values are reported in parentheses; *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5 % level and * 
significant at 10 % level. 
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Figure 3.1: Time Trends of Government Revenue in Tanzania 
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Figure 3.2: Time Trends of Government Revenues in Kenya 
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Figure 3.3: Time Trends of Government Revenues in Uganda 
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Table 3.4: Unit Root Tests for Variables in the Regression Analysis 
 
Variable  ADF Z(t) Value PP Z(t) Value Order of 
Integration 
 
Tanzania 
Government Revenue -4.618*** -7.134*** I(1) 
Trade Volume (TRADE/GDP) -2.507 -3.828*** I(1) 
Inflation Rate -2.995** -5.383*** I(1) 
External Debt Ratio to GDP 2.009 -8.016*** I(1) 
Agriculture Ratio to GDP -3.448*** -6.923*** I(1) 
Industry Ratio to GDP -3.023** -7.155*** I(1) 
Per Capita GDP -2.084 -3.689*** I(1) 
Official Development Aid/GDP -3.166** -4.830*** I(1) 
Grants (% of GDP) -2.850* -5.005*** I(1) 
Loans (% of GDP) -4.538*** -7.847*** I(1) 
 
Kenya 
Government Revenue -4.823*** -7.962*** I(1) 
Trade Volume (TRADE/GDP) -4.078*** -7.011*** I(1) 
Inflation Rate -3.006** -4.354*** I(0) 
External Debt Ratio to GDP -3.167** -5.322*** I(0) 
Agriculture Ratio to GDP -4.211*** -4.943*** I(1) 
Industry Ratio to GDP -4.246*** -5.835*** I(1) 
Per Capita GDP -2.331 -6.759*** I(0) 
Official Development Aid/GDP -2.541* -6.247*** I(1) 
Grants (% of GDP) -1.625 -3.959*** I(1) 
Loans (% of GDP) -3.370** -8.707*** I(1) 
 
Uganda 
Government Revenue -3.501** -8.943*** I(1) 
Trade Volume (TRADE/GDP) -6.193*** -6.139*** I(1) 
Inflation Rate -2.889** -5.555*** I(1) 
External Debt Ratio to GDP -1.814 -4.183*** I(1) 
Agriculture Ratio to GDP -2.121* -6.949*** I(1) 
Industry Ratio to GDP -4.944*** -4.550*** I(1) 
Per Capita GDP -3.234** -5.494*** I(2) 
Official Development Aid/GDP -3.115** -6.877*** I(1) 
Grants (% of GDP) -4.143*** -4.605*** I(1) 
Loans (% of GDP) -1.652 -10.019*** I(1) 
 
Notes: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5 % level and * significant at 10 % level. 
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Table 3.5: Results for Co-integration Analysis 
 
Without Constant Without Trend With Trend 
Mackinnon Critical Values Mackinnon Critical Values Mackinnon Critical Values 
Equation 
Z(t) 1% 5% Z(t) 1% 5% Z(t) 1% 5% 
Tanzania 
Government 
Revenue 
-7.989*** -4.830 -3.917 -7.659*** -5.247 -4.293 -7.758*** -5.665 -4.660 
Trade tax 
Revenue 
-6.757*** -4.546 -3.685 -6.642*** -4.994 -4.283 -6.510*** -5.426 -4.487 
Kenya 
Government 
Revenue 
-4.985*** -4.204 -3.407 -4.911*** -4.696 -3.872 -4.845** -5.144 -4.293 
Trade tax 
Revenue 
-7.050*** -4.204 -3.407 -6.928*** -4.696 -3.872 -6.831*** -5.144 -4.293 
Uganda 
Government 
Revenue 
-4.832*** -4.725 -3.736 -4.707** -5.273 -4.170 5.120** -5.729 -4.589 
Trade tax 
Revenue 
-6.162*** -4.362 -3.457 -6.027*** -4.909 -3.943 -5.930*** -5.418 -4.389 
 
Notes: Z(t) *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5 % level and * significant at 10 % level, (Critical values at 1% 
and 5% level of significant are calculated using Mackinnon (1994) and Ericsson and Mackinnon (2002) method.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  89 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.6: Determinants of Government Revenue Mobilization in Tanzania 
 
Government Revenues Trade Tax Revenues Variables 
1 2ODA 2GRANT 2LOAN 1 2ODA 2GRANT 2LOAN 
GRVt-1 0.341** 
(2.07) 
   0.314** 
(2.00) 
   
TRADE 0.444** 
(2.53) 
0.377* 
(1.91) 
0.399** 
(2.03) 
0.365* 
(1.91) 
0.099 
(0.36) 
0.274 
(0.47) 
0.254 
(0.44) 
0.319 
(0.56) 
INFL -0.145*** 
(3.36) 
0.051 
(0.76) 
0.066 
(0.92) 
0.054 
(0.86) 
 0.111 
(0.57) 
0.084 
(0.40) 
0.129 
(0.70) 
EXD  -0.075 
(0.60) 
-0.070 
(0.57) 
-0.080 
(0.65) 
-0.340** 
(2.34) 
-0.113 
(0.31) 
-0.121 
(0.33) 
-0.106 
(0.29) 
AGR  -0.299 
(0.60) 
-0.211 
(0.38) 
-0.261 
(0.50) 
 0.375 
(0.25) 
0.205 
(0.13) 
0.455 
(0.30) 
IND -0.806** 
(2.50) 
-0.295 
(1.12) 
-0.271 
(1.01) 
-0.270 
(1.02) 
1.039** 
(2.12) 
0.880 
(1.15) 
0.814 
(1.04) 
0.887 
(1.13) 
PCGDP 0.334** 
(2.45) 
0.532** 
(2.23) 
0.490** 
(2.10) 
0.567** 
(2.54) 
 0.475 
(0.70) 
0.514 
(0.77) 
0.406 
(0.63) 
ODA  0.006 
(0.05) 
   0.085 
(0.28) 
  
GRANT   -0.039 
(0.39) 
   0.131 
(0.45) 
 
LOAN    0.032 
(0.60) 
   0.005 
(0.03) 
TREND -0.022*** 
(3.56) 
   -0.047* 
(1.76) 
   
ECMt-1  -0.881*** 
(4.63) 
-0.862*** 
(4.67) 
-0.907*** 
(4.88) 
 -0.765*** 
(3.42) 
-0.762*** 
(3.44) 
-0.752*** 
(3.40) 
Φ 0.674        
CONST. 1.793** 
(2.04) 
-0.029 
(1.00) 
-0.025 
(0.89) 
-0.031 
(1.12) 
-1.633 
(1.09) 
-0.044 
(0.52) 
-0.048 
(0.54) 
-0.039 
(0.47) 
N 35 34 34 34 35 34 34 34 
F-Value 15.89*** 4.17** 4.22** 4.28** 14.08*** 2.08* 2.10* 2.06* 
Adj-R2 0.7243 0.4349 0.4382 0.4428 0.6580 0.2073 0.2110 0.2048 
 
Notes: GVR: the natural logarithm of the ratio of government revenue to GDP; TRADE: the natural logarithm of the ratio of trade 
volume (export plus import to GDP) to GDP; INF: the natural logarithm of inflation rate; EXD: the natural logarithm of total external 
debt to GDP; AGR: the natural logarithm of the share of agriculture in GDP; PCGDP: the natural logarithm of real per capita GDP; 
ODAID: the natural logarithm of the ratio of oversea development aid to GDP; ECMt-1: the residual of the regression of co-
integrated variables lagged one period, Φ: is the coefficient capturing long-run  effects of trade reform on government revenues. 
 
Absolute t-values are reported in parentheses; *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5 % level and * significant at 10 % level. 
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Table 3.7: Determinants of Government Revenue Mobilization in Kenya 
 
Government Revenues Trade Tax Revenues Variables 
1 2ODA 2GRANT 2LOAN 1 2ODA 2GRANT 2LOAN 
GRVt-1 0.498*** 
(3.83) 
   0.676*** 
(4.67) 
   
TRADE 0.075 
(0.60) 
-0.024 
(0.19) 
0.040 
(0.32) 
-0.005 
(0.04) 
0.568* 
(1.72) 
-0.057 
(0.14) 
-0.032 
(0.08) 
-0.009 
(0.02) 
INFL  -0.011 
(0.73) 
-0.005 
(0.35) 
-0.010 
(0.64) 
 -0.032 
(0.61) 
-0.031 
(0.64) 
-0.026 
(0.53) 
EXD  0.012 
(1.51) 
0.014* 
(1.76) 
0.011 
(1.44) 
 -0.003 
(0.11) 
-0.002 
(0.10) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
AGR -0.340* 
(1.95) 
-0.111 
(0.32) 
0.166 
(0.49) 
-0.151 
(0.45) 
0.683 
(1.36) 
0.459 
(0.41) 
0.482 
(0.45) 
0.422 
(0.39) 
IND -0.776*** 
(3.39) 
1.136** 
(2.20) 
1.045** 
(2.02) 
1.049** 
(2.05) 
-0.345 
(0.63) 
0.541 
(0.34) 
0.549 
(0.35) 
0.551 
(0.36) 
PCGDP  -0.709 
(1.35) 
-0.571 
(1.13) 
-0.530 
(1.07) 
 -0.104 
(0.061) 
-0.149 
(0.09) 
-0.128 
(0.08) 
ODA  0.065 
(1.01) 
   -0.001 
(0.00) 
  
GRANT   -0.057 
(0.47) 
   -0.080 
(0.21) 
 
LOAN    0.032 
(0.90) 
   -0.043 
(0.37) 
ECMt-1  -0.387* 
(1.95) 
-0.368* 
(1.84) 
-0.342* 
(1.73) 
 -0.737*** 
(3.10) 
-0.738*** 
(3.21) 
-0.726*** 
(3.13) 
Φ     1.753    
CONST. 4.578*** 
(3.50) 
0.017 
(1.26) 
0.778 
(0.56) 
0.016 
(1.24) 
-3.264* 
(1.89) 
-0.012 
(0.28) 
0.075 
(0.18) 
-0.012 
(0.29) 
N 35 34 34 34 35 34 34 34 
F-Value 31.89*** 3.53** 3.32** 3.48** 13.33*** 1.35 1.36 1.38 
Adj-R2 0.7842 0.3799 0.3604 0.3750 0.5919 0.0783 0.0799 0.0634 
 
Notes: GVR: the natural logarithm of the ratio of government revenue to GDP; TRADE: the natural logarithm of the ratio of trade 
volume (export plus import to GDP) to GDP; INFL: the natural logarithm of inflation rate; EXD: the natural logarithm of total 
external debt to GDP; AGR: the natural logarithm of the share of agriculture in GDP; PCGDP: the natural logarithm of real per capita 
GDP; ODA: the natural logarithm of the ratio of oversea development aid to GDP; ECMt-1: the residual of the regression of co-
integrated variables lagged one period; Φ: is the coefficient capturing long-run  effects of trade reform on government revenues. 
 
 Absolute t-values are reported in parentheses; *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5 % level and * significant at 10 % level. 
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Table 3.8: Determinants of Government Revenue Mobilization in Uganda 
 
Government Revenues Trade Tax Revenues Variables 
1 2ODA 2GRANT 2LOAN 1 2ODA 2GRANT 2LOAN 
GRVt-1 0.285** 
(2.12) 
   0.429*** 
(3.12) 
   
TRADE -0.750** 
(2.51) 
-0.305 
(1.14) 
-0.267 
(0.90) 
-0.416 
(1.26) 
-0.147 
(0.44) 
0.952 
(1.53) 
0.821 
(1.25) 
0.705 
(1.11) 
INFL -0.165*** 
(4.25) 
-0.168*** 
(4.78) 
-0.173*** 
(4.40) 
-0.146*** 
(3.40) 
-0.189*** 
(3.84) 
-0.192** 
(2.29) 
-0.165* 
(1.83) 
-0.151* 
(1.81) 
EXD 0.224*** 
(3.04) 
0.105 
(0.79) 
0.013 
(0.10) 
-0.024 
(0.15) 
-0.112 
(1.03) 
0.203 
(0.60) 
0.032 
(0.10) 
0.148 
(0.45) 
AGR -0.876** 
(2.89) 
-0.383 
(0.77) 
-0.492 
(0.92) 
-0.831 
(1.44) 
 0.799 
(0.64) 
0.210 
(0.16) 
0.452 
(0.39) 
IND  0.243 
(1.16) 
0.241 
(1.06) 
0.294 
(1.15) 
 0.880* 
(1.81) 
0.939* 
(1.84) 
0.959* 
(1.96) 
ODA  -0.349** 
(2.73) 
   -0.343 
(1.08 
  
GRANT   -0.192** 
(2.02) 
   0.019 
(0.08) 
 
LOAN    -0.015 
(0.20) 
   -0.139 
(0.98) 
CIWAR  0.061 
(1.00) 
0.045 
(0.69) 
0.043 
(0.59) 
 -0.021 
(0.14) 
-0.028 
(0.18) 
-0.019 
(0.13) 
ECMt-1  -0.796*** 
(3.71) 
-0.847*** 
(3.63) 
-0.827*** 
(3.16) 
 -0.934*** 
(3.29) 
-0.846** 
(2.84) 
-0.871*** 
(3.15) 
Φ -1.049        
CONST. 7.309*** 
(3.74) 
0.018 
(0.48) 
0.018 
(0.45) 
0.006 
(0.14) 
2.411* 
(1.84) 
-0.002 
(0.02) 
-0.019 
(0.20) 
-0.015 
(0.16) 
N 25 24 24 24 25 24 24 24 
F-Value 66.90*** 9.17*** 7.51*** 5.53*** 19.78*** 2.55* 2.23* 2.49* 
Adj-R2 0.9321 0.7397 0.6937 0.6117 0.7578 0.3508 0.3002 0.3419 
 
Notes: GVR: the natural logarithm of the ratio of government revenue to GDP; TRADE: the natural logarithm of the ratio of trade 
volume (export plus import to GDP) to GDP; INFL: the natural logarithm of inflation rate; EXD: the natural logarithm of total 
external debt to GDP; AGR: the natural logarithm of the share of agriculture in GDP; PCGDP: the natural logarithm of real per capita 
GDP; ODA: the natural logarithm of the ratio of oversea development aid to GDP; CIWAR: the dummy variable for the occurrence of 
civil war in Uganda; ECMt-1T: the residual of the regression of co-integrated variables lagged one period; Φ: is the coefficient 
capturing long-run  effects of trade reform on government revenues.  
 
Absolute t-values are reported in parentheses; *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5 % level and * significant at 10 % level. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSIS OF TAX PERFORMANCE 
4.1 Introduction 
Like many other developing countries, Sub-Saharan African countries have undergone 
economic reforms at varying rates of implementation and commitment. The primary motivation 
for undertaking economic reforms has been the need to achieve key economic objectives, 
including: promoting economic growth, achieving macroeconomic stability, reducing fiscal 
vulnerability and, of late, alleviating poverty. Although some remarkable performances have been 
achieved, in the form of high economic growth rates and lower inflation rates, a remaining 
challenge is to address fiscal imbalances. The persistent increase of fiscal deficits in Tanzania, 
Kenya and Uganda despite implementing economic reforms suggests that revenue generating 
capacity of these three countries has not been commensurate with the growth of their 
expenditures. Since a large proportion of finance for expenditures comes from tax revenue, the 
lagging behind of revenues could be linked to the sluggishness of the tax system in generating 
adequate revenues.  
Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda have implemented similar economic reforms, but the 
previous chapter demonstrates that the impact of reforms across these countries is not identical. 
The findings reveal that economic liberalization has contributed to the decline of government 
revenue in Uganda and had positive impact on government revenue in Kenya and Tanzania. The 
previous chapter also demonstrates that trade liberalization has contributed to the variations and 
fluctuations of government revenue in the three East African countries. This may reflect a 
combination of factors, including the inherent features of their tax systems; the resilience of the 
tax systems to changes in trade and tax policies and differences in macroeconomic conditions, 
economic structure, level of development and institutional framework.  
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The failure to generate adequate revenue, the varied revenue impact of trade 
liberalization in these countries, and the variations and fluctuations of government revenue call 
into question the effectiveness of the tax system in mobilizing revenue. This chapter examines the 
performance of the tax systems in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. The main focus is to determine 
factors affecting revenue mobilization in these countries. The findings emanating from this 
chapter are important from different perspectives. First, they have potential to provide 
information that can be used in revenue forecasting. This information is essential for budget 
planning and management purposes. Second, this information is crucial for design, formulation 
and execution of sound fiscal and macroeconomic policies.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. The review of the theoretical and 
empirical studies on tax performance is presented in the next section. It presents the theoretical, 
conceptual and measurements issues on tax performance as well as determinants of tax 
performance. Section three describes the trends of tax buoyancy of the tax systems of each 
country. This is followed by a presentation of an econometric analysis in section four. Concluding 
remarks are presented in section five. 
4.2 Literature Review 
4.2.1 Theoretical, Conceptual and Measurement Issues 
The most basic characteristic of an effective tax system is that it generates sufficient 
revenues to finance government expenditures and development (Stepanyan, 2003; Indraratna, 
2003; Teera and Hudson, 2004). The capability of the tax system of a country to raise adequate 
resources to finance government spending is determined by the policy tax structure, efforts by the 
government to collect taxes or effectiveness of tax administration, prevailing macroeconomic 
conditions, the level of development and the structure of the economy (Steenekamp, 2007; Teera 
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and Hudson, 2004). Tax performance is a function of the available tax base, the tax rates applied 
to the tax bases available, and the probability of collecting a specific levy.    
A number of approaches have been used to assess tax performance. Among notable 
approaches are the tax effort approach, the regression approach, the average effective tax rate 
approach, tax elasticity approach and tax buoyancy approach. Others include the revenue 
adequacy, economic efficiency, equity and simplicity approaches (Osoro, 1993; Ahmed, 1994; 
Stotsky and Wolde-Mariam, 1997; Ghura, 2002; Steenekamp, 2003; Teera and Hudson, 2004; 
Gupta, 2007; Davoodi and Grigorian, 2007; Begum, 2007).  
There are two methods that can be used to estimate the tax effort index. The first one is 
the tax revenue/GDP ratio. This is determined by taking the ratio of taxes in a country to a 
measure of the tax base, the GDP.  It is assumed that the tax base is a proper measure of taxable 
capacity. However, the tax revenue/GDP ratio as a measure of tax performance is not a sufficient 
measure of taxable capacity because it may not capture all taxes linked to income, and does not 
take into account the distribution of income and how the income is earned from different sources, 
such as agriculture and the informal sector which also affect the country’s tax system (Stotsky 
and Wolde-Mariam, 1997). The tax revenue/GDP ratio also does not provide insight into what 
other factors; such as economic structure, level of economic development and the administrative 
and political capability affect a country’s tax performance (Begum, 2007). 
The regression approach is another tax effort approach that has been extensively used to 
examine tax performance. Recent studies that have used the regression approach to assess tax 
performance are Teera and Hudson (2004), Agbeyegbe et al. (2006), Baunsgaard and Keen 
(2005); Khattry and Rao (2002), Stotsky and Wolde-Mariam (1997), Gupta (2007); Davoodi and 
Grigorian (2007), Ebrill et al. (1999), Ghura (2002); Indraratna, 2003; Begum, 2007). The 
regression approach involves regressing tax revenue/GDP ratios across countries against factors 
that are deemed to proxy for tax bases with explanatory variables that represent different elements 
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of taxable capacity and affect the country’s ability to generate adequate tax revenues. The 
functional form of the regression is expressed as follows: 
 
T/Y = f(X, Z)         (4.1) 
 
Where, T is tax revenue, Y is the tax base (GDP), X is a vector of factors that proxy for tax base 
and Z is vector of other explanatory variables that affect the country’s ability to raise tax 
revenues. The actual tax ratio of an individual country is compared with the tax ratio predicted 
from the regression equation. The predicted tax ratio from the regression is then taken as a 
measure of taxable capacity, and the regression coefficients on X are interpreted as the average 
effective rates of the tax base in question. Then the ratio of the actual to the predicted tax ratios is 
computed and used as an index of tax performance. This measure of tax effort index is considered 
relatively better than a simple tax ratio analysis; in that it takes into account the differences 
among countries in their capacity to raise taxes (Stotsky and WoldeMariam, 1997; Begum, 2007).  
However, this regression approach has its own limitations as a measure of tax performance. The 
approach uses the predicted taxable capacity, which is based on average values for the sample 
which may have no relevance for a given country, making it is a poor normative indicator of 
taxable capacity (Ahmad and Stern, 1989; Addison and Levin, 2006).  
Furthermore, both the tax revenue/GDP ratio and regression approach are generally static 
in nature. They only describe tax revenue at a given point in time (Begum, 2007; Steenekamp, 
2008; Rajaraman et al., 2005). They can not explain plausible short-run and long-run dynamic 
changes in the tax system. It is important to use measures that are able to capture dynamic 
changes in a system for revenue forecasting purposes, and to help assess the progressiveness of a 
tax system (Indraratna, 2003). Tax elasticity and buoyancy are measures which can capture short 
and long-run dynamic changes in a tax system (Indraratna, 2003; Begum, 2007; Steenekamp, 
2008; Rajaraman et al., 2005).  
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Tax elasticity is defined as the percentage change in total tax or individual taxes 
associated with a given percentage change in GDP. The use of the tax elasticity typically is based 
on the assumption that there are no changes in the tax base, in the statutory rates of existing taxes, 
in administrative efficiency and in the type of taxation used. That is, there are no changes to the 
tax structure and tax system (Osoro, 1993; Steenekamp, 2008; Rajaraman et al., 2005; Indraratna, 
2003; Begum, 2007 Creedy and Gemmell, 2001; Kusi, 1998; Chipeta, 1998; 2002; Ariyo, 1997; 
Ayoki, et al. 2005; Murith and Moyi, 2003). If so, it is assumed to capture automatic or natural 
responsiveness of tax yields to changes in income. 
Tax elasticities can be estimated using two methods. The first, involves estimating the 
ratio of the weighted sum of elasticities of individual taxes to changes in income. Overall tax 
elasticity for the individual tax is determined by: 
 
ETY = 1 1
1
. . ...
* * *
k k n n
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Y Y Y
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T T T T T T
      
                  
  (4.2) 
 
where: ETY = elasticity of tax revenue to income (GDP);  T*t = adjusted total tax revenue; ΔT = 
changes in adjusted tax revenue; Tk, Tn = adjusted tax revenue from kth and nth taxes in a system 
of n taxes; Y = income (GDP) and ΔY = changes in GDP. 
The second approach involves estimating a double natural logarithm regression equation 
for adjusted tax revenues on national income (GDP) (Teera and Hudson, 2004; Osoro 1993; 
Indraratna, 2003; Begum, 2007; Steenekamp, 2008; Creedy and Gemmell, 2001; Kusi, 1998; 
Chipeta, 1998; 2002; Ariyo, 1997; Ayoki, et al. 2005; Murith and Moyi, 2003). It is estimated 
from the following Cobb-Douglass regression equation: 
 
T* = γYβε         (4.3) 
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where T* is annual adjusted tax revenue, Y is annual nominal gross domestic product (GDP), ε is 
the multiplicative error term, β provides the estimates of tax elasticity and lnγ = α is a constant. 
The logarithmic transformation gives the following linear form: 
 
lnT*t = α + β1lnYt + εt         (4.4) 
 
where β1 is tax elasticity. A value less than one suggests low tax elasticity, which implies that the 
tax system is incapable of meeting growth in fiscal expenditures. Whereas a value greater than 
one suggests increased responsiveness and demonstrates the efficacy of the tax system, hence 
suggesting that tax revenue collections are able to meet rising expenditures (Creedy and 
Gemmell, 2001; Kusi, 1998; Chipeta, 1998; 2002; Ariyo, 1997; Ayoki, et al. 2005; Murith and 
Moyi, 2003). 
However, where tax policy instruments are subject to change from time to time, the 
elasticity of tax revenue may be difficult to estimate with appreciable degree of accuracy 
(Rajaraman et al., 2005). In countries such as Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda that have experienced 
many changes in their tax policies, it may be difficult to identify and separate all discretionary tax 
policies that have been undertaken in the country. In this context, where tax policy parameters are 
in a state of constant flux, the tax buoyancy provides an alternative approach to evaluating tax 
performance. Tax buoyancy estimates the revenue response with endogenized tax policy. Tax 
buoyancy measures the total response of a tax to a change in income and it shows the growth that 
result from the automatic growth of the base caused by an increase in GDP and from 
discretionary tax changes. Unlike tax elasticity, the estimation of tax buoyancy does not require 
that discretionary changes in tax policy be controlled (Osoro, 1993, 1994; Greedy and Gemmell, 
2001; Kusi, 1998; Chipeta, 1998; 2002; Ariyo, 1997; Ayoki, et al. 2005; Murith and Moyi, 2003; 
Teera and Hudson, 2004; Indraratna, 2003; Begum, 2007; Steenekamp, 2007).  
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Tax buoyancy similarly can be estimated in two ways. First by calculating the ratio of 
percentage change in tax revenue to percentage change in GDP as follows: 
 
bt=  %ΔTt/%ΔYt        (4.5) 
 
Where: %ΔTt = [(Ti+1-Ti)/Ti]100 is the percentage change in tax revenue between year i and year 
i+1 and %ΔYt = [(Yi+1-Yi)/Yi]100 is the percentage change in GDP between year i and year i+1. 
Second, is using a double natural logarithm regression equation, in which case tax revenue is 
regressed against the tax base (GDP) as follows: 
 
lnTt = β + δlnYt + εt        (4.6) 
 
Where: T is unadjusted tax revenue, Y is nominal GDP, β is the constant, δ is the tax buoyancy 
and ε is a stochastic disturbance term.  
There are conceptual similarities and differences between tax elasticity and buoyancy 
approaches. They are both estimated as a ratio of the percentage change in tax revenue to a given 
percentage change in GDP. The interpretation of the tax elasticity and buoyancy coefficients is 
the same. That is, a coefficient of one indicates a commensurate growth of both revenue and 
GDP, while a coefficient less than one indicate lagged revenue growth compared to GDP growth. 
A coefficient of more than one is an indication of a higher revenue growth than GDP growth 
(Kusi, 1998; Chipeta, 1998; 2002; Ariyo, 1997; Ayoki, et al. 2005; Murith and Moyi, 2003; 
Osoro 1993; 1994).  
The differences between tax elasticity and buoyancy is that tax elasticity measures the 
built-in response of revenues to changes in income, while tax buoyancy quantifies the total 
change in revenue accompanying changes in income. That is, tax elasticity measures the 
responsiveness of tax revenue without taking into account the effects of discretionary changes in 
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tax policy, assuming that no changes have taken place within the tax structure of the tax system 
over time. Therefore, the estimation of tax elasticity requires an adjustment to the actual revenue 
series so as to separate the growth of revenue arising from discretionary changes from that due to 
automatic changes. Tax buoyancy on the other hand, measures the responsiveness of revenues 
including changes in the tax system and its estimation does not require adjustments to the actual 
tax revenue (Creedy and Gemmell, 2001; Kusi, 1998; Chipeta, 1998; 2002; Ariyo, 1997; Ayoki, 
et al. 2005; Murith and Moyi, 2003; Osoro 1993; 1994; Indraratna, 2003; Steenekamp, 2008).  
Therefore, in developing countries such as Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, where tax 
policies, tax structure and tax systems have significantly changed, tax elasticity of tax revenue 
would not provide the best tax performance indicator. Instead, tax buoyancy would be an 
appropriate measure of tax performance. In light of the above discussion, the tax buoyancy 
approach is adopted to evaluate the responsiveness of the tax system in Tanzania, Kenya and 
Uganda. 
4.2.2 Determinants of Tax Performance: Empirical Evidence 
The empirical literature on determinants of tax performance is vast. The most recent 
studies on this area are Ghura (2002); Teera and Hudson (2004); Khattry and Rao, (2002); Gupta 
(2007); Steenekamp (2007); Agbeyebe et al. (2006); Davoodi and Grigorian (2007); Stotsky and 
WoldeMariam (1997); Baunsgaard and Keen (2005). However, most of these studies have used a 
static measure of tax performance, the revenue/GDP ratio, rather than examining short-run and 
long-run dynamic changes taking place in the tax system of a country over time.  
Exceptions are studies by Creedy and Gemmell, (2001); Kusi, (1998); Chipeta, (1998); 
(2002); Ariyo, (1997); Ayoki, et al. (2005); Murith and Moyi, (2003); Osoro (1993); Indraratna, 
(2003); Begum, (2007). These studies have employed the dynamic indicators of tax performance, 
tax elasticity and tax buoyancy. A limitation of these studies, however, is that they have used very 
short time series data. With short time-series one cannot sufficiently capture and separate short-
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term and longer-term dynamics (Ericsson and Mackinnon, 2002; Baunsgaard and Keen, 2005; 
Agbeyegbe et al., 2006). This is important since economic reforms may take a long time to exert 
their potential impacts in the economic system (Blejer and Cheasty, 1990). 
These studies have all used more or less the same explanatory variables as determinants 
of the responsiveness of a tax system. In addition to the level of development of a country proxy 
by per capita income, level of literacy, communication, extent of urbanization and population size 
and density, other factors include openness of the economy, structure of the economy reflected by 
the size of manufacturing/industry, agriculture and informal sector in GDP and the 
macroeconomic environment reflected by inflation rate, size of the fiscal deficit and the debt size. 
How these factors affect revenue generation capacity was explained in chapter three.  
Other factors affecting the revenue generating capacity of a tax system include: the 
administrative and political constraints on the fiscal system, social and political values, 
indigenous institutional arrangements, popular demand for government spending and other 
factors which condition overall willingness to pay taxes. Ultimately, the taxable capacity of the 
country’s tax system depends on the willingness and ability of people to pay taxes and the 
willingness and ability of the government to collect taxes. The willingness and ability of people to 
pay taxes depends, among other things, on the types of goods and services provided by the 
government, which varies with the degree of participation of the people acting as citizens (Teera 
and Hudson, 2004; Steenekamp, 2007). 
This study makes a contribution to the existing literature on tax performance in three 
ways. First, it examines the performance of the tax system using a dynamic index measure of tax 
performance-the tax buoyancy, and also employs a dynamic econometric approach – an error 
correction regression analysis. This approach allows capturing both short-run and long-run tax 
performance. Second, the study seeks to explain observed differences in the performance of tax 
systems of the three East African countries by analyzing key determinants of these differences. 
Third, the study uses a longer time-series (data from 1970-2005) compared to other studies that 
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have been conducted in the region. With a relatively longer time series, this study is able to 
identify short-run and long-run dynamic tax performance.   
4.3 Tax Revenue Performance in East Africa 
Tax revenue performance will be assessed based on the trends of buoyancy coefficients 
of the different tax categories and the overall changes in total tax. The aim is to trace and evaluate 
the changes in the tax buoyancy coefficients over the different policy episodes through which 
Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda have passed. In addition, the trends in tax buoyancy are compared 
between the pre-reform and post-reform period, in order to capture the overall impact of 
economic reforms on the performance of the tax system as a whole.  
It is important to provide a postmortem on the evolution of tax performance in these 
different policy episodes as this has important implications for identifying effective policy 
packages and determinants of tax revenue performance. The analysis shows that the performance 
of the tax system in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda has been generally improving since the 
initiation of economic reforms in the three countries, though varying over time. Tables 4.1, 4.2, 
4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 demonstrate this observation. This suggests that tax policy reforms undertaken 
during the period under study have contributed to the improvement of tax revenue performance in 
al three countries. However, overall the analysis shows that tax performance has not been 
impressive in Tanzania as compared to Kenya and Uganda.  
4.3.1 Tanzania 
The evolution of Tanzania’s tax revenue and overall tax system performance is depicted 
in Tables 4.1 and summarized in Tables 4.4 and 4.5. As pointed out earlier the tax revenue 
performance in Tanzania has been sluggish though with some slight improvement over time. This 
is substantiated by the overall tax buoyancy coefficient of total tax revenue and its tax 
components, which generally are less than one. This suggests that the responsiveness of the tax 
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revenue and tax system to changes in the level of economic activity and discretionary tax policies 
implemented in Tanzania for the period under study has been sluggish.  
Although overall Tanzania’s tax system paints a poor performance, there are some gains 
in tax revenue performance for some individual taxes and for the tax system as whole over time. 
The tax buoyancy of the tax system (i.e. total tax revenue) rose from an average of 0.91 in 1987-
92 to 0.98 during the period 1993-95, before it tapered to 0.87 in 1996-2005. This development 
can largely be attributed to the improved performance of sales and excise taxes (VAT), and 
income taxes. The support for this observation is linked to increasing buoyancy coefficients of the 
individual taxes. The buoyancy coefficient of sales and excise tax (VAT) increased from an 
average of 0.88 in 1970-80 to 0.92 in 1987-92, and rose further to 0.98 in 1993-95, before 
dropping to 0.87 in 1996-2005. Similarly, the buoyancy coefficient of income tax increased from 
an average of 0.88 in 1970-80 to 0.92 in 1986-92, and 1993-95, before falling to 0.87 in 1996-
2005. This could provide an indication that tax policy reforms implemented in the mid-1980s and 
1990s explain this improvement in tax revenue and tax performance in Tanzania.  
It is also worth noting that during the pre-crisis period the tax system performed better 
than during the crisis period and post reform period, except for trade taxes. During the pre-crisis 
period the tax buoyancies for sales and excise taxes (VAT) and income taxes are greater than one, 
suggesting that during this period the tax system was buoyant. The less than one tax buoyancy for 
trade tax during the pre-crisis period could be attributable to the fact that during this period 
Tanzania followed an inward-looking import-substitution strategy and therefore international 
trade was less important to the country.  
A comparison between the pre- and post-reform period, Table 4.4 shows that tax 
buoyancy of tax revenue improved slightly from 0.87 to 0.90. The tax buoyancy of trade tax 
remained almost constant, averaging at 0.999. However, the overall performance of the tax 
system and its tax components has not been impressive for the entire period under investigation 
as indicated by a tax buoyancy of less than one in all cases.    
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4.3.2 Kenya 
Kenya’s tax revenue and tax system performance has responded to changing tax policy 
implemented in the country. This observation is supported by the increasing trends of buoyancy 
coefficients of the overall tax system and individual taxes throughout much of the period under 
investigation as depicted in Tables 4.4 and 4.5. That is, the tax buoyancy has improved since 
1987-91, the period when economic reforms were initiated. There has been a slight decline in the 
period 1997-2005.  
The improvement in the performance of the Kenyan tax system can be seen on the 
buoyancy coefficient of sales and excise tax, rising from an average of 1.05 in the pre-crisis 
period to 1.10 during the reform period (1987-91). It then decreased slightly to 1.02 in 1992-96 
and rose to 1.09 in 1997-2005. The improvement in the Kenya’s tax revenue performance 
coincides with the period during which the government undertook tax reforms (i.e. in the mid-
1980s and 1990s) to improve the tax system. The decline in the tax buoyancy for international 
trade taxes on the other hand, could be associated with the fact that the Kenyan government 
reduced the tariff rates as part of its commitment to various international trade agreements. 
Comparing the performance of the Kenyan tax system between the pre-reform and post-
reform periods, Table 4.4 shows that the Kenyan tax system has become responsive to changes in 
economic activities following the implementation of tax reform programs in the mid-1980s and 
1990s as described in chapter two. The tax system has become more responsive after the 1987 tax 
reform. Overall the tax buoyancy improved slightly from 1.05 in the pre-reform period to 1.06 
during the post-reform period. A reasonable explanation for this result is that tax reform 
implemented in the country led to the improvement of the domestic tax structure, thus increase in 
revenue collection from sales and excise and income taxes. This is also attributed to the reduction 
in tax exemptions, the inclusion of many other commodities in VAT brackets, and the increase in 
the tax base.  
  104 
Overall, the Kenya tax system has been impressive as indicated by the greater than one 
tax buoyancy for total tax revenue, VAT and income tax. That is the taxes revenue generating 
capacity has been growing at a high rate than the growth of the national output (GDP), despite the 
government’s shift from trade taxes as a major source of revenue to domestic taxes. Less than one 
tax buoyancy for trade tax is an indication of the switch from trade taxes to domestic taxes as 
sources of government revenue in Kenya. 
4.3.3 Uganda 
Uganda’s tax revenue and tax system shows a strong improvement of performance from 
negative values of buoyancy coefficients to greater than one. Tables 4.4 and 4.5 depict a summary 
of the evolution of buoyancy coefficients for Uganda’s overall tax system and its tax components 
during different policy episodes over the period 1977-20053. Overall, the tax buoyancy 
coefficient for the Uganda’s tax system for the whole period under study-1977-2005 averaged at 
1.1. That is, the revenue generating capacity of the tax system in Uganda was growing faster than 
the growth rate of the economy.  
The figures in Table 4.5 show that the tax system during the pre-crisis period 1977-79 
was buoyant as compared to the crisis period. The tax buoyancy coefficients of all the tax 
categories and total tax revenue are greater than the buoyancy coefficients during the crisis 
period. Comparing the performance of the tax categories for the period between 1980 and 1986, 
the performance is impressive except for sales and excise tax (VAT) and trade tax in which the 
tax buoyancy is less than one. Since the period 1980-86 the improvement of the Uganda’s tax 
system performance has been remarkable. In all cases, the tax buoyancy was greater than one 
throughout the period between 1987 and 2005.  
                                               
3 The series for Uganda is shorter than that for Tanzania and Kenya. The data for Uganda were available for the period 
1977-2005 whereas that for Tanzania and Kenya were available for the period 1970-2005 
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Overall, a comparison of the Uganda’s tax revenue and tax system performance between 
the pre-reform and post reform period shows that total tax revenue became more responsive to 
changes in economic activities as a result of economic reforms implemented in the country. That 
is, the revenue generating capacity of the tax system was growing relatively faster than the 
growth rate of the economy. The tax buoyancy of the trade tax, VAT and income tax declined 
during the post-reform period. The tax buoyancy for the Uganda’s overall tax system improved 
slightly from 1.08 to 1.10.   
4.4 Econometric Analysis 
4.4.1 Methodology 
The tax buoyancy approach is adopted to assess tax performance in this study. Tax 
buoyancy measures the changes in tax revenue due to changes not only in income but also in tax 
policy. It also sheds light how responsive the tax system was in terms of generating adequate 
revenue to offset revenue lost as a result of tariff cuts.  
The first step was to estimate tax buoyancy coefficients of each tax and the overall tax 
system. The double natural log regression approach (equation 4.6) was used to estimate tax 
buoyancy coefficients of each tax. The estimated buoyancies for each tax and the overall tax 
system for the each country are presented in Tables 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 respectively. Then to assess 
factors affecting tax performance, tax buoyancy coefficients of the different tax categories and 
total tax revenue are regressed against factors which are hypothesized to affect tax performance. 
The basic estimation equation is specified as follows: 
 
bt =  + 1OPt + iXt + εt       (4.7) 
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Where bt is the estimated tax buoyancy, OPt is the measure of openness (trade 
liberalization), Xt is vector of determinants of tax buoyancy and εt is a stochastic disturbance 
term. Since the objective of this study is to examine short-run and long-run responsiveness of the 
tax system for the East African countries, a general autoregressive distributed lag-model is 
specified as follows:  
 
bt =  + ηbt-1 + 1OPt +2OPt-1 + i1Xt + i2Xt-1 + εt    (4.8) 
 
Estimating equation (3.2) can generate spurious results when time-series are not 
stationary.  With non-stationary time-series data, the best alternative to explain the dynamics of 
changes in policy reforms is the error-correction model. This involves re-arranging equation 
(4.8), which gives the error-correction model:  
 
Δbt = α+ 1ΔOPt + γεt-1 + ωt        (4.9) 
 
Where γ = (η-1), is the adjustment coefficient (i.e. the estimated coefficient on the error-
correction term). The expected value of adjustment coefficient is negative, which implies that 
there are dynamic stability in the long-run within the error-correction estimation model; εt-1 = (bt-
1- kOPt-1+ hXt-1), is the error correction term, which can also be obtained directly from the 
residuals of the co-integration regression equation (4.8); k = (1+2)/(1-η), and h = (δ1+ --- + 
δ5)/(1-η).  
4.4.2 Estimation Results 
Before proceeding to estimating the error-correction model it is important to test for the 
presence of unit root (i.e. whether the time-series data is stationary or non-stationary) and to 
ascertain whether the variables are co-integrated. This involves, first, determining the order of 
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integration for each of the variables under consideration; this involves differencing each series 
successively until stationary series are obtained. The second step is to estimate the co-integration 
regression with ordinary least squares, using variables with the same order of integration. The 
third is to test for stationary residuals of the co-integration regressions. The final step is to 
estimate the error-correction models.  
 
Unit Root Test  
Testing for stationary series, a unit root test was performed for each variable over the 
1970 to 2005 time period. In their levels of the series, for some variables (i.e. growth of 
agriculture for Tanzania and growth of manufacturing and public fiscal deficit for all countries) 
the null hypothesis of non-stationary of the series was rejected and other with no rejection of the 
hypothesis of non-stationary of the series at the 1 percent and 5 percent level. For those variables 
which were not stationary in their levels, after differencing we reject for each series the null 
hypothesis of non-stationary of the series at 1 or 5 percent levels. To minimize the possibility of 
falsely rejecting the true null hypothesis or accepting the null hypothesis which is false, both the 
augmented Dickey Fuller Test (ADF) and Pillips-Perron (P-P) non-parametric test were used to 
test for the presence of unit root. ADF test results are sensitive to different lag lengths of the 
dependent variable, thus biased towards non-rejection of unit roots when structural breaks are 
incorporated in the data (Indraratna, 2003; Li, 2001). The ADF test was therefore supplemented 
by the P-P test to confirm for the presence of unit root. The ADF and P-P unit root tests are 
summarized in Tables 4.6. The results show that after taking the first differences most of the 
variables became integrated of order 1. Other variables were integrated of order 0 (growth of 
agriculture for Tanzania and growth of manufacturing and public fiscal deficit for all countries) 
and 2 (growth of urban population for Kenya). Variables integrated of order 0 were also included 
in the error-correction estimation equation after taking their first differences so that all variables 
included in the regression were of the same order of integration and for interpretation purposes..  
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 Co-integration Analysis 
Table 4.7 reports results for co-integration analysis (unit root test for the residuals-the 
error-correction term). Co-integration regression for each tax category and total tax revenue for 
Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda respectively are presented in Tables 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 under column 
1. Since more than one independent variable is included in the co-integration analysis, the ADF 
and PP tests are not appropriate (Mackinnon, 1991). The critical values generated by Mackinnon, 
(1991) and Ericsson and Mackinnon (2002) were used to test for the stationarity of the residuals 
from the co-integration regression. The unit root tests for the residuals in Table 4.7 fail to reject 
the null hypothesis of non-stationary series, suggesting that the variables are co-integrated. 
Therefore, we proceed with the final stage of estimating the error-correction model to examine 
the dynamics of revenue performance in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. 
 
Error-Correction Estimation Results 
Based on co-integration analysis, the error-correction estimation is valid and therefore we 
can proceed to examine short-run and long-run relationships of the different tax categories and 
overall tax system and its determinants. The error-correction results for each tax category and the 
overall tax system are presented under column 2 of Tables 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 for Tanzania, Kenya 
and Uganda respectively. The interesting observation to note is the negative and statistically 
significant coefficient of the error correction term for all the tax categories and overall tax system, 
with exception of sales and excise tax (VAT) for Tanzania, but it has the expected negative sign. 
This suggests that in almost all types of taxes, tax revenue tends to move towards the equilibrium 
as a result of the changes in the variables included in the co-integration regression. A close 
examination of results in Tables 4.8, 4.9 and 4.10 suggests that there are differences among the 
three countries which are worth noting. 
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Tanzania 
  Table 4.8 reports both the co-integration (column 1) and error-correction (column 2) 
regression results for all tax categories and overall tax system in Tanzania. The results show that 
there are short-run and long-run relationships between total tax revenue and growth of GDP, 
openness to international trade, official development aid as well as total external debt; between 
trade tax collection and growth of GDP, inflation, openness to international trade and total 
external debt; and between income tax revenue collection and per capita GDP, inflation, growth 
of urban population and openness. This is strongly supported by the adjustment coefficients 
(error-correction term), which in all cases are negative, suggesting short-run and long-run 
dynamic stability. That is the changes in tax revenue collection from all tax categories are 
equilibrated by the growth of GDP, changes in the inflation rates, total external debt, official 
development aid, growth of urban population and the more the country is open to the rest of the 
world. The coefficients on a lagged dependent variables for the sales and excise tax (VAT) and 
income tax are positive and statistically significant. This is an indication that there are partial 
short-run and long-run adjustments in sales and excise and income tax revenue generation over 
time in Tanzania.  
It is also worth noting significant short-run effects on some of the variables included in 
the error-correction model. In the short-run, changes in total external debt positively and 
significantly bolster tax revenue collection. This suggests that with a larger public debt the 
government is pressurized to collect more revenue in order to service that debt. There seem to be 
no significant short-run effects of the growth rate of GDP, changes in the inflation rate, growth of 
agriculture and manufacturing, growth of the urban population, growth of the public budget 
deficit and greater openness to trade on overall tax performance.  
Trade tax revenue collection is statistically associated with the growth of GDP, changes 
in the inflation rate and trade openness. In the short-run, the growth of GDP seems to discourage 
revenue collection from trade taxes, as indicated by a negative coefficient. This is expected, 
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because economic theory suggests that as the level of development of the country rises, the 
importance of trade tax as sources of government revenue diminishes. Therefore, the higher the 
growth of GDP the less important trade taxes becomes as a source of government revenue.  
Inflation displays a positive relationship with trade tax, suggesting that high inflation 
rates boosts revenue generation from trade taxes. In the short-run openness to trade has resulted to 
decline in revenue generation from trade taxes. This reflects the significance of the changes that 
have been undertaken to liberalize trade in Tanzania. Other remaining variables do not show any 
significant short-run relationship with trade tax revenue mobilization. The growth of agriculture 
is inversely associated with sales and excise tax revenue generation. This is supported by a 
significant negative coefficient on agriculture. Results in Table 4.8 show that most of the 
variables in the VAT and income tax error-correction regressions had no significant short-run 
influence of revenue generation. The growth of the manufacturing and ODA show a significant 
negative correlation with the generation of revenue from other taxes and the growth of 
urbanization is positively correlated with revenue generation from other taxes in Tanzania. 
 
Kenya 
The estimation regression results of co-integration and error-correction equations for 
Kenya are presented in Table 4.9 under column 1 and 2, respectively, for all tax categories except 
other taxes4 and total tax revenue. A close examination at the results indicate that there exist 
short-run and long-run relationship between revenue collection in all tax categories as well as 
total tax revenue and growth of GDP, openness to international trade, official development aid, 
inflation and growth of the manufacturing sector. Strong support for the existence of dynamic 
stability is provided by the statistically significant negative sign of the adjustment coefficients 
                                               
4 The other taxes categories regression was not estimated because there were not sufficient observations to estimate the 
dynamic error-correction model. The Kenyan government has been abolishing other taxes from time to time, thus 
empty entries for many years. 
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(error-correction term) for total tax revenue and its components. That is in the long-run revenue 
generation tends to move towards the equilibrium in response to the growth of  GDP, and changes 
in the openness to international trade, official development aid, inflation and growth of the 
manufacturing sector.  
The results also show that there are partial adjustments in revenue generation across all 
tax categories and overall tax system in Kenya over time. This is substantiated by significant 
positive coefficients on lagged dependent variables in all co-integration regression equations (see 
Table 4.9, column 1). There is no evidence for the existence of significant long-run effects of 
trade reforms on tax revenue generation in Kenya. 
In the short-run, changes in official development aid inhibit revenue generation in Kenya. 
This is substantiated by a negative statistically significant coefficient of ODA. The bulk of 
foreign aid that has been flowing in Kenya is in the form of grant (see Table 2.6). A plausible 
explanation is that grants reduce incentives for government to adopt good fiscal policies and 
maintain efficient institutions in tax administration. Short-run changes in the government budget 
deficit and ODA significantly affect trade revenue collection in Kenya. The growth in the 
government budget deficit negatively affects trade revenue collection, whereas ODA is positively 
associated with trade revenue generation.  
Short-run changes in inflation are associated with a decline in income tax revenue 
generation in Kenya, as indicated by a negative and statistically significant coefficient on 
inflation. Growth of the urban population and openness to international trade contribute to 
revenue generation from sales and excise taxes.  
  
Uganda 
Table 4.10 summarizes both the co-integration (column 1) and error-correction (column 
2) estimation results for Uganda from 1977 to 2005. The results demonstrate that there are short-
run and long-run relationships between tax performance and growth of GDP, openness to 
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international trade, official development aid, inflation and growth of the manufacturing sector in 
Uganda. This is substantiated by the significant and negative coefficient of the error-correction 
term in all tax categories. This implies that in the long-run revenue generation tends to move 
towards the equilibrium due to changes in the growth rate of GDP, openness to international 
trade, official development aid, inflation and growth of the manufacturing sector. Coefficients on 
lagged dependent variables are negative and statistically significant in the co-integration 
regression for overall tax system and trade tax. This is an indication that there are partial 
adjustments over time in total tax revenue and trade tax revenue generation in Uganda. It can be 
noticed from the results that there are no strong evidence to support the existence of long-run 
effects of trade reforms on tax revenue generation in Uganda. 
The results indicate that in the short-run, increases in inflation rates negatively affect 
revenue generation from trade taxes, income and sales and excise tax. This is substantiated by 
negative coefficients of inflation on these taxes. However, the results show that inflation rate has 
been associated with overall revenue mobilization in Uganda, suggesting compensating shift in 
the composition of taxes. Strong support is provided by the positive and statistically significant 
coefficient on inflation with total tax revenue.  Results in Table 4.10 reveal that in the short-run 
the growth of the manufacturing sector, growth of urban population, openness to trade and total 
external debt contribute to less revenue generation in Uganda, as indicated by significant and 
negative coefficients. In the short-run, the results show that the growth of manufacturing, 
openness to international trade and total external debt bolster revenue collection from trade, 
income and sales and excise taxes. This is substantiated by the positive sign and statistically 
significant coefficients on these taxes.  
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4.5 Conclusions  
The empirical results of this chapter corroborate and extend the results presented in 
Chapter Three. In that chapter, it was demonstrated that trade liberalization depressed government 
revenues in Uganda, as opposed having no significant effect in Kenya, and a positive impact in 
Tanzania despite the observed declining trend in government and tax revenue. The findings in 
this chapter paint a similar picture. The results suggest that economic reforms implemented in the 
three countries have contributed to improvements in tax performance. However, the response of 
the tax system in Tanzania has remained relatively sluggish compared to its counterparts in 
Kenya and Uganda, whose tax performances have been strong since the implementation of 
economic reforms despite some downs and ups from year to year.  
This chapter confirms that the observed decline in the share of government revenue in 
GDP in Tanzania described in Chapter Three was due to the failure of the tax system to generate 
adequate revenue. This is supported by a less-than-one tax buoyancy of the overall tax system 
(total tax revenue) and its tax components. It is unambiguous at this point to attribute the 
observed decline in the share of government revenue and tax revenues in GDP to tax revenue 
leakages and weaknesses and inefficiencies in tax administration and tax collection of the tax 
system in Tanzania.    
The results suggest that the differences in tax revenue performance among these countries 
are attributable, at least in part, to variations in their initial conditions. That is, macroeconomic 
environment, underlying economic structure, level of development and efficiency of tax 
administration have been fundamental to overall tax performance in the three countries. For 
instance, the negative impact of inflation on overall tax system (total tax revenue) in Tanzania can 
be contrasted to its positive impact in Kenya and Uganda. Similarly, the positive impact of 
growth of the manufacturing and agricultural sector on revenue generation in Tanzania and 
Kenya can be contrasted to their negative impacts in Uganda.  
  114 
All three countries have a potential for generating more revenue, if and only if they can 
address underlying structural weaknesses in their tax systems and their economies as a whole. 
This is reflected by the negative impact of the growth of GDP and public budget deficit in 
Tanzania, and of the growth of the manufacturing sector and urban population in Uganda on tax 
revenue generation, as well as negative impact of the growth of manufacturing sector and GDP on 
sales and excise and income taxes in Kenya. Furthermore, the buoyancy of Uganda’s tax system 
demonstrated in this chapter does not translate into the levels of government revenue/GDP ratio 
described in chapter three. This is an indication of existence of some structural and institutional 
problems related to weaknesses and inefficiencies in tax administration and tax collection, and tax 
revenue leakages due to tax evasion, tax exemptions, non-tax compliance and embezzlement of 
collected taxes that need to be addressed in order to exploit the full potential of revenue 
generation.   
Based on this evidence, it is clear that all three countries need to address problems 
associated with tax revenue leakages, such as abolishment of unnecessary tax exemptions and 
reduce tax evasion. All three countries need to improve tax administration and institute strong 
legal frameworks in tax management.  
The result suggest that East African governments should also focus at providing 
incentives for the development of the manufacturing sector and commercialization of the 
agricultural sector, as one of the strategy of raising income and sales and excise taxes as well as 
trade taxes. 
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Table 4.1: Estimated Tax Buoyancies in Tanzania, 1970-2005 
  
YEAR 
Overall Tax 
Buoyancy 
Tax Buoyancy for 
Trade Tax VAT Buoyancy  
Tax Buoyancy for 
Income Tax 
Other Tax 
Buoyancy 
1970 0.9597 0.9046 0.5786 1.0886 0.7703 
1971 1.0137 0.9050 0.5927 1.0043 0.7866 
1972 0.8811 0.9179 0.5602 0.9700 0.7608 
1973 0.7599 0.9172 0.7655 0.9688 0.7519 
1974 0.7527 0.9651 1.0831 0.7867 0.7883 
1975 0.7970 0.9875 1.0596 0.8752 0.7809 
1976 1.0335 1.0137 0.9459 0.8309 0.8431 
1977 0.9126 1.0347 0.9296 0.8140 0.7843 
1978 0.8567 0.9117 0.9519 0.8023 0.8345 
1979 0.8906 0.9865 1.0074 0.7408 0.8394 
1980 0.8641 1.0240 1.0142 0.7572 0.8020 
1981 0.8788 1.0366 1.0843 0.8276 0.8276 
1982 0.8464 1.0798 1.0802 0.8315 0.7963 
1983 0.8260 1.0690 1.0806 0.7829 0.7999 
1984 0.8966 1.0852 1.0939 0.7969 0.8928 
1985 0.9233 1.0533 1.0413 0.9126 0.8082 
1986 0.7637 1.0877 0.9827 0.8995 0.7543 
1987 0.9271 1.0260 0.9760 0.9449 0.7901 
1988 0.9070 1.0286 0.9734 0.9036 0.7885 
1989 0.7889 1.0089 1.0876 0.8254 0.8106 
1990 1.0055 0.9801 0.8799 0.9929 0.8182 
1991 0.9364 0.9407 0.7474 0.9100 0.8144 
1992 0.9190 0.9676 0.8757 0.9124 0.8032 
1993 1.0358 1.0110 0.8361 0.9373 0.8061 
1994 0.9591 0.9983 0.8732 0.9338 0.7947 
1995 0.9288 0.9844 0.8530 0.8856 0.7964 
1996 0.9018 0.9792 0.8203 0.8866 0.7845 
1997 0.8647 0.9713 0.8445 0.8859 0.7825 
1998 0.8699 0.9792 0.8587 0.8668 0.7845 
1999 0.9069 0.9933 0.9031 0.8968 0.7967 
2000 0.9051 0.9988 0.8949 0.8511 0.7985 
2001 0.8732 0.9843 0.9321 0.9069 0.7991 
2002 0.8695 0.9891 0.9381 0.9040 0.7962 
2003 0.8464 0.9906 0.9527 0.8689 0.7962 
2004 0.8193 0.9880 0.9763 0.8241 0.8089 
2005 0.7960 0.9977 1.0057 0.7925 0.8143 
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Table 4.2: Estimated Tax Buoyancies in Kenya, 1970-2005 
 
YEAR 
Overall Tax 
Buoyancy 
Tax Buoyancy for 
Trade Tax 
Tax Buoyancy for Sales and 
Excise Tax (VAT) 
Tax Buoyancy for 
Income Tax 
1971 0.9979 0.9473 NA 1.1328 
1972 0.9864 0.9554 NA 1.1840 
1973 1.0197 1.0144 0.4325 1.1300 
1974 0.9718 0.9788 1.0888 1.0353 
1975 0.9366 0.9915 1.1591 1.2070 
1976 0.9631 1.0190 1.1643 1.1555 
1977 1.2261 1.0392 1.1171 1.0716 
1978 1.0699 0.9275 1.1809 1.2295 
1979 1.0966 0.9393 1.1695 1.1794 
1980 1.0606 0.9551 1.2422 1.1519 
1981 1.0464 0.9309 1.2389 1.1398 
1982 1.0513 0.9231 1.2161 1.0043 
1983 1.1049 0.9585 1.1819 1.0143 
1984 1.0950 0.9728 1.2146 0.9793 
1985 1.1163 1.0042 1.0637 1.0214 
1986 1.1043 0.9984 1.0697 1.0285 
1987 1.0777 0.9794 1.0978 0.9910 
1988 1.0753 0.9838 1.1133 0.9995 
1989 1.0780 0.9888 1.1169 0.9853 
1990 1.0970 0.9884 1.0642 0.9982 
1991 1.0999 1.0038 1.0947 1.0305 
1992 1.0988 1.0044 1.0058 1.0451 
1993 1.0955 0.9699 0.9958 0.9810 
1994 1.0591 0.9327 1.0517 1.2759 
1995 1.0780 0.8907 1.0203 1.2632 
1996 1.0745 0.8877 1.0100 1.2322 
1997 1.0963 0.8987 0.9812 1.1445 
1998 1.0781 0.8829 1.0014 1.1664 
1999 1.0730 0.8896 1.0239 1.1107 
2000 1.0844 1.0317 1.0219 1.0335 
2001 1.0860 0.9128 1.0419 0.9893 
2002 1.0985 0.9268 1.1782 1.0117 
2003 0.9339 1.0902 1.1767 1.1017 
2004 0.9199 1.0692 1.1612 1.0869 
2005 0.8985 1.0877 1.1841 1.1634 
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Table 4.3: Estimated Tax Buoyancies in Uganda, 1977-2005 
 
YEAR 
Overall Tax 
Buoyancy 
Tax Buoyancy for 
Trade Tax VAT Buoyancy  
Tax Buoyancy for 
Income Tax 
Other Tax 
Buoyancy 
1977 0.9931 1.3312 1.4512 1.5349 1.5141 
1978 0.9571 1.4852 1.3776 1.5543 1.5402 
1979 1.1515 0.9538 0.9653 1.1873 1.5160 
1980 1.1436 0.9362 1.0558 1.1766 1.5191 
1981 1.2804 0.4714 0.7363 0.8986 1.5083 
1982 1.0593 1.1644 1.2840 1.2974 1.5047 
1983 1.0284 1.3104 1.2433 1.1560 1.5115 
1984 1.0272 1.2801 1.1654 1.2730 1.5894 
1985 1.0779 1.2006 1.0233 1.0817 1.5522 
1986 1.1137 1.1350 0.8473 0.9528 1.5357 
1987 1.1748 0.9425 0.8125 0.9425 1.5268 
1988 1.1427 0.6909 0.9561 0.9111 1.5548 
1989 1.1318 0.8295 1.0267 1.0076 1.5489 
1990 1.1127 1.0459 1.0621 1.0749 1.5368 
1991 1.1096 1.0814 1.0449 1.0772 1.5290 
1992 1.1254 1.0333 0.9534 1.0698 1.5335 
1993 1.1015 1.0832 1.0595 1.1501 1.5334 
1994 1.0997 1.0971 1.0641 1.1542 1.5285 
1995 1.0911 1.1027 1.0990 1.1838 1.5333 
1996 1.0873 1.1158 1.1389 1.1776 1.5272 
1997 1.0834 1.1238 1.1300 1.1925 1.5321 
1998 1.0856 1.1132 1.1470 1.2077 1.5258 
1999 1.0824 1.1079 1.1641 1.2395 1.5269 
2000 1.0838 1.1004 1.1655 1.2359 1.5270 
2001 1.0845 1.0938 1.1717 1.2566 1.5193 
2002 1.0799 1.0979 1.1715 1.2847 1.5269 
2003 1.0822 1.0869 1.1648 1.2881 1.5258 
2004 1.0807 1.1636 1.0247 1.1900 1.5305 
2005 1.0816 1.1564 1.0392 1.2048 1.5292 
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Table 4.4: Trends in Tax Buoyancies Pre- and Post-Reform in East Africa 
 
Tax Category Pre-Reform 
(1970-86) 
Post-Reform 
(1987-2005) 
Overall 
(1970-2005 
 
Tanzania 
Tax Revenue 0.8739 0.8979 0.8866 
Trade Tax 0.9988 0.9904 0.9944 
VAT 0.9324 0.9068 0.9189 
Income Tax 0.8641 0.8910 0.8783 
Other Tax 0.8012 0.7991 0.8001 
 
Kenya 
Tax Revenue 1.0521 1.0580 1.0552 
Trade Tax 0.9719 0.9694 0.9705 
VAT 1.1099 1.0706 1.0873 
Income Tax 1.0969 1.0847 1.0902 
Other Tax 0.3246 0.3314 0.3261 
 
Uganda 
Tax Revenue 1.0832 1.1011 1.0949 
Trade Tax 1.1268 1.0561 1.0805 
VAT 1.1149 1.0735 1.0878 
Income Tax 1.2113 1.1499 1.1711 
Other Tax 1.5291 1.5314 1.5306 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
119 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.5: Trends in Tax Buoyancies in Different Policy Episodes in East Africa, 1970-2005 
 
Tanzania Kenya Uganda Tax 
Category 70-80 81-86 87-92 93-95 96-05 70-79 80-86 87-91 92-96 97-05 70-79 80-86 87-91 92-05 
TXRVB  0.884 0.856 0.914 0.975 0.865 1.031 1.083 1.086 1.081 1.030 1.034 1.104 1.134 1.089 
TRTXB 0.961 1.069 0.992 0.998 0.987 0.978 0.963 0.989 0.937 0.977 1.257 1.071 0.918 1.505 
VATB 0.863 1.061 0.923 0.854 0.913 1.045 1.175 1.097 1.017 1.086 1.265 1.051 0.980 1.107 
INTXB 0.876 0.842 0.915 0.919 0.868 1.131 1.049 1.001 1.160 1.090 1.426 1.129 1.003 1.203 
OHTX 0.795 0.813 0.804 0.799 0.796 0.325 0.314 0.213 0.315 0.335 1.523 1.532 1.539 1.529 
 
Notes: TXRV: Tax buoyancy for total tax revenue; TRTXB: Tax buoyancy for trade tax; VATB: Tax buoyancy for sales and excise taxes (VAT); INTXB: tax 
buoyancy for income tax, OHTX: Other taxes. 
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Table 4.6: Unit Root Tests for the Variables in the Regression Analysis, 1970-2005 
 
Tanzania Kenya Uganda Variable 
ADF Z(t) 
Value 
PP Z(t) Value I (?) ADF Z(t) 
Value 
PP Z(t) 
Value 
I (?) ADF Z(t) 
Value 
PP Z(t) 
Value 
I (?) 
TXRXB -2.450 -4.779*** I(1) -4.107*** -8.009*** I(1) -5.576*** -6.501*** I(1) 
TRTXB -3.552*** -7.085*** I(1) -2.229 -7.346*** I(1) -4.867*** -6.063*** I(1) 
VATB 5.780*** -4.837*** I(1) -4.239*** 14.914*** I(1) -4.310*** -6.607*** I(1) 
INCTXB -4.336*** -8.644*** I(1) -3.148** -7.234*** I(1) -4.362*** -7.114*** I(1) 
GDPG -5.234*** -8.886*** I(1) -6.536*** -7.010*** I(1) -5.372*** -4.976*** I(1) 
INFL -3.822*** -6.548*** I(1) -3.782*** -6.099*** I(1) -3.123** -4.068*** I(1) 
AGRG -2.294 -5.277*** I(0) -3.520*** -5.633*** I(0) -5.226*** -3.886*** I(0) 
MANG -1.474 -5.044*** I(0) -3.734*** -6.692*** I(1) -2.766** -9.011*** I(1) 
URBG -3.009** -5.635*** I(1) -2.760** -5.333*** I(2) -2.490 -4.850*** I(1) 
TRADE -2.344 -3.668*** I(1) -4.277*** -6.871*** I(1) -4.131*** -3.805*** I(1) 
GBDEF -2.958** -4.028*** I(0) -3.888*** -5.972*** I(0) -4.361*** -5.791*** I(0) 
 
  Note: *** = significant at 1% level, ** = significant at 5% level  
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Table 4.7: Results of Co-integration Analysis 
 
Without Constant Without Trend With Trend 
Mackinnon Critical Values Mackinnon Critical Values Mackinnon Critical Values 
Equation 
(Residual) 
Z(t( 1% 5% Z(t( 1% 5% Z(t( 1% 5% 
Tanzania 
TXRV -4.353** -4.830 -3.917 -5.909** -6.025 -5.203 -5.808** -6.434 -5.581 
TRTX -6.625*** -4.546 -3.685 -5.551** -5.622 -4.826 -5.447** -6.050 -5.227 
VAT -6.075*** -4.546 -3.685 -6.010*** -5.622 -4.826 -5.966** -6.050 -5.227 
INTX -9.003*** -4.546 -3.685 -7.880*** -5.622 -4.826 -7.953*** -6.050 -5.227 
OTTX -6.888*** -5.087 -4.125 -6.754*** -5.482 -4.464 -6.553*** -5.879 -4.808 
Kenya 
TXRV -6.511*** -4.813 -3.912 -6.167*** -6.025 -5.203 -6.089** -6.434 -5.581 
TRTX -5.425*** -4.532 -3.682 -7.311*** -5.622 -4.826 -7.189*** -6.050 -5.227 
VAT -5.043*** -4.813 -3.912 -5.939** -6.025 -5.203 -5.952** -6.434 -5.581 
INTX -5.656*** -4.813 -3.912 -6.821*** -6.025 -5.203 -6.759*** -6.434 -5.581 
Uganda 
TXRV -5.077*** -5.067 -3.977 -5.699** -6.358 -5.408 -6.070** -6.826 -5.827 
TRTX -4.774** -5.067 -3.977 -5.686** -6.358 -5.408 -5.989** -6.826 -5.827 
VAT -4.943*** -4.725 -3.736 -4.710 -5.904 -4.998 -5.581** -6.393 -5.439 
INTX -4.028** -4.725 -3.736 -5.543** -5.904 -4.998 -5.494** -6.393 -5.439 
OTTX -4.492** -5.067 -3.977 4.386 -6.358 -5.408 4.297 -6.826 -5.827 
 
Notes: TXRV: tax revenue; TRTX: trade tax revenue; VAT: value-added tax (sales and excise tax) revenue; INTX: 
income tax revenue. Z(t) *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5 % level and * significant at 10 % level, 
(Critical values at 1% and 5% level of significant are calculated using Mackinnon (1991) and Ericsson and Mackinnon 
(2002) method.  
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Table 4.8: Determinants of Tax Performance in Tanzania 
 
Tax Revenue Trade Tax  Sales and Excise Tax (VAT) Income Tax Other Taxes Variables 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
TAXB1 0.144 
(0.78) 
 0.093 
(0.57) 
 0.544*** 
(3.58)    
 0.388** 
(2.29) 
 -0.073 
(0.40) 
 
GDPG 0.005 
(0.74) 
-0.002 
(0.39) 
-0.002 
(0.91) 
-0.005* 
(1.72) 
-0.007 
(0.97) 
0.012 
(1.40) 
0.007 
(1.55) 
-0.003 
(0.50) 
0.002 
(0.98) 
0.001 
(0.59) 
INFL  -0.002 
(0.92) 
0.002*** 
(2.89) 
0.002** 
(2.21) 
-0.001 
(0.47) 
0.004 
(1.25) 
0.002* 
(1.95) 
0.000 
(0.02) 
 0.001 
(1.06) 
AGRG  0.002 
(0.37) 
 0.000 
(0.07) 
 -0.015** 
(2.00) 
 0.001 
(0.24) 
 0.001 
(0.82) 
MANG  0.003 
(1.51) 
 0.000 
(0.01) 
 -0.004 
(1.46) 
 0.002 
(0.96) 
 -0.001** 
(2.03) 
ODA 0.040 
(0.87) 
-0.035 
(0.65) 
 -0.009 
(0.40) 
 0.025 
(0.36) 
 0.045 
(1.04) 
-0.016 
(0.99) 
-0.031* 
(1.97) 
EXD 0.031 
(0.05) 
0.198** 
(2.52) 
-0.013*** 
(2.90) 
-0.034 
(0.90) 
 -0.031 
(0.29) 
 -0.003 
(0.04) 
0.069*** 
(3.00) 
0.030 
(1.32) 
URBG -0.019 
(0.68) 
0.022 
(0.61) 
 0.012 
(0.76) 
-0.001 
(0.14) 
-0.048 
(0.98) 
-0.002 
(0.51) 
-0.004 
(0.14) 
0.005 
(0.43) 
0.021* 
(1.98) 
GBDEF  -0.000 
(1.07) 
 -0.000 
(0.44) 
 0.000 
(0.27) 
 0.000 
(0.38) 
 -0.000 
(0.14) 
TRADE 0.065 
(0.80) 
0.155 
(1.50) 
-0.083*** 
(3.89) 
-0.079* 
(1.67) 
-0.060 
(1.24) 
-0.073 
(0.51) 
0.022 
(0.74) 
0.004 
(0.04) 
0.042 
(1.36) 
-0.013 
(0.43) 
TREND         0.014** 
(2.78) 
 
ECMt-1  -0.910*** 
(4.25) 
 -0.913*** 
(3.99) 
 -0.084 
(0.29) 
 -1.009*** 
(3.85) 
 -1.038*** 
(5.60) 
Constant 0.518** 
(2.64) 
0.036* 
(1.96) 
1.179*** 
(5.41) 
0.001 
(0.06) 
0.690** 
(2.33) 
-0.003 
(0.11) 
0.411*** 
(3.04) 
-0.007 
(0.43) 
0.444* 
(1.99) 
0.012** 
(2.26) 
N 33 32 33 32 33 32 33 32 33 32 
F-Value 1.31 4.24** 13.31 3.20** 8.39*** 1.47 4.07** 2.26* 2.31* 9.19*** 
Adj_R2 0.0541 0.5107 0.6580 0.4149 0.5361 0.1309 0.3240 0.2885 0.2228 0.7254 
 
Notes: TAXB1: Tax buoyancy lagged one period; GDPG:  Real GDP growth rate; INFL: Inflation rate; AGRG: Agriculture Growth rate; MANG: Manufacturing growth rate; 
URBG: Growth rate of the urban population; GDEF: the change in public budget deficit; ODA: Natural logarithm of the share of official development aid in GDP; EXD: Natural 
logarithm of the share of external debt in GDP; TRADE: is the share of trade volume (percentage of import plus export) in GDP; ECMt-1: the residual of the regression of co-
integrated variables lagged one period. Figures in Parentheses are absolute t-values, *** = significant at 1% level, ** = significant at 5% level and * = significant at 10% level  
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Table 4.9: Determinants of Tax Performance in Kenya 
 
Tax Revenue Trade Tax Sales and Excise 
Tax (VAT) 
Income Tax Variables 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
TAXB1 0.484** 
(2.82) 
 0.661*** 
(3.62) 
 0.262*** 
(3.00) 
 0.481** 
(2.88) 
 
GDPG 0.002 
(0.38) 
0.008 
(1.02) 
-0.006 
(1.45) 
0.003 
(0.55) 
0.000 
(0.06) 
-0.102 
(1.50) 
-0.002 
(0.31) 
-0.002 
(0.24) 
INFL 0.002 
(0.02) 
0.002 
(1.00) 
-0.000 
(0.09) 
0.001 
(0.93) 
-0.003* 
(1.97) 
-0.002 
(1.19) 
-0.002 
(0.73) 
-0.006*** 
(3.09) 
AGRG  -0.003 
(0.78) 
 -0.001 
(0.27) 
 -0.000 
(0.00) 
 0.003 
(0.73) 
MANG 0.003 
(1.05) 
0.003 
(0.76) 
0.004* 
(1.71) 
0.003 
(1.26) 
0.000 
(0.07) 
-0.001 
(0.27) 
-0.000 
(0.05) 
-0.002 
(0.50) 
ODA -0.077* 
(1.96) 
-0.092* 
(1.73) 
0.059** 
(2.02) 
0.093** 
(2.51) 
0.066 
(1.43) 
-0.012 
(0.23) 
-0.049 
(0.97) 
0.036 
(0.65) 
EXD  0.002 
(0.23) 
 -0.006 
(1.15) 
 0.007 
(1.09) 
 -0.004 
(0.51) 
GBDEF  0.000 
(1.33) 
 -0.000* 
(1.85) 
 0.000 
(0.86) 
 -0.000 
(1.16) 
TRADE -0.131 
(1.17) 
0.101 
(0.73) 
-0.093 
(1.14) 
-0.113 
(1.16) 
0.316** 
(2.59) 
0.252* 
(1.86) 
-0.049 
(1.47) 
0.020 
(0.14) 
ECMt-1  -0.539** 
(2.31) 
 -0.651** 
(2.75) 
 -0.358* 
(1.69) 
 -0.815*** 
(4.11) 
Constant 1.034** 
(2.03) 
0.001 
(0.05) 
0.717** 
(2.10) 
0.003 
(0.37) 
-0.411 
(0.82) 
-0.021 
(1.26) 
-0.308 
(0.56) 
0.001 
(0.08) 
N 34 31 34 31 32 29 34 31 
F-Value 2.76** 1.33 4.38** 2.74** 3.49** 1.11 3.15** 3.31** 
Adj_R2 0.2423 0.0889 0.3805 0.3425 0.3252 0.0378 0.2813 0.4093 
 
Notes: TAXB1: Tax buoyancy lagged one period; GDPG:  Real GDP growth rate; INFL: Inflation rate; AGRG: 
Agriculture Growth rate; MANG: Manufacturing growth rate; GDEF: the change in public budget deficit; ODA: 
Natural logarithm of the share of official development aid in GDP; EXD: Natural logarithm of the share of external 
debt in GDP; TRADE: is the share of trade volume (percentage of import plus export) in GDP; ECMt-1: the residual of 
the regression of co-integrated variables lagged one period.  Figures in Parentheses are absolute t-values, *** = 
significant at 1% level, ** = significant at 5% level and * = significant at 10% level  
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Table 4.10: Determinants of Tax Performance in Uganda 
 
Tax Revenue Trade Tax Sales and Excise Tax (VAT) Income Tax Other Taxes Variables 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
TAXB1 0.336* 
(1.61) 
 0.536*** 
(2.31) 
 0.122 
(0.59) 
 0.191 
(1.21) 
 0.109 
(0.62) 
 
GDPG 0.007** 
(2.13) 
0.004 
(1.07) 
-0.021* 
(1.67) 
0.004 
(0.24) 
-0.09 
(1.17) 
-0.009 
(0.78) 
-0.010* 
(1.74) 
-0.006 
(0.86) 
-0.005*** 
(4.23) 
-0.002 
(0.87) 
INFL 0.001*** 
(2.87) 
0.001*** 
(3.79) 
-0.002** 
(2.91) 
-0.002*** 
(3.79) 
-0.002*** 
(3.28) 
-0.002*** 
(4.07) 
-0.002*** 
(4.57) 
0.001*** 
(5.15) 
0.000 
(0.59) 
-0.000 
(0.97) 
AGRG  -0.004 
(1.47) 
 0.010 
(1.16) 
 0.011* 
(1.61) 
 0.004 
(0.95) 
 -0.002* 
(1.72) 
MANG -0.004** 
(2.48) 
-0.004*** 
(3.33) 
0.012** 
(2.12) 
0.012 
(2.68) 
0.005* 
(1.60) 
0.011*** 
(3.08) 
0.005* 
(1.96) 
0.008*** 
(3.73) 
 -0.000 
(0.28) 
URBG -0.006 
(0.53) 
-0.027* 
(1.90) 
0.040 
(0.82) 
0.048 
(1.12) 
 0.078* 
(1.97) 
 0.044** 
(2.04) 
0.000 
(0.07) 
0.010 
(0.15) 
ODA  0.032 
(0.99) 
 -0.119 
(0.99) 
 0.027 
(0.30) 
-0.059* 
(1.71) 
0.018 
(0.34) 
 0.012 
(0.60) 
EXD  -0.090** 
(2.35) 
 0.450*** 
(3.34) 
 0.203* 
(1.85) 
 0.102* 
(1.60) 
 -0.016 
(0.61) 
GBDEF  0.000 
(0.70) 
   -0.000 
(1.21) 
 -0.000 
(0.61) 
 -0.000 
(0.01) 
TRADE 0.068 
(0.97) 
-0.042* 
(1.86) 
-0.195 
(0.75) 
0.216** 
(2.61) 
-0.239** 
(2.00) 
0.099* 
(1.56) 
0.257 
(1.32) 
0.087** 
(2.43) 
-0.054* 
(1.85) 
0.010 
(0.74) 
TREND         0.001* 
(1.70) 
 
ECMt-1  -0.668** 
(2.69) 
 -0.430* 
(1.78) 
 -0.545** 
(2.44) 
 -0.918*** 
(5.15) 
 -1.051** 
(2.45) 
Constant 0.495* 
(1.79) 
-0.061* 
(1.92) 
1.081 
(0.84) 
0.301** 
(2.60) 
1.845*** 
(3.69) 
0.133 
(1.49) 
1.151*** 
(5.21) 
0.123** 
(2.44) 
1.547*** 
(4.97) 
0.023 
(1.00) 
N 25 24 25 24 25 24 25 24 25 24 
F-Value 5.75*** 5.77*** 5.47*** 5.70*** 7.16*** 5.33*** 11.02*** 11.80*** 3.71** 2.54* 
Adj_R2 0.5427 0.6747 0.5280 0.6478 0.5619 0.6531 0.6761 0.8245 0.4414 0.4017 
 
Notes: TAXB1: Tax buoyancy lagged one period; GDPG: Real GDP growth rate; INFL: Inflation rate; AGRG: Agriculture Growth rate; MANG: Manufacturing growth rate; 
URB: Growth rate of the urban population; POPG: Growth rate of the population; TAX: Natural logarithm of the share of tax revenue and its components in GDP; GDEF: the 
change in public budget deficit; ODA: Natural logarithm of the share of official development aid in GDP; EXD: Natural logarithm of the share of external debt in GDP; TRADE: 
is the share of trade volume (percentage of import plus export) in GDP; ECMt-1: the residual of the regression of co-integrated variables lagged one period. Figures in Parentheses 
are absolute t-values, *** = significant at 1% level, ** = significant at 5% level and * = significant at 10% level 
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CHAPTER 5 
EFFECTS OF TRADE REFORMS ON PUBLIC INVESTMENT  
5.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to examine whether declines in government revenue, and 
inadequate and erratic tax revenue generation, have had adverse effects on public investment 
spending in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. This is emanating from the empirical findings in 
Chapters three and four. Chapters three and four demonstrated that economic reforms 
implemented in these three countries contributed to the lower levels of government revenue and 
erratic tax revenue generation in Uganda and erratic revenue generation in Kenya. It was also 
demonstrated in chapter three and four that the share of government and tax revenue in GDP has 
been declining and tax revenue performance has been sluggish throughout the period under study 
in Tanzania.  
Declining, inadequate and erratic revenue generation may create unpredictability of 
revenues available to finance public capital expenditures, resulting in sub-optimal allocation of 
government resources. This is likely to have adverse consequences on long-run growth of the 
economy. It may also jeopardize macroeconomic stability and limit the speed of economic 
reforms and the extent to which their benefits can be achieved. The political economy of fiscal 
policy suggests that fiscal policy may either promote or inhibit economic growth through its 
effects on decisions regarding resource allocation on public investment spending in physical and 
human capital development. Investment spending on physical and human capital can bolster long-
term growth. In turn, a higher rate of growth generates greater resources to finance spending on 
human capital development, further bolstering the dynamism of the economy (Clement et al., 
2004; Ndulu, 2006; Palley, 2006). Therefore, if economic reforms have to enhance growth and 
reduce poverty, they must be accompanied by public investment in physical and human capital 
development.  
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This chapter investigates whether declines in government revenue, and inadequate and 
erratic revenue generation have had any adverse consequences for public investment spending in 
the three countries. Understanding the consequences of fiscal squeeze on public investment 
provides useful insights to improve the effectiveness of national poverty reduction strategies that 
will promote long-run economic growth and enhance human development outcomes provided by 
the United Nations sanctioned Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)5.    
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Theoretical and empirical evidence on the 
subject are reviewed in section 5.2. Section 5.3 describes the trend and patterns of selected public 
expenditures for the three East African countries. It also traces changes in the composition of 
public investment spending on physical infrastructure and human capital. Section 5.4 presents an 
econometric analysis of the effects of the decline in government revenue and erratic revenue 
generation on physical and human capital investment as well as investigating other determinants 
of physical and human capital investment. The conclusions are summarized in section 5.5.   
5.2 Literature Review 
5.2.1 Theoretical Issues and Empirical Evidence 
The theoretical underpinning adopted in this chapter builds on the political economy 
theory of fiscal policy. The theory suggests that governments raise revenues and use the collected 
resources to finance public investment spending for the provision of public goods and targeted 
development projects. Policy decisions are made by the government, which decides on how best 
to allocate the collected limited resources into alternative competing sectors (Hassler et al., 2007; 
Battaglini and Coate, 2008). In developing countries, as in developed countries, governments play 
                                               
5 The goals are directed at reducing poverty in all its forms; including halving poverty, achieving universal primary 
education, reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS, reducing child and maternal mortality, and ensuring environmental 
sustainability.  
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a key role in the provision of public goods. Choices have to be made how to allocate the limited 
resources, so governments face tradeoffs (Khattry, 2003).  
Khattry (2003) succinctly summarizes the tradeoffs which governments often face in the 
process of public expenditure management. She identifies three tradeoffs.  The first one involves 
the tradeoff between public spending on physical infrastructure and human capital. Because of 
substantial costs involved in capital investment, the involvement of the private sector is limited. 
Thus the government takes a large share of the burden to undertake such investment. But 
governments also put much emphasis on allocating substantial resources on human capital 
investment in order to maintain social cohesion and political legitimacy.  
The second dilemma is allocating resources between defense spending and spending on 
physical and human capital investment. It is contended that governments in developing countries 
facing deteriorating political and social conditions tend to invest in military apparatus in order to 
maintain political authority, while compromising physical and human capital investment.  
The third is the concern of allocating resources between public investment in both 
physical and human capital infrastructure and interest payments on accumulated debt. Developing 
countries that have accumulated large debts have reduced spending on capital investment in order 
to service the debt and qualify for new borrowing to meet spending obligations. 
Economic reforms implemented in many developing countries entailed expenditure 
switching, expenditure reducing, and trade liberalization policy packages. Some countries that 
underwent fiscal adjustment marginally managed to reduce their fiscal deficits. However, this 
resulted in cuts in public expenditure, especially when economic reforms include policy measures 
that restrain government revenue, thus inducing increased budgetary pressure and diminished 
resources available for public spending on domestic capital investment (Patel et al. 1997; Rao, 
1999; Palley, 2006; Drether, 2006; Tanzi, 1993; Basu and Morrissey, 1997; Khattry, 2003; 
Atolia, 2006; Roy et al. 2006, Palley, 2006; Winters, et al. 2004; Clement, et al. 2003; Roy, et al. 
2006; Schade, 2005; Kumar et al. 2007; Gupta et al. 2002, 2005; Baldacci et al. 2004). 
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 Empirical evidence demonstrates that in periods of restrictive fiscal policies and fiscal 
consolidation, public spending on infrastructure is often the first item to suffer from government 
expenditure compression (Tanzi, 1993; Basu and Morrissey, 1997; Patel et al., 1997; Atolia, 
2006; Roy et al. 2006, Dreher et al., 2006; Palley, 2006; Winters, et al. 2004; Clement, et al. 
2003; Roy, et al. 2006; Schade, 2005; Kumar et al. 2007; Gupta et al. 2002, 2005; Baldacci et al. 
2004). This is partly due to the fact that deleterious effects of reduced public investment are felt 
with long lags, whereas other components of government budgets, such as transfers and public 
sector wage bill have higher and more immediate political costs. The extent of the effect of 
economic reforms on public investment spending may differ, given differences in macroeconomic 
conditions, structure of the economy, level of development and the size of the government 
(Randolph, 1996; Sturm, 2001; Clement, et al. 2003; Dreher, et al. 2006; Kumar, et al. 2007). 
Furthermore, it is acknowledged that the fiscal adjustment-public investment nexus depends on 
the extent of the change in and the means through which the fiscal budget balance is achieved 
(Gupta, et al. 2003; Gupta, et al. 2005; Mackenzie and Orsmond, 1996; Roy, et al. 2006; Dreher, 
et al. 2006; Kumar, et al. 2007). 
5.2.2 Determinants of Public Investment Spending 
Previous work has concluded that the principal determinants of public investment are the 
following: macroeconomic environment, underlying economic structure, level of development, 
and the size of the government. Macroeconomic conditions are reflected by the size of the public 
budget deficit and public debt as well as the inflation rate. In addition to reflecting the 
macroeconomic conditions of the country, the change and size of government budget deficit 
account for the effects of fiscal adjustment. The size of the fiscal deficit controls for initial fiscal 
conditions and any improvements in tax collection in the adjustment process. Empirical evidence 
on the relationship between fiscal adjustment and public investment is, however, inconclusive, 
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because it appears to depend on the magnitude, length and quality of adjustment (Gupta, et al. 
2005; Clement, et al. 2003; Baldacci, et al. 2004; Kumar et al. 2007).  
Higher government budget deficit in the previous period tends to lower the level of 
infrastructure expenditures. In the presence of high public budget deficits, governments may be 
forced to adopt restrictive fiscal policy measures by cutting back or postponing public capital 
spending, whilst maintaining other sensitive social spending in order to maintain political 
legitimacy (Randolph 1996; Sturm, 2001; Roy, et al. 2006; Rao, 1999; Ndikumana, 2004). 
Furthermore, high public deficits may cause high inflation which can create uncertain investment 
climate. This may force the government to increase infrastructure investment to compensate for 
or stimulate private investment (Randolph, et al. 1996). Generally, however, the relationship 
between public budget deficit and public investment depends on initial and accompanying 
macroeconomic conditions.  
Like the public deficit, high public debt can lead to budget cuts on government 
investment spending on capital expenditure (Rao, 1999; Clement, et al. 2003; Sturm, 2001; Roy, 
et al. 2006; Schade, 2005). A high level of external debt reduces government incentives to carry 
out structural and fiscal reforms; because these reforms could intensify the pressure to repay the 
debt. It is argued that any strengthening of the fiscal position resulting from structural policy 
reforms intensify the pressures to repay foreign debt. The government may undertake 
distortionary policies in order to remain under the shadow so that don not repay the debts 
(Clements et al., 2004). Debt servicing depresses a country’s resources available to finance 
budget expenditures, thus resulting in cuts in capital development expenditures. It is also argued 
that high debt overhang depresses public investment. That is, as the public debt increases, there is 
a growing concern about governments’ actions and policies for servicing the debt obligations, and 
this tends to have adverse effects on both public and private investment. For example, with high 
stock of debt, there may be expectations that the government may decide to service the debt 
through distortionary measures, such as inflation tax (Agenor and Montiel, 1996). Higher 
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inflation rates reduce the real value of tax revenue, thus reducing government resources for 
spending on physical capital (Sturm, 2001; Aubin et al. 1988, McMahon and Schmidt-Hebbel, 
2000). In certain circumstances, various public spending components may complement or 
substitute each other. For instance, defense and infrastructure spending are substitutes, higher 
spending on defense is associated with decreased spending on physical capital investment 
(Khattry, 2003; Looney, 1997); whilst there is some evidence that education and defense 
expenditures may complement one another. That is, military spending encourages modernization, 
supplies technological innovations to civilian industries, contributes to the building of physical 
infrastructure, provides modern education and health services to defense personnel  (Marlow and 
Shiers, 1999; Mehrotra and Delamonica, 2007).  
Furthermore, the ways in which the public budget deficit is financed may affect public 
investment spending. External financing of the budget deficit is socially desirable, provided it is 
invested in credit-worthy investment development projects with high economic returns. Deficit 
financing through domestic borrowing may be associated with inflationary pressures. Higher 
levels of inflation are associated with macroeconomic instability and often contribute to the 
decline in government revenues due to the fall in demand for money and decline of the real value 
of tax. Reduction in government revenue again limits the availability of resources required to 
finance budget capital expenditures (Weiss, 1995; Gupta, et al. 2005; Baldacci, et al. 2004; 
Kumar et al. 2007).  
The ratio of tax revenue in GDP also controls for the initial fiscal conditions and the 
contribution of improvements in tax collection to fiscal adjustment effort (Gupta, et al. 2005). 
High tax revenue reflects the availability of resources required to finance government 
expenditure. Higher tax revenue is associated with increased public investment spending on 
physical and human capital development (Sturm, 2001; Khattry, 2003).   
The level of development is reflected by levels of per capita GDP, and urbanization. The 
more the country is open to the rest of the world, the more it becomes vulnerable to foreign 
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competition and therefore competes for business by offering, among other things, adequate 
infrastructure. Similarly, in seeking to attract foreign direct investment, a government could 
increase public capital spending (Clement, et al. 2003; Rao, 1999; Sturm, 2001; Khattry, 2003). 
In addition to reflecting the level of development, the real GDP growth rate accounts for business 
cycle effects on public investment spending. Growth of GDP reflects previous failures in the 
adjustment process and the effects of exogenous growth shocks (Gupta, et al. 2002, 2005). Lower 
growth rates of GDP are associated with less government spending on capital investments 
(Dreher, et al. 2006). The relationship between per capita income and public investment spending 
depends on the type of public spending. For instance, higher levels of per capita income are 
associated with higher spending on physical and human development (Sanz and Velazquez, 2002, 
Randolph et al. 1996). However, lower levels of development are associated with relatively more 
spending on physical infrastructure. Per capita GDP can exhibit an inverse relationship with total 
spending on physical capital, because private investment in physical infrastructure is low in the 
least developed countries (Khattry, 2003).   
There are two opposing arguments on the impact of urbanization on public investment. 
First, as a society becomes more urbanized, there is a shift from the family to the public sector for 
services provision, such as education and health care. In this case urbanization is predicted to be 
associated with increased public investment in social service provision. Secondly, most public 
capital spending concerns physical infrastructure, the need for which is relatively greater in rural 
areas. Hence greater urbanization may be associated with less public spending on infrastructure 
(Clement, et al. 2003; Sturm, 2001, Randolph et al. 1996). However, this may not be the case in 
some developing countries, particularly in sub-Saharan African countries where urban centers are 
not developed as compared to those in developed countries. 
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5.3 Trends and Patterns of Public Investment Spending in East Africa 
The trends and patterns of government investment spending in different sectors of the 
economy have changed considerably over time for the period under study in the three countries 
(Tables 5.1-5.5). It is therefore important to trace the trends and patterns in the levels and 
composition of government expenditures and examine their determinants. The trends and patterns 
in the levels and composition of government investment spending reflects governments’ spending 
priorities, including their commitment to achieving poverty reduction and economic growth goals 
as outlined in their Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and the framework provided by the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  
The focus of this section is to describe the changes in government spending between the 
pre-reform (1970-1986) and post-reform (1987-2005) periods, as well as across policy episodes 
through which the three countries have passed as described in chapter 2 (section 2.3). Tables 5.1, 
5.2 and 5.3 depict the trends and patterns of government expenditures between 1970 and 2005. 
Table 5.4 summarizes changes in government expenditure between pre- and post-reform periods. 
Table 5.5 reports the changes in government expenditures in the different policy episodes. The 
tables show considerable heterogeneity in the trends and patterns of central government 
expenditures among the three countries for the period under investigation.    
5.3.1 Tanzania 
A close examination of Tables 5.1-5.5 generally illustrates that in Tanzania the trends and 
patterns of central government expenditure and its components have been declining during the 
period under investigation. The share of total government expenditure in GDP decreased 
dramatically from 27.9 percent during the pre-crisis period (1970-80) to 18.3 percent during the 
second phase of the economic recovery reform 1996-2005, a decrease by more than one-third. 
Comparing the trends of the ratio of total government expenditure to GDP between the period 
before and after policy reform, Table 5.4 shows that on average the share of total government 
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expenditure in GDP plummeted considerably from 27.4 percent to 19.3 percent, a decrease of 
29.6 percent.  
The shares of the different government expenditure categories in GDP depict the same 
trend, except for general public service expenditure. The share of general public service 
expenditure in GDP has been increasing throughout the entire period under study. On average, it 
rose from 3.3 percent in the pre-crisis period to 5.5 percent during the second phase of economic 
recovery reform period (1996-2005). Comparing the pre-reform and post-reform period, the 
composition of general public service expenditure in GDP rose from 3.6 percent to 5.0 percent. 
On the other hand, the proportion of defense expenditure in GDP has been declining throughout 
the period.   
The shares of human capital development expenditure (education and health) and 
infrastructure reveal mixed trends. The ratios declined from the pre-crisis period (1970-80) to the 
crisis period (1981-85), continued to decelerate during the first phase of the economic recovery 
reform period (1987-92), before rising in 1993-95 when reforms went off-track, then declined 
again in the second phase of economic recovery reform period (see Table 5.5). However, overall, 
comparing the pre-reform and post-reform periods, Table 5.4 shows that spending on human 
capital development declined during the reform period.    
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 also demonstrate that the composition of the constituents of 
government expenditure in total government expenditure have changed substantially over the 
period under investigation. The proportion of public spending in education in total government 
expenditure declined on average from 13.2 percent in the pre-crisis period-1970-80 to 10.5 
percent in the crisis period (1981-85) and further declining to 6.6 percent during the economic 
recovery period-1987-92. Thereafter, it started rising, rose to 7.5 percent when the reform went 
off-track and increased further to 10.2 percent during the second phase of economic recovery 
(1997-2005), but remained lower than it was in the 1970s.  
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The shares of health and physical infrastructure expenditure in total government 
expenditure show the same trend. Both decreased during the crisis period through 1993-95 when 
reform went off-track. During the period the share of health and physical infrastructure spending 
increased, before decreasing during the second phase of economic recovery period. The share of 
defense expenditure in total government expenditure rose (from 11.9 percent to 13.3 percent) 
during the crisis period (1981-85), and then decelerated throughout during economic recovery 
program (10.0 percent) and off-track reform period (7.2 percent), before rising slightly (7.7 
percent) during the second phase of economic recovery reform period. The proportion of general 
public service expenditure in total government expenditure has been rising throughout the entire 
period under study (Table 5.5).  
Table 5.5 reveals the priorities of public spending in Tanzania. On average for the entire 
period under investigation, the top sectors receiving the highest priority in Tanzania, as reflected 
by the composition of total government expenditure, are general public service (19.9 percent), 
physical capital (infrastructure-10.7 percent), education (10.3 percent) and defense (10.3 percent). 
Overall, human capital development spending in Tanzania received 15.8 percent of total 
government expenditure, out of which 10.3 percent was education spending and 5.5 percent was 
allocated for health spending. This is mirrored in poor human capital development outcomes: 
higher adult illiteracy rate, lower enrolment rates in primary and secondary schools, higher infant 
mortality rates, higher crude death rates and lower life expectancy in Tanzania as compared to 
Kenya and Uganda (Tables 2.2, 2.7 and 2.11 in Chapter 2).   
5.3.2 Kenya 
Over the entire period under investigation, total government expenditure in Kenya shows 
an increasing trend. The share of total government expenditure in GDP during the crisis period 
(1980-86), rose from 18.8 percent to 23.0 percent during the pre-crisis period (1970-79) and 
increased further to 25.5 percent during economic recovery reform period (1987-91). It also rose 
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sharply to 28.9 percent during the 1992-96 reforms before it fell to 27.8 percent in the 1997-2005 
(Table 5.5). Overall, comparing between pre-reform and post-reform period, the share of total 
government expenditure in GDP increased dramatically from 20.5 percent to 27.5 percent, an 
increase of more than one-third.   
The share of human capital development spending in GDP has been rising throughout, 
except between the economic recovery programs of 1987-91 and 1992-96, when it dropped 
slightly from 5.9 percent to 5.6 percent, before rising to 6.6 percent in the period 1997-2005.  
Spending on physical capital (infrastructure) shows a mixed trend. The share of 
infrastructure expenditure in GDP declined from 6.0 percent during the pre-crisis period to 5.1 
percent during the crisis period. Then it declined to 3.4 percent in 1987-91 and further to 2.3 
percent in 1992-96, before rising sharply to 4.9 percent in 1997-2005. The ratio of defense 
spending/GDP also shows a mixed trend. It increased from 1.5 percent in 1970-79 to 2.4 percent 
in 1980-86. Thereafter, it decreased to 2.1 percent in 1987-91 and further to 1.3 percent in 1992-
96 before increasing slightly to 1.4 percent in 1997-2005. The share of general public service in 
GDP has been increasing throughout, except during the period between 1992-96 and 1997-2005 
when it decreased slightly from 4.6 percent to 4.4 percent. Overall, Table 5.4 shows that spending 
on human capital development and general public service spending increased during post-reform 
period, whilst spending on infrastructure and defense plummeted during the reform period as 
opposed to pre-reform period. However, splitting human capital into its components, the results 
show that spending in education rose whereas spending in health declined.  
The composition of spending in Kenya reveals mixed trends. The composition has 
fluctuated from year to year as well as from one policy episode to another. The proportion of 
education in total government expenditure declined from 18.2 percent in the pre-crisis period 
(1970-79) to 17.9 percent during the crisis period (1980-86). It then rose to 18.4 percent during 
economic recovery program (1987-91), before decreasing to 15.4 percent in the period 1992-96 
and then rose to 19.4 percent during the period 1997-2005. Spending in health service has been 
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declining throughout from the pre-crisis (6.5 percent) until 1992-96 reform period (4.2 percent), 
then increased to  4.5 percent in the reform period 1997-2005, though remained lower than it was 
between 1970-79 and 1987-91. 
The share of physical capital (infrastructure) spending in total government expenditure 
has been declining throughout the period under study, except in the reform period 1997-2005 
when it dramatically increased from 8.0 percent during 1992-96 to 17.7 percent, an increase of 
121.3 percent. However, it remained lower than in 1970-79 and 1980-91. Defense spending as a 
share of total government expenditure rose from 7.7 percent during the pre-crisis period to 10.4 
percent during the crisis period, and then dropped continuously to 8.3 percent during the 
economic recovery program period and to 4.5 percent in 1992-96, before rising to 5.2 percent in 
1997-2005. The share of general public service expenditure in total government expenditure has 
been increasing throughout the entire period under study. The ratio increased from 13.1 percent in 
the pre-crisis period to 16.1 percent in 1997-2006, an increase of 22.9 percent.   
Tables 5.4 and 5.5 reveal that the top priority sectors that constitute the largest shares in 
total government spending are physical capital (20.0 percent), education (18.1 percent) and 
general public service sector (14.6 percent). Spending on defense and health are respectively 7.2 
and 5.4 percent. Overall, human capital development spending represents the largest share (23.4 
percent) of total government expenditure in Kenya as compared to other spending categories 
(Table 5.4). The larger share of spending in human capital development is education (18.1 
percent) as compared to health (5.4 percent). This is not surprising because Kenya has a higher 
quality of human capital in terms of education attainment as compared to its counterparts 
Tanzania and Uganda. This is also reflected in lower adult illiteracy levels; higher enrolment rates 
in primary and secondary schools; lower infant mortality and crude death rates (Table 2.7 in 
Chapter 2).   
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5.3.3 Uganda 
Uganda’s share of total government expenditure in GDP over the study period shows a 
mixed trend. The share of total government expenditure in GDP during the crisis period (1980-
86) plummeted to 8.2 percent from 13.6 percent during the pre-crisis period (1970-79). It then 
increased slightly to 8.3 percent during economic recovery reform period (1987-91) and went up 
sharply to 18.6 percent during 1992-2005, an increase of 124.1 percent (Table 5.5). However, 
comparing the pre-reform and post-reform periods, Table 5.4 demonstrates that overall total 
government expenditure as a share in GDP rose sharply from 11.1 percent to 15.9 percent, an 
increase of almost 43.2 percent.   
Spending on human capital development also shows a mixed trend. It decreased during 
the crisis period from 2.9 percent of GDP in the pre-crisis period down to 1.3 percent, a decline of 
55.2 percent. It then declined slightly further to 1.0 percent in 1987-91 and then increased sharply 
to 3.6 percent during the period 1992-2005. Education and health spending as a percentage of 
GDP each follow the same trend. The share of physical capital (infrastructure) in GDP declined 
during the crisis period (1980-86) and thereafter it experienced an increasing trend throughout. 
Physical capital spending increased from 2.1 percent during the crisis period to 3.5 percent during 
the economic recovery program and rose further to 4.8 percent during the second generation 
reform period (1992-2005). Similarly, spending on public service and defense reveal mixed 
trends. They both fell during the crisis (1980-79) and economic recovery program (1987-91) and 
went up during the second generation reform period (1992-2005).   
Overall, Table 5.4 shows that human capital development (education and health), 
physical capital and general public expenditure increased in the post-reform period from 2.1, 2.2 
and 2.0 percent to 2.9, 4.5 and 2.1 percent respectively. Spending on defense declined from 2.4 
percent in the pre-reform period to 1.9 percent in the post-reform period, a decline of 20.8 
percent. We can attribute this decline in defense spending to fiscal adjustment coupled with 
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changes in sector spending priorities in Uganda. That is, the Ugandan government has shifted 
emphasis to physical and human capital development.  
The composition of spending in Uganda likewise shows mixed trends. The composition 
has fluctuated from year to year as well as from one policy episode to another. The proportion of 
education in total government expenditure declined from 15.5 percent in the pre-crisis period 
(1970-79) to 12.7 percent during the crisis period (1980-86). It then declined further to 9.8 
percent during economic recovery program (1987-91), before rising to 13.8 percent in the second 
generation reform period 1992-2005. Spending on health services declined throughout from the 
pre-crisis (5.5 percent) up until the period 1987-91 (2.8 percent) and then rose to 4.9 percent 
during the second generation reform period 1997-2005 (Table 5.5).  
The share of physical capital (infrastructure) spending in total government expenditure 
has been rising throughout the period under study, except during second generation reform 1992-
2005. During this period spending on physical capital decreased sharply from 42.2 percent during 
economic recovery program period (1987-91) to 26.3 percent in the second generation economic 
reform period (1992-2005), a decrease of 37.7 percent. Defense spending as a share of total 
government expenditure rose from 20.1 percent during the pre-crisis period to 25.5 percent during 
the crisis period, and then dropped continuously to 21.0 percent during the economic recovery 
program period (1987-91) and to 10.9 percent in 1992-2005. The share of general public service 
expenditure in total government expenditure decreased from 23.0 percent during the pre-crisis 
period to 12.5 percent in 1992-2005.  
Uganda’s top priority sectors are physical capital (26.0 percent), defense (17.6 percent) 
and general public service (17.4 percent). Education and health spending received 13.4 percent 
and 4.5 percent respectively. Human capital development (17.9 percent) receives almost same 
share as defense (17.6) and general public service (17.4). High spending in defense could be 
explained by the fact that Uganda has been in a constant civil strife almost for entire period under 
investigation. Nonetheless, in the post-reform period the Ugandan government allocated more 
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resources to education as a share of GDP than Tanzania. This is reflected in higher enrolment 
rates in primary and secondary schools in Uganda than Tanzania (Table 2.2 and 2.11 in Chapter 
2).   
5.4 Econometric Analysis 
5.4.1 Methodology 
Based on the theoretical and empirical evidence reviewed in section 5.2, the reduced-
form equation for analyzing the effect of economic reforms on public investment spending is as 
follows:  
 
PIt = f (PIt-1, OPt, Et, Mt, Gt)       (5.1) 
 
Where PI is the public expenditure category as percentage of GDP; OP is the index of openness 
measure (export plus import divided by GDP) capturing the effects of trade liberalization; E is a 
vector controlling for the structure of the economy; M is a vector controlling for macroeconomic 
conditions; and G is the size of the government measured by the change in tax revenues. The 
estimation equation is specified as follows: 
 
PIt = β + γPIt-1+ ρGt + qOPt + δiEt + ηiMt+ αt + εt    (5.2) 
 
In order to capture short-run and long-run dynamic changes in fiscal adjustments as a 
result of economic policy reforms a general autoregressive distributed lagged model is specified:  
 
PIt = β + γPIt-1+ ρGt + OPt + δiEt + ηiMt+ρGt-1 + OPt-1 + δEt-1 + ηiMt-1 + εit (5.3) 
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Estimating equation (5.3) while variables are in levels there is, however, a danger of 
encountering spurious regression; that is, obtaining significant regression results from unrelated 
data. An alternative approach is to estimate the error-correction regression equation. The error-
correction model is obtained by re-parameterizing and re-arranging equation (5.3) as follows:  
 
PIt = α + ΔOPt + ρΔGt + δiΔEt + ηiΔMt+ λεt-1+ Ωt    (5.4) 
 
where λ = (γ-1), is the adjustment coefficient (i.e. the estimated coefficient on the error-correction 
term). The expected value of adjustment coefficient is negative, which implies that there are 
dynamic stability in the long-run within the error-correction estimation model; εt-1= (PIt-1 - hOPt-1 
- kGt-1 - jEt-1 - lMt-1) is the error-correction term lagged one period, and h = /(1-γ); k = ρ1/(1-γ); j 
= δ1/(1-γ); and l = (η1 + η2+ η3)/(1- γ). It is obtained directly from the residuals of the co-
integration regression equation (5.2). This captures long-run equilibrium changes of public 
investment spending as a result of changes in trade policy reforms in the short-run. Equation (5.4) 
is estimated separately for physical capital and human capital and then separately for education 
and health investment spending. 
5.4.2 Econometric Results 
With time-series data it is meaningless to estimate the error-correction model with 
variables which are not stationary. Therefore, the first step before embarking on the error-
correction estimation approach is to ascertain the stationarity, order of integration and whether the 
variables under scrutiny are co-integrated.  
 
Unit Root Test  
A unit root test was performed for each variable for the period spanning 1970 to 2005. 
First, a unit root test was performed for each variable in their levels. For the variables in which 
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the null hypothesis of non-stationarity was rejected, their first differencing was tested for 
stationarity. To minimize the possibility of falsely rejecting the true null hypothesis or accepting 
the null hypothesis which is false, both the augmented Dickey Fuller Test (ADF) and Pillips-
Perron (P-P) non-parametric test were used to test for the presence of unit root. Table 5.6 
summarizes results of the ADF and P-P unit root tests. The results show that after taking the first 
differences most of the variables became integrated of order 1. Other variables were integrated of 
order 0. Variables integrated of order 0 were also included in the estimation of the error-
correction estimation after taking their first differences so that all variables included in the 
regression are of the same order and for interpretation purposes.. 
 
 Co-integration Analysis 
Since more than one variable was included in the co-integration regression equation, 
critical values generated by the Mackinnon (1991) and Ericsson and Mackinnon (2002) method 
were used for co-integration analysis. This is because ADF and P-P do not take into account finite 
samples and asymptotic distribution properties (Mackinnon, 1991). Results for co-integration 
analysis (unit root test for the residuals-the error-correction term) are summarized in Table 5.7. 
An examination of unit root tests for the residuals in Table 5.7 fail to reject the null hypothesis of 
non-stationary series, suggesting that the variables in the co-integration regression equation are 
co-integrated. This warrants the use of the error-correction model to examine short-run and long-
run dynamic changes in public investment spending in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. 
 
Error-Correction Estimation Results 
Co-integration analysis results in Table 5.7 demonstrate that variables in the co-
integration regression equation are co-integrated. This suggests that we can proceed to estimating 
the error-correction equation (5.4) to investigate short-run and long-run effects of economic 
reforms and macroeconomic environment, structure of the economy, size of the government and 
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level of development on public investment spending in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. Tables 5.8, 
5.9 and 5.10 report both co-integration (column 1) and error-correction (column 2) estimation 
results for physical capital, human capital development, education and health spending for the 
three countries respectively. It is apparent from the results that there exist a long-run relationship 
between openness to the rest of the world, countries’ economic conditions and public investment 
spending on physical capital (infrastructure), human capital development, education and health in 
Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. This is supported by the negative and statistically significant 
adjustment coefficient (error-correction term). A close examination at the results in Tables 5.8, 
5.9 and 5.10 suggests, however, that there are noticeable differences among the three countries as 
described below.  
 
Tanzania 
  Table 5.8 reports the co-integration (column 1) and error-correction (column 2) 
regression results for physical capital and overall human capital development as well as its 
components: education and health for Tanzania. The results show that there are short-run and 
long-run relationships between external debt and public investment spending on physical and 
human capital development in Tanzania. Strong support is inferred by the negative signs on the 
adjustment coefficients (error-correction term) across capital development spending categories. 
This suggests that there are short-run and long-run dynamic stability. That is, the movement of 
changes in public investment spending on infrastructure, human capital development, education 
and health towards the steady state are partly explained great openness of the Tanzanian economy 
to the rest of the world; as well as its prevailing economic structure, macroeconomic environment 
and level of development. However, the speed of adjustment towards the equilibrium among the 
public investment spending category varied. Physical capital adjusted faster, followed by 
education, human capital development and lastly heath, as reflected by the absolute value of 
adjustment coefficients (Table 5.8).   
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The coefficients on lagged dependent variables for each category of public investment 
spending are positive and statistically significant. This signals that there are partial short-run and 
long-run adjustments in physical capital, human capital development, education and health 
spending investment in Tanzania over time. Results in Table 5.8 also suggest that there are 
significant short-run effects of different variables included in the co-integration and error-
correction regression models. In the short-run, contrary to the prior expectations, changes in total 
external debt positively and significantly contributed to increase spending on physical capital and 
health as well as on overall human capital development and education, though insignificant. The 
possible explanation for this could suggest that spending on the provision of social services was 
protected during fiscal adjustment in order to maintain social cohesion and political legitimacy.  
The results also reveal that in the short-run, openness to the global economy is positively 
and significantly associated with increased spending on health investment and though 
insignificant is negatively associated with spending on physical capital, education and overall 
human capital development investment spending in Tanzania. As expected official development 
aid (ODA) is positively and significantly linked with increased public investment spending on 
overall human capital development and health as well as physical capital and education, although 
the estimated coefficients generally are not statistically significant.  
Tax revenue positively and significantly contributed to increase spending by the 
Tanzanian government on overall human capital development as well as on education and health. 
It seems the government commits its meager resources to human capital development. This could 
be attributed to the commitment of the government to HIPC initiative conditionalities and MDGs 
framework. Although not significant, changes in tax revenues had negative impact on physical 
capital spending. This finding is consistent with the theoretical literature that during fiscal 
adjustment for a government facing a budget constraint spending on physical infrastructure 
suffers the most from expenditure cuts. This is also reflected by how each spending category 
behaved as a result of changes in tax revenue. In order to ascertain the responsiveness of 
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government spending of each spending to changes in tax revenue, both short-run and long-run 
elasticities of public investment on physical infrastructure and human capital development 
(education and health) were estimated. Results of the estimated elasticities are reported in Table 
5.11. The results show that government spending on physical infrastructure, education and health 
was less sensitive to changes in tax revenue as evidenced by the elasticity of less than one both in 
the short- and long-run in all cases. It can also be noted from the results that government spending 
on physical infrastructure was relatively less responsive to changes in tax revenue both in the 
short-run and long-run as compared to education and health spending.  
Contrary to a prior expectation, urbanization negatively and significantly affects public 
investment spending on health, though insignificant on physical capital, human capital and 
education. In the short-run, the results demonstrate that inflation negatively and significantly 
affects public investment expenditure on overall human capital development and education.   
Changes in the public fiscal deficit, contrary to expectations, display a positive 
correlation with physical capital, overall human capital development and health spending as well 
as education although not significant. As expected, per capita GDP is positively and significantly 
associated with increased public investment spending on overall human capital development, 
education and health spending, as well as on physical capital development, although not 
statistically significant.   
 
 Kenya 
Co-integration and error-correction estimation results for Kenya are reported in Table 5.9 
under columns 1 and 2, respectively, for all public investment spending categories under 
investigation. The results demonstrate that there exist short-run and long-run relationships 
between Kenya’s openness to international trade, macroeconomic environment, size of 
government, structure of the economy and level of development and public investment spending 
on overall human capital development, infrastructure, education and health. This is evidenced by 
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the negative and statistically significant adjustment coefficients (error-correction term) across all 
government expenditure categories. This implies that long-run government investment spending 
on overall human capital development; physical capital; education and health gravitate towards 
the equilibrium in response to changes in macroeconomic environment, economic structure, the 
size of the government and level of development. The speed towards the equilibrium varies 
among the public investment categories, physical capital investment moving faster, followed by 
health spending, then overall human capital development spending, and lastly education (Table 
5.9). 
Results in Table 5.9 also suggest that there are partial adjustments in Kenya’s public 
investment expenditures on physical and human capital development as well as on education and 
health. Strong support is implied by the positive and statistically significant coefficients on lagged 
dependent variables in all co-integration regression equations (see Table 5.9, column 1). Table 
5.9 reveals some important significant short-run effects of variables on government investment 
spending in Kenya which are worth mentioning at this point.  
In the short-run, Kenya’s openness to the rest of the world had significant adverse impact 
on public investment on overall human capital development, education and health.  Spending on 
military apparatus seems to exert significant positive and negative effects on physical 
infrastructure development and education, respectively. Though insignificant, defense spending is 
also negatively and positively associated with public spending on human capital development and 
health respectively. Surprisingly, ODA seem to be statistically and negatively associated with 
health spending in Kenya in the short-run. However, ODA, though not significant is positively 
associated with other spending categories (Table 5.9).  
Table 5.9 also demonstrates that in the short-run tax revenue in Kenya had a positive and 
significant impact on public spending on overall human capital development and education. 
Although not significant short-run changes in tax revenue has positive effects on Kenya’s public 
investment spending on physical capital and health. Short-run and long-run elasticities of 
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government spending on each spending category with respect to tax revenue were estimated to 
ascertain their responsiveness to changes in tax revenue. Table 5.11 displays the elasticities of 
each government spending category both in the short-run and long-run. The results show that 
both in the short-run and long-run, government spending on physical infrastructure, education and 
health was less responsive to changes in tax revenue as indicated by a less-than-unity elasticity 
coefficient. The results show that spending on health was relatively less responsive to changes in 
tax revenue both in the short-run and long-run as compared to spending on physical infrastructure 
and education. This suggests that fiscal adjustment in Kenya insofar as it was accompanied by 
rising tax revenue, had no adverse impact on public investment spending. However, adjustments 
in the public fiscal deficit adversely affected public investment spending in Kenya. The results in 
Table 5.9 reveal that public fiscal adjustment had significant adverse impact on physical and 
human capital development as well as on education in Kenya. 
 Inflation displays a significant negative correlation with physical capital development. 
Though, insignificant it is positively and negatively associated with public spending on overall 
human capital development, education and health spending respectively. Although not 
statistically significant, per capita GDP is negatively associated with physical capital 
development and positively related to overall human capital development spending.  
 
Uganda 
Table 5.10 depicts both co-integration (column 1) and error-correction (column 2) 
estimation results for Uganda for the period spanning from 1977 to 2005. It is apparent from the 
results that there are short-run and long-run relationships between public investment spending and 
Uganda’s macroeconomic conditions, economic structure, level of development, size of 
government and openness to the rest of the world. Strong support is implied by the significant and 
negative coefficients of the error-correction term in all error-correction regression equations. This 
suggests that in the long-run, government spending on infrastructure, overall human capital 
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development, education and health move towards the equilibrium in response to changes in 
macroeconomic conditions, economic structure, size of the government, level of development and 
openness to trade. The speed of convergence toward the steady state varies from one spending 
category to another; physical capital being the faster, followed by education, then human capital 
and lastly health. Coefficients on lagged dependent variables are not significant in the co-
integration regressions, suggesting that there are no partial significant adjustments of public 
investment spending on physical capital, overall human capital development and its components-
education and health.   
The results in Table 5.10 suggest that in the short-run, as Uganda continued to open its 
economy to the rest of the world, the government increased spending on human capital 
development. This is implied by the positive and significant coefficients of the measure of 
openness (TRADE) on human capital and its components. Surprisingly, contrary to prior 
expectation, the coefficients of ODA on overall human capital development and education 
spending are negative and statistically significant. This could reflect the existence of 
inefficiencies in the targeting or the misuse of public resources in Uganda.   
The results also demonstrate that tax revenue had positive and statistically significant 
effects on public investment in Uganda. This is supported by positive and significant coefficients 
across all spending categories. Since tax revenue seem to be an important determinant of public 
investment it is important to ascertain the responsiveness of public investment to changes in tax 
revenue. Table 5.11 depicts estimated short-run and long-run elasticities for each government 
spending category. The results reveal that spending on physical infrastructure was more 
responsive to changes in tax revenue in the long-run in Uganda, as indicated by the elasticity of 
greater than one. The results also show that spending in physical infrastructure, education and 
health was relatively responsive to changes in tax revenue in Uganda when compared to its 
counterparts. It is also evident from the results in Table 5.10 that the public fiscal deficit had no 
adverse impact on human capital development investment spending. Strong support is provided 
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by positive and statistically significant coefficients on human capital and health, as well as on 
education though not significant, as opposed to an insignificant negative coefficient on physical 
capital development.  
In the short-run, as expected, inflation displays significant negative impacts on human 
capital development investment and its components, as well as negative impacts on physical 
capital although not statistically significant. As expected, the results demonstrate that public debt 
had been associated with negative effects on public investment in Uganda. Spending on military 
had insignificant positive effects on physical capital and health spending and negative effects on 
overall human capital and education spending (Table 5.10).  
5.5 Conclusions  
This chapter analyzed the trends, composition and determinants of various categories of 
government spending in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. It is apparent from the results in this 
chapter that all the three countries have experienced declines in one or more of the public 
spending categories. However, it is difficult to conclude firmly that economic liberalization has 
contributed to the decline in public investment spending in these countries. This is because the 
trends are mixed as are the econometric results for various public investment categories. 
Nonetheless, a few unambiguous conclusions can be drawn.   
The results unambiguously demonstrate that public spending on infrastructure; human 
capital and education have declined in the course of economic reforms in Tanzania and have 
increased in Uganda. For Kenya the results show unambiguous decreases in government spending 
on physical capital and health investment spending. It is also evident from the results that changes 
in tax revenue have strong impacts on public investment spending in the three countries. The 
findings of this chapter are consistent with both the empirical and theoretical literature that when 
the government is in short supply of resources to finance its budgets, physical infrastructure is the 
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first expenditure item to suffer from government expenditure compression during fiscal 
adjustment. This is particularly, evident in Tanzania.  
The results show that ODA had negative effects of health spending in Kenya and human 
capital development spending in Uganda. This is an indication of the diversion of foreign aid 
funds to other uses (McGillivary and Morrissey, 2004; O’Brien and Ryan, 2001).  
The trends in the composition of the different government spending categories are mixed. 
Comparing the pre-reform and post-reform periods, all spending categories declined in Tanzania 
post-reform period. For Kenya, the story is different. Education spending increased in Kenya, but 
spending in health, infrastructure and defense declined during the post-reform period. In Uganda, 
all the spending categories increased, except for defense spending which declined during the post-
reform period.  
It is evident from the findings in this chapter that there are variations in the sectoral 
priorities spending in the three countries. The results indicate that spending on defense as share in 
total government expenditure has been reduced in all the three countries, but it has relatively 
remained higher in Uganda as compared to Tanzania and Kenya. Tanzania allocates most of its 
resources on general public services, followed by physical infrastructure. Education and defense 
get almost the same amount of resources. The priority sectors in Kenya are physical 
infrastructure, education and public services. Uganda’s priority sectors are physical infrastructure, 
defense and general public service. Overall, the share of human capital development in total 
government spending is relatively lower in Tanzania as compared to its counterparts, Kenya and 
Uganda. This calls into question whether Tanzania will be able to achieve MDGs and PRSPs 
poverty reduction goals and overall economic development, given the meager resources the 
country spends on human capital development. Following the work on endogenous growth 
theory, it has been widely acknowledged that human capital development has large long-run 
economic growth and poverty reduction impacts. Higher economic growth in turn has positive 
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impact on human capital development outcomes and long-term solution to poverty. Therefore, 
low spending on human capital development is cause for concern.  
Several policy lessons can be drawn from this chapter. First, increase in tax revenue has 
positive impacts on public investment spending in physical capital and human capital 
development as well as education and health in all the three countries. This suggests that 
governments in these three countries should continue to reform their tax system in order to bolster 
revenue generation and thus increase availability of public resources to finance budget 
expenditure. This in turn will help to reduce poverty and promote overall economic development 
in these countries. Revenue generation can be improved through improving tax administration, 
expanding tax bases, bringing in more taxpayers in the tax brackets, and reducing tax revenue 
leakages through tax exemption, noncompliance, evasion and embezzlement.  
Second, the findings of this chapter have relevant policy implications for the achievement 
of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and poverty reduction strategies’ objectives. That 
is, the East African governments should strike a balance of the composition of government 
expenditure if they are to attain poverty reduction objectives as stipulated in the MDGs 
framework and in their Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs). This could be achieved by 
increasing spending on physical and human capital development and reducing their spending in 
unproductive sectors such as defense and general public services. Again, spending on physical 
and human capital development have direct long-run impacts on poverty reduction and economic 
growth. Utilizing resources more effectively and efficiency will enhance the achievements of 
MDGs and PRSPs objectives and long-run economic growth. Reprioritization of public 
expenditures into more productive sectors and achieving better governance should be at the fore 
in future institutional reforms in the three East African countries. 
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Table 5.1: Trends in Central Government Expenditures in Tanzania, 1970-2005 
 
Central Government Expenditure  
(% of GDP) 
Central Government Expenditures  
(% of Total Expenditure) 
Year TTE GPS DFE EDE HEE CAE HCE GPS DFE EDE HEE CAE HCE 
1970 23.30 3.23 1.38 3.15 1.29 5.24 4.44 13.85 5.94 13.52 5.52 22.51 19.05 
1971 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 
1972 22.86 2.54 2.33 3.39 1.42 5.48 4.82 11.12 10.18 14.84 6.23 23.96 21.06 
1973 24.28 3.09 2.20 3.23 1.58 4.78 4.81 12.73 9.05 13.29 6.51 19.67 19.80 
1974 27.68 3.06 3.09 3.40 1.84 4.50 5.24 11.05 11.16 12.29 6.64 16.26 18.93 
1975 32.54 3.41 3.83 3.98 2.24 4.72 6.22 10.48 11.78 12.24 6.89 14.50 19.12 
1976 25.49 2.73 3.10 3.60 1.82 3.83 5.42 10.71 12.16 14.11 7.14 15.01 21.25 
1977 25.65 3.25 3.15 3.49 1.81 3.08 5.30 12.65 12.29 13.60 7.06 11.99 20.66 
1978 29.34 3.66 4.19 4.12 2.08 3.62 6.20 12.46 14.29 14.03 7.09 12.34 21.11 
1979 37.93 4.39 8.80 4.06 1.90 4.84 5.95 11.57 23.21 10.70 5.00 12.77 15.69 
1980 29.77 3.76 2.64 3.92 1.75 4.17 5.68 12.63 8.85 13.18 5.89 14.01 19.08 
1981 29.73 3.49 3.79 3.63 1.66 3.92 5.28 11.73 12.76 12.21 5.57 13.18 17.78 
1982 31.65 4.09 3.96 3.95 1.70 3.71 5.65 12.92 12.53 12.47 5.38 11.72 17.85 
1983 27.36 3.20 3.63 3.61 1.39 2.96 5.00 11.70 13.26 13.18 5.10 10.81 18.28 
1984 24.13 3.90 3.09 2.82 1.32 2.26 4.13 16.14 12.79 11.67 5.46 9.36 17.13 
1985 24.50 5.24 3.27 1.60 1.19 2.11 2.79 21.40 13.34 6.54 4.84 8.60 11.39 
1986 22.49 5.19 3.36 1.56 1.01 1.53 2.56 23.08 14.95 6.92 4.48 6.80 11.40 
1987 24.39 4.97 3.53 1.56 1.11 1.81 2.67 20.38 14.48 6.42 4.54 7.41 10.96 
1988 19.96 4.25 2.08 1.09 0.89 1.35 1.98 21.27 10.42 5.44 4.47 6.77 9.91 
1989 19.51 4.02 1.78 1.08 0.88 1.35 1.96 20.60 9.12 5.55 4.51 6.93 10.06 
1990 18.29 4.29 1.57 1.20 0.90 1.21 2.11 23.45 8.59 6.58 4.92 6.61 11.51 
1991 20.29 3.85 1.73 1.63 1.20 1.38 2.83 18.99 8.53 8.05 5.92 6.82 13.97 
1992 19.96 3.48 1.70 1.54 1.17 1.65 2.71 17.45 8.53 7.72 5.85 8.27 13.57 
1993 23.99 5.15 1.63 1.79 1.36 3.36 3.15 21.45 6.79 7.46 5.65 14.02 13.12 
1994 22.41 4.72 1.09 1.69 1.61 3.29 3.30 21.07 4.88 7.55 7.16 14.68 14.72 
1995 15.11 NA 1.49 NA NA NA NA NA 9.86 NA NA NA NA 
1996 14.49 3.29 1.19 0.99 0.54 0.61 1.52 22.69 8.19 6.80 3.70 4.19 10.50 
1997 17.07 3.53 1.23 1.68 0.62 0.80 2.30 20.67 7.23 9.86 3.62 4.70 13.49 
1998 15.91 4.98 1.51 0.92 0.72 0.91 1.64 31.30 9.46 5.78 4.50 5.73 10.28 
1999 15.61 4.51 1.38 0.90 0.76 1.58 1.67 28.90 8.85 5.80 4.88 10.11 10.67 
2000 17.59 4.18 1.32 2.39 0.95 1.67 3.34 23.74 7.51 13.58 5.39 9.52 18.97 
2001 18.26 3.89 1.38 2.69 1.09 1.33 3.78 21.28 7.56 14.71 5.99 7.30 20.70 
2002 19.35 4.21 1.51 2.83 1.12 1.26 3.96 21.74 7.82 14.64 5.81 6.53 20.45 
2003 21.72 4.18 1.47 4.17 1.51 1.54 5.68 19.24 6.78 19.20 6.96 7.08 26.16 
2004 19.35 10.01 1.50 1.09 0.73 1.76 1.82 51.70 7.75 5.64 3.75 9.11 9.39 
2005 23.55 12.40 1.30 1.32 0.82 0.84 2.14 52.66 5.53 5.60 3.47 3.59 9.08 
 
Notes: TTE: share of total expenditure in GDP; GPS: share of general public service expenditure; DFE: share of 
defense spending; EDE: share of education expenditure; HEE: share of health spending; ECA: share of spending 
economic activity; HCE: share of human capital development spending (education and health); CAE: share of physical 
capital (transport, communication, roads, fuel and energy) expenditure. 
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Table 5.2: Trends in Central Government Expenditures in Kenya, 1970-2005 
 
Central Government Expenditure  
(% of GDP) 
Central Government Expenditures  
(% of Total Expenditure) 
Year TTE GPS DFE EDE HEE CAE HCE GPS DFE EDE HEE CAE HCE 
1970 15.40 3.50 0.72 2.22 1.01 4.45 3.23 22.72 4.69 14.44 6.54 28.92 20.98 
1971 17.94 3.48 0.74 3.16 1.16 6.30 4.31 19.41 4.13 17.59 6.45 35.11 24.04 
1972 18.42 4.08 0.95 3.44 1.25 5.77 4.68 22.14 5.15 18.66 6.77 31.31 25.43 
1973 17.73 1.06 1.05 3.55 1.12 5.61 4.68 5.99 5.93 20.05 6.34 31.63 26.39 
1974 16.72 0.94 1.04 3.35 1.05 4.96 4.40 5.63 6.20 20.04 6.27 29.69 26.31 
1975 19.40 0.97 1.22 3.97 1.31 5.94 5.28 5.00 6.31 20.48 6.75 30.61 27.23 
1976 19.77 0.99 1.09 3.81 1.27 6.93 5.07 5.01 5.52 19.25 6.41 35.04 25.67 
1977 16.98 2.61 1.78 3.35 1.23 5.17 4.58 15.35 10.47 19.72 7.21 30.46 26.94 
1978 22.13 3.46 2.98 3.54 1.38 7.43 4.93 15.62 13.45 16.01 6.25 33.58 22.26 
1979 23.58 3.36 3.57 3.69 1.46 7.20 5.14 14.23 15.15 15.64 6.18 30.54 21.82 
1980 22.84 3.71 3.27 4.01 1.59 7.16 5.60 16.25 14.31 17.54 6.97 31.35 24.51 
1981 24.46 4.16 2.28 4.44 1.66 7.64 6.10 17.01 9.33 18.17 6.78 31.23 24.95 
1982 24.54 3.49 2.81 4.32 1.56 4.21 5.88 14.23 11.45 17.61 6.34 0.00 23.95 
1983 22.97 2.70 2.66 3.98 1.34 6.35 5.33 11.74 11.57 17.34 5.85 27.65 23.19 
1984 21.39 2.78 2.41 3.79 1.26 4.65 5.05 12.99 11.27 17.71 5.90 21.75 23.61 
1985 23.33 3.16 1.70 3.96 1.22 3.32 5.17 13.54 7.28 16.95 5.21 14.23 22.17 
1986 21.56 2.70 1.67 4.31 1.21 2.32 5.53 12.54 7.73 20.00 5.62 10.74 25.63 
1987 24.40 3.75 1.95 4.65 1.29 3.80 5.94 15.35 8.01 19.04 5.30 15.59 24.34 
1988 22.59 3.12 2.48 4.64 1.20 2.46 5.84 13.80 10.99 20.55 5.31 10.89 25.85 
1989 26.43 3.54 1.80 4.78 1.25 3.35 6.02 13.40 6.81 18.07 4.71 12.69 22.78 
1990 25.62 3.92 2.12 4.44 1.13 3.86 5.57 15.30 8.26 17.33 4.43 15.05 21.76 
1991 28.48 3.89 2.05 4.77 1.20 3.44 5.97 13.68 7.21 16.76 4.22 12.09 20.98 
1992 26.60 3.52 1.39 4.33 1.14 2.35 5.47 13.23 5.24 16.29 4.29 8.83 20.58 
1993 29.08 3.54 1.34 4.10 1.12 1.85 5.22 12.19 4.61 14.11 3.83 6.35 17.95 
1994 35.05 3.60 1.34 4.18 1.28 2.21 5.45 10.27 3.82 11.91 3.64 6.31 15.56 
1995 27.13 7.90 1.04 4.67 1.16 2.36 5.83 29.11 3.83 17.21 4.27 8.71 21.49 
1996 26.52 4.18 1.31 4.62 1.32 2.61 5.95 15.75 4.95 17.43 4.99 9.83 22.43 
1997 23.70 4.66 1.36 4.35 1.37 2.03 5.72 19.68 5.74 18.34 5.79 8.57 24.13 
1998 37.03 4.52 1.20 5.43 1.51 1.59 6.95 12.21 3.23 14.67 4.09 4.30 18.76 
1999 26.79 4.56 1.18 5.30 1.11 1.36 6.40 17.03 4.39 19.76 4.14 5.08 23.90 
2000 23.32 4.55 1.08 4.93 0.95 2.01 5.88 19.53 4.62 21.15 4.07 8.60 25.22 
2001 26.12 6.16 1.39 4.86 1.16 3.22 6.02 23.58 5.32 18.61 4.44 12.34 23.05 
2002 29.95 3.40 1.57 5.35 1.46 10.20 6.81 11.37 5.23 17.87 4.88 34.07 22.75 
2003 27.22 3.94 1.85 5.85 1.23 6.94 7.08 14.46 6.78 21.49 4.50 25.48 25.99 
2004 29.55 3.51 1.84 6.13 1.20 9.02 7.34 11.89 6.22 20.76 4.07 30.54 24.83 
2005 26.21 4.04 1.45 5.85 1.13 7.85 6.97 15.43 5.52 22.31 4.29 29.94 26.60 
 
Notes: TTE: share of total expenditure in GDP; GPS: share of general public service expenditure; DFE: share of 
defense spending; EDE: share of education expenditure; HEE: share of health spending; HCE: share of human capital 
development spending (education and health); CAE: share of physical capital (transport, communication, roads, fuel 
and energy) expenditure. 
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Table 5.3: Trends in Central Government Expenditures in Uganda, 1977-2005 
 
Central Government Expenditure  
(% of GDP) 
Central Government Expenditures  
(% of Total Expenditure) 
Year TTE GPS DFE EDE HEE CAE HCE GPS DFE EDE HEE CAE HCE 
1972 21.40 NA 4.97 3.28 1.12 2.44 4.40 NA 23.21 15.32 6.09 11.41 21.41 
1973 16.25 NA 1.84 2.74 0.99 3.22 3.73 NA 11.33 16.89 4.72 19.82 21.62 
1974 16.87 NA 3.05 2.57 0.72 2.88 3.29 NA 18.07 15.24 3.47 17.04 18.71 
1975 14.79 3.90 2.69 2.11 0.60 2.62 2.71 26.35 18.21 14.25 3.58 17.70 17.83 
1976 14.27 4.06 2.57 2.15 0.80 2.22 2.95 28.48 17.98 15.07 4.47 15.55 19.55 
1977 9.71 2.04 2.22 1.50 0.78 1.65 2.28 21.03 22.85 15.43 8.06 16.96 23.49 
1978 9.26 1.85 2.20 1.36 0.76 1.33 2.12 19.94 23.74 14.68 8.25 14.40 22.93 
1979 6.17 1.17 1.56 1.08 0.32 1.36 1.40 19.02 25.28 17.43 5.18 22.03 22.61 
1980 5.35 1.35 1.23 0.80 0.27 0.66 1.07 25.13 23.04 14.90 5.08 12.34 19.97 
1981 4.37 1.36 1.08 0.55 0.26 0.67 0.81 31.10 24.63 12.59 5.87 15.38 18.46 
1982 9.87 1.62 3.06 1.22 0.42 2.87 1.64 16.41 31.03 12.37 4.28 29.04 16.65 
1983 10.18 1.47 3.38 1.12 0.40 2.63 1.51 14.47 33.16 10.97 3.88 25.86 14.86 
1984 11.06 1.85 2.58 1.29 0.28 3.48 1.57 16.71 23.31 11.68 2.53 31.50 14.21 
1985 8.64 1.33 2.00 1.09 0.30 3.05 1.38 15.42 23.18 12.58 3.42 35.31 16.00 
1986 7.61 1.88 1.55 1.07 0.17 1.54 1.24 24.75 20.35 14.10 2.24 20.31 16.35 
1987 5.21 1.37 1.23 0.41 0.10 1.85 0.51 26.24 23.58 7.78 1.94 35.42 9.72 
1988 5.38 1.82 1.23 0.76 0.14 2.70 0.90 33.88 22.78 14.12 2.51 50.10 16.63 
1989 7.79 1.81 1.67 0.80 0.24 3.34 1.04 23.24 21.49 10.27 3.14 42.91 13.41 
1990 11.17 1.39 2.26 0.93 0.34 4.45 1.27 12.42 20.21 8.37 3.04 39.87 11.41 
1991 12.09 1.20 2.02 1.00 0.38 5.20 1.37 9.90 16.70 8.25 3.10 43.00 11.35 
1992 14.84 1.34 1.48 0.37 0.13 4.77 0.49 9.04 9.99 2.47 0.86 32.13 3.33 
1993 18.26 2.93 1.54 1.17 0.42 5.74 1.59 16.04 8.41 6.39 2.30 31.42 8.69 
1994 16.77 2.59 1.66 0.93 0.37 4.17 1.30 15.42 9.90 5.55 2.23 24.89 7.78 
1995 15.45 2.89 1.91 1.90 0.74 4.30 2.64 18.71 12.33 12.31 4.81 27.84 17.11 
1996 16.50 2.30 1.94 1.78 0.89 4.30 2.67 13.94 11.75 10.80 5.38 26.08 16.18 
1997 16.98 2.15 2.07 2.35 0.68 3.82 3.03 12.67 12.16 13.82 4.03 22.51 17.85 
1998 15.74 2.45 1.76 2.73 0.69 4.64 3.42 15.55 11.17 17.32 4.38 29.50 21.70 
1999 16.86 1.57 2.59 3.14 0.78 5.81 3.92 9.31 15.35 18.64 4.62 34.48 23.26 
2000 19.27 2.07 2.37 3.45 0.85 5.84 4.30 10.72 12.27 17.89 4.40 30.28 22.29 
2001 20.95 3.30 2.21 3.67 1.08 5.38 4.76 15.75 10.55 17.53 5.18 25.67 22.71 
2002 22.97 2.78 2.18 4.22 1.51 4.99 5.72 12.12 9.48 18.36 6.56 21.74 24.92 
2003 21.96 1.79 2.02 3.89 1.50 4.38 5.39 8.13 9.18 17.72 6.84 19.93 24.56 
2004 22.39 2.18 2.22 3.65 1.47 4.84 5.12 9.72 9.91 16.32 6.55 21.63 22.87 
2005 21.80 1.59 2.23 3.84 2.33 4.26 6.17 7.28 10.21 17.63 10.68 19.53 28.31 
 
Notes: TTE: share of total expenditure in GDP; GPS: share of general public service expenditure; DFE: share of 
defense spending; EDE: share of education expenditure; HEE: share of health spending; HCE: share of human capital 
development spending (education and health); CAE: share of physical capital (transport, communication, roads, fuel 
and energy) expenditure. 
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Table 5.4: Trends in Central Government Pre- and Post-Reform in East Africa 
 
Variable Pre-Reform Period 
(1970-86) 
Post-Reform Period 
(1987-2005) 
Whole Period 
(1970-2005) 
Tanzania 
Composition of Expenditures (% of GDP) 
Social (Human Capital) 4.96 2.70 3.76 
 Education 3.34 1.70 2.47 
 Health 1.62 1.00 1.29 
Infrastructure 3.80 1.54 2.60 
Defense 3.49 1.60 2.46 
General Public Service 3.64 4.99 4.36 
Total Expenditure 27.42 19.31 23.01 
Composition of Expenditures (% of Total Expenditure) 
Social (Human Capital) 18.09 13.75 15.80 
 Education 12.17 8.69 10.33 
 Health 5.92 5.06 5.47 
Infrastructure 13.97 7.74 10.67 
Defense 12.41 8.31 10.33 
General Public Service 13.51 25.48 19.85 
Other Expenditure 42.02 44.72 43.35 
Total Expenditure 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Kenya 
Composition of Expenditures (% of GDP) 
Social (Human Capital) 6.00 6.13 5.60 
 Education 4.70 4.91 4.34 
 Health 1.30 1.22 1.26 
Infrastructure 5.61 3.82 4.66 
Defense 1.88 1.56 1.71 
General Public Service 2.77 4.23 3.54 
Total Expenditure 20.54 27.46 24.19 
Composition of Expenditures (% of Total Expenditure) 
Social (Human Capital) 24.41 22.58 23.44 
 Education 18.07 18.09 18.08 
 Health 6.34 4.49 5.36 
Infrastructure 26.69 13.96 19.97 
Defense 8.82 5.83 7.24 
General Public Service 13.49 15.64 14.63 
Other Expenditure 26.59 41.99 34.72 
Total Expenditure 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Uganda 
Composition of Expenditures (% of GDP) 
Social (Human Capital) 2.14 2.93 2.58 
 Education 1.59 2.16 1.91 
 Health 0.55 0.77 0.67 
Infrastructure 2.17 4.46 3.45 
Defense 2.40 1.92 2.13 
General Public Service 1.99 2.08 2.04 
Total Expenditure 11.05 15.92 13.77 
Composition of Expenditures (% of Total Expenditure) 
Social (Human Capital) 18.97 17.05 17.90 
 Education 14.23 12.71 13.38 
 Health 4.74 4.34 4.52 
Infrastructure 20.31 30.47 25.99 
Defense 22.62 13.55 17.55 
General Public Service 21.57 14.74 17.38 
Other Expenditure 16.53 24.19 21.18 
Total Expenditure 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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Table 5.5: Trends in Central Government Expenditure in Different Policy Episodes in East Africa 
 
Tanzania Kenya Uganda Variable 
70-80 81-85 86-92 93-95 96-05 70-79 80-86 87-91 92-96 97-05 70-79 80-86 87-91 92-05 
 
Government Expenditures (% of GDP) 
         
Social (Human Capital) 5.80 4.24 2.37 3.22 2.79 4.63 5.53 5.87 5.58 6.58 2.86 1.32 1.02 3.61 
 Education 3.63 2.86 1.35 1.74 1.90 3.41 4.12 4.66 4.38 5.34 2.10 1.02 0.78 2.65 
 Health 1.17 1.38 1.02 1.48 0.89 1.22 1.41 1.21 1.20 1.24 0.76 0.30 0.24 0.96 
Infrastructure 4.43 2.75 1.46 3.33 1.23 5.98 5.09 3.38 2.28 4.91 2.21 2.13 3.51 4.80 
Defense 3.47 3.52 2.07 1.40 1.38 1.51 2.40 2.08 1.29 1.43 2.64 2.13 1.68 2.01 
General Public Service 3.31 4.18 4.14 4.93 5.52 2.44 3.24 3.64 4.55 4.37 2.60 1.55 1.52 2.80 
Total Expenditure 27.88 26.64 20.40 20.50 18.29 18.81 23.01 25.50 28.88 27.77 13.59 8.15 8.33 18.62 
 
Government Expenditures (% of Total Expenditure) 
         
Social (Human Capital) 19.58 15.64 11.68 13.92 14.97 24.71 24.00 23.14 19.60 23.91 21.02 16.64 12.51 18.68 
 Education 13.18 10.50 6.63 7.51 10.16 18.19 17.90 18.35 15.39 19.44 15.54 12.74 9.76 13.77 
 Health 6.40 5.14 5.05 6.41 4.81 6.52 6.10 4.79 4.21 4.47 5.48 3.90 2.75 4.91 
Infrastructure 16.30 10.08 7.13 14.35 6.78 31.69 19.56 13.26 8.01 17.66 16.86 24.25 42.24 26.26 
Defense 11.89 13.27 9.95 7.18 7.67 7.70 10.42 8.26 4.49 5.23 20.08 25.53 20.95 10.90 
General Public Service 11.92 16.16 20.36 21.26 29.39 13.11 14.04 14.31 16.11 16.13 22.96 20.57 21.14 12.46 
Other Expenditures 40.31 44.85 50.88 43.29 41.19 22.79 31.98 41.03 51.79 37.07 19.08 13.01 3.16 31.70 
Total Expenditure 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
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Table 5.6: Unit Root Tests for Variables in the Regression Analysis 
 
Tanzania Kenya Uganda Variables 
ADF Z(t) 
value 
PP Z(t) 
Value 
I(?) ADF Z(t) 
value 
PP Z(t) 
Value 
I(?) ADF Z(t) 
value 
PP Z(t) 
Value 
I(?) 
CAE -2.852* -3.905** I(1) -3.466*** -6.976*** I(1) -3.783*** -5.184*** I(1) 
HCE -1.974 -6.487*** I(1) -5.095*** -7.693*** I(1) -7.703*** -7.414*** I(1) 
EDE -2.185 -6.572*** I(1) -5.265*** -7.976*** I(1) -3.491** -8.046*** I(1) 
HEE -2.666* -6.137*** I(1) -4.801*** -6.464*** I(1) -3.933*** -5.735*** I(1) 
DFE -5.004*** -9.254*** I(1) -3.247** -4.947*** I(1) -4.978*** -4.424*** I(1) 
EXD -5.698*** -5.095*** I(1) -3.167** -5.322*** I(1) -1.814 -4.183*** I(1) 
TRADE -2.344 -3.668*** I(1) -4.277*** -6.871*** I(1) -6.193*** -6.139*** I(1) 
ODA -3.254** -5.654*** I(1) -3.025** -5.704*** I(1) -3.736** -6.877*** I(1) 
TXRV -4.681*** -6.989*** I(1) -4.669*** -7.165*** I(1) -5.103*** -6.342*** I(1) 
URBAN -2.494 -3.324** I(1) - - - - - - 
INFLT -3.822*** -6.548*** I(1) -3.782*** -6.099*** I(1) -2.889** -5.555*** I(1) 
GBDEF -2.958** -4.028*** I(1) -3.888*** -5.972*** I(1) -4.361*** -5.791*** I(1) 
PCGDP -2.084 -3.689*** I(0) -2.331 -6.759*** I(0) -3.234** -5.494*** I(0) 
 
Notes: CAE: share of physical capital (transport, communication, roads, fuel and energy) expenditure, DFE: share of defense spending; EDE: share of 
education expenditure; HEE: share of health spending; HCE: share of human capital development spending (education and health); GBDEF: the change in 
public budget deficit; ODA: Natural logarithm of the share of the share of official development aid in GDP; EXD: Natural logarithm of the share of the share of external 
debt in GDP; TRADE: is the share of trade volume (percentage of import plus export) in GDP; TXRV: is the natural logarithm of the share of tax revenue in GDP; 
URBN: is the natural logarithm of urbanization (% of the urban population to the total population); INFLT: is the natural logarithm of inflation rate; PCGDP: is the 
natural logarithm of real per capita GDP. 
 
*** = significant at 1% level, ** = significant at 5% level and * = significant at 10% level  
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Table 5.7: Results for Co-integration Analysis 
 
Without Constant Without Trend With Trend Equation 
Z(t) 1% 5% Z(t) 1% 5% Z(t) 1% 5% 
Tanzania          
CAE -4.354** -4.919 -3.939 -4.269 -5.362 -4.323 -4.182 -5.802 -4.699 
HCE -6.625*** -4.710 -4.174 -6.489*** -5.806 -4.542 -6.435*** -6.301 -4.917 
EDE -6.075*** -4.710 -4.174 -5.965*** --5.806 -4.542 -5.944** -6.301 -4.917 
HEE -9.003*** -4.710 -4.174 -8.759*** -5.806 -4.542 -8.481*** -6.301 -4.917 
Kenya          
CAE -6.511*** -4.206 -3.407 -6.422*** -4.696 -3.872 -6.346*** -5.144 -4.293 
HCE -5.425*** -4.510 -3.602 -5.330*** -4.961 -4.091 -5.282** -5.383 -4.480 
EDE -5.043*** -4.510 -3.602 -4.958** -4.961 -4.091 -4.991** -5.383 -4.480 
HEE -5.656*** -5.047 -4.109 -5.542*** -5.432 -4.454 -5.428** -5.813 -4.794 
Uganda          
CAE -5.077*** -4.725 -3.736 -4.954** -5.273 -4.170 -4.815** -5.729 -4.589 
HCE -4.774** -5.067 -3.977 -4.668** -5.556 4.376 -4.552 -6.053 -4.771 
EDE -4.943** -5.067 -3.977 -4.833** -5.556 4.376 -4.729 -6.053 -4.771 
HEE -4.024** -4.725 -3.736 -3.927 -5.273 -4.170 3.762 -5.729 -4.589 
 
*** = significant at 1% level, ** = significant at 5% level and * = significant at 10% level (Critical values at 1% and 5% estimated using  
Ericsson and Mackinnon (2002) Method. 
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Table 5.8: Determinants of Public Investment Spending in Tanzania 
 
Physical Capital Human Capital Education Health Variables 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
CAPt-1 0.503*** 
(3.42) 
 0.704***  0.583*** 
(3.54) 
 0.785*** 
(7.46) 
 
EXD 0.226*** 
(3.14) 
0.322*** 
(3.49) 
 0.128 
(1.54) 
 0.143 
(1.28) 
 0.153** 
(2.40) 
TRADE 0.047 
(0.33) 
-0.443 
(1.26) 
0.250 
(1.26) 
-0.069 
(0.19) 
0.228 
(0.85) 
-0.066 
(0.14) 
0.451** 
(2.69) 
0.282 
(1.10) 
ODA 0.183 
(1.50) 
0.180 
(0.80) 
0.216 
(1.41) 
0.431* 
(1.86) 
0.306 
(1.49) 
0.406 
(1.42) 
0.074 
(0.56) 
0.346** 
(2.27) 
DEFNS  0.014 
(0.09) 
 -0.044 
(0.30) 
 -0.079 
(0.40) 
 0.071 
(0.68) 
TXRV  -0.092 
(0.22) 
0.825** 
(2.38) 
0.566 
(1.39) 
1.153** 
(2.48) 
0.850* 
(1.69) 
0.756** 
(2.62) 
0.570** 
(2.13) 
URBAN  -3.669 
(1.14) 
 -2.636 
(0.75) 
    
INFL  0.020 
(0.16) 
-0.135* 
(1.80) 
-0.084 
(0.61) 
-0.218** 
(2.15) 
-0.140 
(0.78) 
-0.016 
(0.25) 
-0.017 
(0.16) 
GBDEF 0.008 
(0.55) 
0.027 
(1.50) 
0.015 
(1.05) 
0.027* 
(1.67) 
0.018 
(0.94) 
0.033 
(1.48) 
0.008 
(0.69) 
0.023* 
(1.92) 
PCGDP  0.155 
(0.32) 
0.423* 
(1.76) 
0.896* 
(1.76) 
0.590* 
(1.78) 
0.807 
(1.24) 
0.325* 
(1.64) 
0.934** 
(2.71) 
TREND -0.023** 
(2.40) 
       
ECMt-1  -0.544* 
(1.71) 
 -0.479* 
(1.85) 
 -0.526** 
(2.02) 
 -0.477* 
(1.85) 
CONS. -0.059 
(0.10) 
0.090 
(0.88) 
-5.033** 
(2.02) 
0.064 
(0.58) 
-6.754* 
(1.98) 
-0.020 
(0.32) 
-5.116** 
(2.47) 
-0.006 
(0.18) 
N 29 27 29 27 29 27 29 27 
F-value 34.87*** 2.38* 16.60*** 1.21 12.19 1.01 25.20*** 3.35** 
R2Adj. 0.8789 0.3471 0.7959 0.0749 0.7366 0.0047 0.8581 0.4485 
 
Notes: CAPt-1: is the natural logarithm of the share of the respective capital expenditure in GDP lagged 
one period; GBDEF: the change in public budget deficit; ODA: Natural logarithm of the share of official development 
aid in GDP; EXD: Natural logarithm of the share of external debt in GDP; TRADE: is the share of trade volume 
(percentage of import plus export) in GDP; TXRV: is the natural logarithm of the share of tax revenue in GDP; 
DEFNS: is the natural logarithm of the share of defense expenditure in GDP; URBN: is the natural logarithm of 
urbanization (% of the urban population to the total population); INFL: is the natural logarithm of inflation rate; 
PCGDP: is the natural logarithm of real per capita GDP; TREND: is the time trend variable; ECMt-1 is the residual of 
the regression of co-integrated variables lagged one period. 
 
Figures in Parentheses are absolute t-values, *** = significant at 1% level, ** = significant at 5% level and * = 
significant at 10% level  
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Table 5.9: Determinants of Public Investment Spending in Kenya 
 
Physical Capital Human Capital Education Health Variables 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
CAPt-1 0.763*** 
(6.60) 
 0.402*** 
(3.82) 
 0.431*** 
(4.60) 
 0.351* 
(1.82) 
 
DEBT  -0.158 
(1.26) 
 0.011 
(0.46) 
 0.023 
(0.85) 
 -0.025 
(0.63) 
TRADE 0.272 
(0.57) 
0.334 
(0.65) 
-0.169* 
(1.74) 
-0.334*** 
(3.28) 
-0.268** 
(2.63) 
-0.354*** 
(3.19) 
0.061 
(0.38) 
-0.263* 
(1.63) 
ODA  0.186 
(0.86) 
-0.030 
(1.21) 
0.005 
(0.10) 
 0.034 
(0.71) 
-0.074* 
(1.61) 
-0.125* 
(1.76) 
DEFNS  0.995** 
(2.81) 
 -0.094 
(1.42) 
-0.045 
(1.54) 
-0.143* 
(1.98) 
0.111* 
(1.61) 
0.071 
(0.68) 
TXRV  0.589 
(0.92) 
0.349*** 
(3.95) 
0.224* 
(1.78) 
0.433*** 
(4.22) 
0.296** 
(2.17) 
0.334 
(1.40) 
0.013 
(0.06) 
INFL -0.126 
(1.58) 
-0.160** 
(2.06) 
 0.003 
(0.17) 
 0.002 
(0.13) 
 -0.001 
(0.03) 
GBDEF -0.045 
(1.45) 
0.186 
(0.86) 
-0.015** 
(2.69) 
-0.011* 
(1.68) 
-0.016** 
(2.69) 
-0.011 
(1.56) 
-0.010 
(0.89) 
-0.013 
(1.22) 
PCGDP  3.113 
(1.49) 
 0.518 
(1.23) 
 0.694 
(1.52) 
 0.120 
(0.02) 
TREND       -0.007* 
(1.66) 
 
ECMt-1  -0.876*** 
(3.96) 
 -0.667*** 
(3.18) 
 -0.521** 
(2.50) 
 -
0.729*** 
(3.19) 
CONS. -0.591 
(0.31) 
0.013 
(0.23) 
0.791* 
(1.70) 
0.008 
(0.73) 
0.767 
(1.55) 
0.010 
(0.86) 
-0.834 
(1.03 
-0.001 
(0.07) 
N 35 34 35 34 35 34 35 34 
F-value 16.87*** 2.24** 31.37*** 3.24** 41.65*** 2.69** 4.10*** 2.76** 
R2Adj. 0.6513 0.2525 0.8170 0.3783 0.8567 0.3157 0.3894 0.32.44 
 
Notes: CAPt-1: is the natural logarithm of the share of the respective capital expenditure in GDP lagged 
one period; GBDEF: the change in public budget deficit; ODA: Natural logarithm of the share of official development 
aid in GDP; EXD: Natural logarithm of the share of external debt in GDP; TRADE: is the share of trade volume 
(percentage of import plus export) in GDP; TXRV: is the natural logarithm of the share of tax revenue in GDP; 
DEFNS: is the natural logarithm of the share of defense expenditure in GDP; URBN: is the natural logarithm of 
urbanization (% of the urban population to the total population); INFL: is the natural logarithm of inflation rate; 
PCGDP: is the natural logarithm of real per capita GDP; TREND: is the time trend variable; ECMt-1 is the residual of 
the regression of co-integrated variables lagged one period. 
 
Figures in Parentheses are absolute t-values, *** = significant at 1% level, ** = significant at 5% level and * = 
significant at 10% level  
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Table 5.10: Determinants of Public Investment Spending in Uganda 
 
Physical Capital Human Capital Education Health Variables 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
CAPt-1 -0.036 
(0.35) 
 -0.098 
(0.58) 
 -0.080 
(0.50) 
 0.082 
(0.36) 
 
DEBT  -0.077 
(0.37) 
 -0.057 
(0.18) 
 -0.060 
(0.19) 
 -0.260 
(0.60) 
TRADE -0.604** 
(2.74) 
-0.147 
(0.43) 
1.359** 
(2.20) 
1.622*** 
(3.33) 
-1.029* 
(1.75) 
1.383** 
(2.72) 
1.843** 
(2.18) 
1.830** 
(2.60) 
ODA 0.536*** 
(6.10) 
0.681*** 
(3.83) 
-0.591*** 
(3.63) 
-0.072 
(0.29) 
-0.641*** 
(3.88) 
-0.090 
(0.36) 
-0.280* 
(1.63) 
0.186 
(0.54) 
DEFNS  0.035 
(0.17) 
 -0.042 
(0.15) 
 -0.132 
(0.43) 
 0.428 
(1.06) 
TXRV 0.625*** 
(5.67) 
0.658*** 
(4.31) 
0.581*** 
(2.98) 
0.812*** 
(3.71) 
0.583*** 
(3.08) 
0.842*** 
(3.63) 
0.449* 
(1.69) 
0.518* 
(1.71) 
INFL 0.029 
(0.61) 
-0.210 
(0.40) 
-0.140* 
(1.73) 
-0.149* 
(1.89) 
-0.115 
(1.42) 
-0.149* 
(1.84) 
-0.251** 
(2.33) 
-0.203* 
(1.87) 
GBDEF  -0.002 
(0.09) 
 0.047* 
(1.80) 
 0.038 
(1.39) 
 0.064* 
(1.80) 
TREND   0.039* 
(1.80) 
 0.047** 
(2.08) 
   
ECMt-1  -1.106*** 
(4.19 
 -1.009*** 
(4.12) 
 -1.010*** 
(4.03) 
 -0.779*** 
(2.95) 
CONS. 0.874 
(0.92) 
-0.014 
(0.43) 
-3.963* 
(1.71) 
-0.008 
(0.17) 
-3.237 
(1.44) 
-0.005 
(0.10) 
-6.508* 
(1.90) 
-0.003 
(0.04) 
N 25 24 25 24 25 24 25 24 
F-value 50.21*** 16.37*** 33.99*** 11.20*** 32.45*** 11.00 26.60*** 5.09*** 
R2Adj. 0.9111 0.8425 0.8919 0.7801 0.8872 0.7767 0.8421 0.5871 
 
Notes: CAPt-1: is the natural logarithm of the share of the respective capital expenditure in GDP lagged 
one period; GBDEF: the change in public budget deficit; ODA: Natural logarithm of the share of official development 
aid in GDP; EXD: Natural logarithm of the share of external debt in GDP; TRADE: is the share of trade volume 
(percentage of import plus export) in GDP; TXRV: is the natural logarithm of the share of tax revenue in GDP; 
DEFNS: is the natural logarithm of the share of defense expenditure in GDP; URBN: is the natural logarithm of 
urbanization (% of the urban population to the total population); INFL: is the natural logarithm of inflation rate; 
PCGDP: is the natural logarithm of real per capita GDP; TREND: is the time trend variable; ECMt-1 is the residual of 
the regression of co-integrated variables lagged one period. 
 
Figures in Parentheses are absolute t-values, *** = significant at 1% level, ** = significant at 5% level and * = 
significant at 10% level  
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Table 5.11: Short- and Long-run Elasticities of Public Spending with Respect to Tax 
Revenue 
 
Physical Infrastructure Education Health Country 
Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run Short-run Long-run 
Tanzania 0.297 0.931 0.425 0.968 0.368 0.989 
Kenya 0.171 0.834 0.256 0.973 0.115 0.789 
Uganda 0.737 1.007 0.480 0.972 0.419 0.991 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
This dissertation has explored the short-run and long-run fiscal consequences of 
economic reforms on government revenue and public investment spending in Tanzania, Kenya 
and Uganda. It has questioned the applicability of cross-country regressions, and static empirical 
studies on fiscal impacts of trade liberalization suggesting that these cannot be extrapolated to 
individual developing countries for policy prescriptions.  
The dissertation argues that countries’ heterogeneity in terms of their macroeconomic 
conditions, economic structure, level of development and institutional frameworks matters, and 
need not be neglected. Most previous empirical studies on the fiscal impact of trade liberalization 
have ignored the short-run and long-run dynamic effects of trade reforms, hence failing to capture 
the full range of the potential revenue and public investment spending consequences. This is 
because the effects of economic reforms can take a long time to materialize. The empirical 
analyses of the three country case studies presented in this dissertation confirm this. The impact 
of economic reforms on government revenue, tax performance and public investment spending is 
not the same in the three countries. This is partly due to the fact that Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda 
differ significantly in their economic structure, level of development, macroeconomic 
environment, institutional framework, and fiscal structure and policies.  
This dissertation has contributed to the literature on the fiscal impact of trade 
liberalization by resolving some of these issues by applying the co-integration and error-
correction modeling framework to analyze the revenue and public investment spending 
consequences of economic reforms in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, using time-series data over 
the period 1970-2005. The strength of this approach lies in the fact that it is able to distinguish 
between short-run and long-run dynamic effects. These have important implications for revenue 
and expenditure forecasting and fiscal and macroeconomic policy formulation.  
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This chapter summarizes the findings of the three empirical analyses undertaken in this 
dissertation on the fiscal impact of economic reforms in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. The 
chapter also provides some policy suggestions that have emerged from the three empirical 
analyses. 
6.1 Summary of Findings 
This dissertation has set out to provide an understanding of whether economic reforms, 
particularly trade liberalization, have had adverse impacts on government revenue mobilization, 
tax performance and public investment spending in East Africa, with particular emphasis on 
Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. Although it is not possible to draw conclusive generalizations on 
the fiscal impact of economic reforms, there are nevertheless important conclusions that merit 
summarizing.     
6.1.1 Impact on Government Revenues 
Chapter Three attempted to analyze the effects of trade reforms on government revenue 
mobilization in the three East African countries. The major findings are: 
 Surprisingly, despite the declining trends of the share of government revenue in GDP in 
Tanzania, econometric results demonstrate that trade reforms had a positive impact on 
government revenue. In the case of Uganda, while government revenues exhibited an 
increasing trend, the econometric results suggest a negative impact of trade reform on 
government revenue.  The results are inclusive in the case of Kenya.  
 This suggests that the declining trend of the share of government revenue in GDP in Tanzania 
was associated with the weaknesses and inefficiencies in tax administration and tax 
collections and existence of tax revenue leakages due to tax evasion, tax avoidance, tax 
exemptions and embezzlement of the collected taxes in the tax system.  
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 Kenya has been successful at establishing a relatively more efficient, less distortionary and 
buoyant domestic tax system. It raises significant revenue from VAT and income taxes 
compared to Tanzania and Uganda. This contributes to Kenya’s higher levels of government 
revenue and tax revenue and its components (particularly domestic taxes-sales and excise tax 
and income tax) in GDP. Partly, this can be attributed to the fact that Kenya has relatively a 
well-developed manufacturing sector, and a larger share of the service sector in GDP, since 
these are easy-to-tax sectors as compared to the underdeveloped manufacturing sector and 
higher share of the agricultural sector in Tanzania and Uganda.  
 All the three East African countries have switched from international trade taxes to domestic 
tax sources (sales and excise and income taxes) as major sources of government revenue, as 
evidenced by the declining trend of the share of trade taxes in GDP and tax revenue. This is a 
result of reduced their tariff rates following trade and liberalization. However, the share of 
international trade tax in GDP remains higher in Uganda than in Tanzania and Kenya.  
 Tax revenue leakages and weaknesses and inefficiencies in tax administration and tax 
collection remain major challenges limiting the realization of the full potential of revenue 
mobilization in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda.    
6.1.2 Impact on Tax Performance 
Chapter Four set out to empirically explore the responses of the tax systems to changes in 
trade policies implemented in the three East African countries. The following findings merit 
highlighting: 
 Tax reforms implemented in the three countries have contributed to the improvement in tax 
performance in these countries. However, the responsiveness of Tanzania’s tax system has 
been relatively sluggish as compared to its neighbors Kenya and Uganda.  
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 The results suggest that the declining trends of the ratios of government revenue and tax to 
GDP in Tanzania described in Chapter Three was partly due to weaknesses and inefficiencies 
in tax administration and tax collection, and tax revenue leakages as a result of tax evasion, 
tax exemptions and embezzlement of collected taxes.  
 Uganda’s impressive tax performance described in this chapter can be contrasted with its 
lower levels of the share of government and tax revenue described in Chapter Three. This 
anomaly is an indication of the existence of tax leakages, partly, due tax evasion, tax 
exemption and embezzlement of collected taxes, which go unrecorded in official government 
reports. 
 The findings of this chapter confirm and extend the results presented in Chapter Three that 
despite committing to tax reforms, there are still structural and institutional problems that 
limit tax revenue generation in the three countries. That is, weaknesses and inefficiencies in 
tax administration, weak tax laws and legal enforcements, widespread legal and illegal tax 
exemptions, tax evasion and embezzlement of collected taxes remain major challenges 
limiting revenue generation in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. These problems need urgent 
attention in order to boost revenue generation in these countries.  
6.1.3 Impact on Public Investment Spending 
Chapter Five was an attempt to investigate whether trade openness, notably through its 
effects on government revenue had an impact on public investment spending in the three East 
African countries. Some pertinent findings from Chapter Five are: 
 Inadequate and erratic revenue generation has adversely affected public investment spending 
in the three East African countries. This is particularly evident Tanzania, where the declining 
trends in government and tax revenue have been accompanied with the declining public 
investment in almost all spending categories. 
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 Where government revenue declined and revenue generation was inadequate, public 
investment spending in physical infrastructure declined. This again is particularly visible in 
Tanzania. Where government revenue increased and tax revenue performance has been more 
impressive, public investment spending rose, as in Uganda.  
 The findings are consistent with the theoretical and empirical literature that in periods of 
restrictive fiscal policies and fiscal consolidation, public investment in physical infrastructure 
often suffers the most from government expenditure compression. 
 ODA had statistically significant negative impacts on health spending in Kenya, and negative 
impact on overall human capital investment in Uganda. This suggests that there have been 
misallocations of foreign aid funds in Kenya and Uganda. 
 Heterogeneity in sectoral spending priorities has significantly changed in the three countries. 
Spending on defense has been reduced; however, it has remained relatively higher in Uganda 
than in Tanzania and Kenya. The priority sectors that have been receiving higher shares of 
government expenditures are general public services, human capital development, and 
physical infrastructure in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, respectively. 
 Spending in human capital development has been relatively low in Tanzania compared to that 
in Kenya and Uganda. This creates some concerns on commitments of the Tanzanian 
government to achieving the MDG objectives, reducing poverty and overall economic 
development.  
 There are clear indications from the results that the three countries allocate high proportions 
of their resources on unproductive sectors (e.g. defense and general public services), which 
limit the availability of resources for productive sectors (physical infrastructure and human 
capital development-education and health). 
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6.2 Policy Implications and Further Research Work 
The findings emanating from this dissertation have potential policy relevance for the 
design and formulation of sound fiscal and macroeconomic policies for enhancing revenue 
mobilization and generation as well as for achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
and Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSPs) objectives. Some of the policy suggestions that can be 
drawn from the findings of the three empirical studies are as follows: 
It is evident from the findings of the empirical studies in Chapters Three and Four that 
low levels of government revenue, sluggish tax performance and erratic revenue generation in the 
three countries partly has been due to weaknesses and inefficiencies in tax administration; and tax 
revenue leakages as a result of pervasive tax exemption, tax evasion, tax avoidance and 
embezzlement of collected taxes. In Uganda, trade reforms appear to have exacerbated these 
problems. Therefore, the three countries have the potential for mobilizing and generating more 
revenue if they can address these structural and institutional weaknesses in their tax systems.  
Computerization of tax administration and collection; expansion of the tax base by 
bringing more taxpayers in the tax bracket; addressing problems associated with tax revenue 
leakages such as abolishing unnecessary tax exemptions and strengthening of tax collection by 
preventing tax evasion and avoidance, instituting strong legal enforcements in order to punish 
those engaging in tax evasion, embezzlement of collected taxes and corruption should be at the 
fore in the ongoing tax reforms in the three countries so as to enhance tax revenue collection.  
These countries should also focus at providing incentives for the development of the 
manufacturing sector and commercialization of the agricultural sector, as means for the 
monetization and raising income and sales and excise taxes as well as trade taxes. Tanzania and 
Uganda should learn from Kenya’s success story for designing a more non-distortionary domestic 
tax structure.  
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In order to achieve MDG and PRSP objectives and overall economic development, 
reprioritization of public expenditures should be at the fore in the planning and management of 
the public budget in the three countries. This should also be accompanied with more effective and 
efficient utilization of available meager resources. The focus should be changing the composition 
of government expenditure by allocating more resources into productive sectors-that is, 
increasing spending on physical and human capital development, and reducing spending in 
unproductive sectors such as defense and general public services. Spending on physical 
infrastructure and human capital development has long-run impacts on poverty reduction and 
economic development.  
No one study can be exhaustive, and this is also true for the empirical studies presented in 
this dissertation. Several questions and issues have been left unanswered, and these merit further 
exploration. How can the three countries raise sufficient resources to meet their budget 
requirements? What are the full implications of inadequate and declining public expenditures for 
human development outcomes? Future work on these questions could contribute further to this 
literature. 
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